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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Following the January 2011 Revolution, 
Tunisia entered a phase of political and economic 
transition.  While the country achieved a successful 
transition with the adoption of a new Constitution on 
27 January 2014 and the organization of general 
elections, the economy is struggling to return to the 
high growth rates of the pre-2010 period. In addition 
to the security aspect, the need to meet the strong 
social demands expressed during the Revolution has 
created significant macro-fiscal imbalances that the 
authorities are experiencing difficulty in   reducing. 
The low average growth rates posted since 2011 
(1.71% over the 2011-2015 period compared to 
3.6% over the 2008-2010 period) have mainly been 
due to delays in implementing structural reforms 
aimed at adjusting Tunisia’s economic development 
model in force since 1972.  From 2011 to 2016, the 
Bank has provided Tunisia with support in the form 
of two (2) interim strategies (2012-2013 and 2014-
2016), whose objective was to support the transition 
period by financing operations aimed at reducing 
regional disparities, fighting inequality and 
supporting the implementation of structural and 
governance reforms.  It was also necessary to give 
the authorities the necessary time to allow them to 
prepare their medium-term strategy. In this regard, 
the Bank financed a major capacity building 
programme, including the provision of technical 
assistance and the conduct of strategic studies aimed 
at assisting decision-making by the authorities.  
 
2. Reverting to the principle of five-year plans 
developed up to 2010, the new Government in 2015 
initiated the preparation of a 2016-2020 Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) 2016-2020 aimed at 
returning Tunisia to a sustainable growth trajectory 
in line with its historical long-term average of 5% by 
2020 (see Annex 4).  
 
3. The broad lines as well as the main focus 
areas of the SDP were presented in a Guidance Note 
published in September 2016, which served as the 
basis for the preparation of the Bank’s new Country 
Strategy Paper (DSP) for the 2017-2021 period.  
 
In compliance with the strategic directions of the 
Bank’s 2013-2022 Long-Term Strategy, its high five 
priorities (High 5s) as well as the recently approved 
sector and thematic strategies such as the 2016-2025 
New Deal for Energy in Africa 2016-25, the 2016-
2025 Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy, the Bank 
Group’s Industrialization Strategy for Africa and the 
Agricultural Transformation Strategy for Africa, 
2016-2025, the goal of this new CSP is to support 
Tunisia in implementing its SDP through two (2) 
pillars: (i) Industrialization and value chains 
development; and (ii) Improvement of the quality of 
life for the people of the priority regions. This CSP 
has been particularly enriched by the lessons learned 
from the evaluation of Bank assistance to Tunisia 
over the 2004-2014 period as well as those of the two 
interim strategies (2012-2013 and 2014-2016). 
 
4. The main expected outcomes of  the 2017-
2021 CSP will be for the first Pillar: (i) improvement 
of the overall competitiveness and productivity of 
Tunisian industry through a global action aimed at 
reducing factor costs (labour, energy, water and 
telecommunications) and logistic costs, a significant 
improvement of the business climate and an increase 
in public and private investments. The Bank will also 
strive to achieve a qualitative improvement in the 
supply of labour provided by the Tunisian education 
system by more closely matching demand from 
businesses with the education system’s training 
supply. Furthermore, it will take actions to increase 
the integration rate for young people without school-
leaving qualifications into professional life.  
 
5. The expected outcomes of the second Pillar 
will mainly consist in improving the quality of 
service provided by government services and local 
government, and facilitating access to public services 
in compliance with the highest existing standards of 
quality for the population of the priority regions as 
well as increasing the growth, income and 
employment of the population of the sixteen (16) 
priority governorates according to the Regional 
Development Index (RDI).  
 
 vi 
 
6. This change will be obtained through a 
holistic regional economic development strategy 
based on increased exploitation of local value chains, 
development of the rural economy, improved access 
to markets, and promotion of targeted 
entrepreneurship that prioritizes women and young 
people.  
 
7. Furthermore, with respect to the green 
economy, the 2017-2021 CSP will contribute to 
efforts to diversify energy using renewable resources 
and improving energy efficiency. In the area of 
environmental enhancement, the CSP will undertake 
sanitation and waste management actions, harness 
non-conventional water resources and disseminate 
irrigation techniques that will help to save water in a 
bid to ease water stress. 
 
8. The main risks that could partly or fully 
compromise the expected outcomes are of a security, 
political, and macroeconomic nature. The CSP has 
provided for a series of activities aimed at 
minimizing these risks especially in the context of the 
initiation of very high-level dialogue with the 
Tunisian Government.          
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Following the January 2011 Revolution, 
Tunisia entered a four-year transitional period.  
On the political front, this period was mainly 
dominated by the preparation of a new 
Constitution, which led to the organization of 
legislative and presidential elections in late 2014, 
and the formation of a government in February 
2015.  On the economic front, since 2011, Tunisia 
has been faced with a deterioration of its public 
finances due to the volume of recurrent 
expenditure in the budget, particularly salaries, 
and difficulties in boosting and implementing the 
structural reforms that would allow the country to 
return to sustainable, inclusive growth by laying 
the foundations of a new economic and social 
development model.  The transitional period was 
also marked by the absence of a medium-term 
economic strategy to succeed the five-year plans 
which, since the 1960s, had been the main 
political economic and social tool for Tunisia’s 
development.   
 
1.2 During the transitional period, and 
pending clarification of the political situation and 
finalization of a medium-term development 
strategy, the Bank has supported Tunisia through 
two interim strategies (2012-2013 and 2014-
2016). The main objective of these two strategies 
was to support the Tunisian Government’s efforts 
to revive growth, implement the necessary 
structural reforms for economic recovery and 
reduce the regional disparities that had sharply 
increased over the past two decades.  Aware of the 
need to steer the country in a new direction in 
terms of economic and social development, the 
new government appointed in February 2015 
following the general elections in late 2014 set the 
priority of establishing a development strategy 
over the 2016-2019 period called the Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP).   
 
1.3 The Bank has decided to support the 
SDP’s implementation with a new 2017-2021 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Tunisia as part 
of the operationalisation of its ten-year vision on 
Africa’s structural transformation process and as a 
strategic framework for rolling out the Bank’s 
High-5s in Tunisia. 
 
1.4 This report is organized in four (4) 
Chapters. Chapter I serves as the Introduction. 
Chapter II gives an overview of the country 
context from the political, economic and social 
standpoints. It also describes the country’s 
medium-term strategy (SDP) and reviews the 
challenges and opportunities facing Tunisia over 
the next five (5) years. It then describes the Bank’s 
positioning in the country and analyses Tunisia’s 
performance in aid coordination and 
harmonization. Chapter III presents the main 
pillars and thrusts of the Bank’s strategy for the 
2017-2021 period as well as the risks related to 
implementing the strategy, and proposes 
mitigation measures. Chapter IV presents the 
conclusions and recommendations.  
 
II. COUNTRY CONTEXT AND 
PROSPECTS 
 
2.1 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL CONTEXT AND 
CROSSCUTTING THEMES 
 
A. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1.1 In the wake of the “Arab Spring”, Tunisia 
made a successful political transition by 
establishing democratically elected institutions.  
Despite a difficult gestation period marked by an 
initial bottleneck relating to the content of the 
Constitution and formation of a Government of 
technocrats from January to June 2014, the 
adoption of the new Constitution by the National 
Constituent Assembly (ANC) led to the 
organization of legislative and presidential 
elections in the fourth quarter of 2014. A new 
assembly, the Assembly of the Representatives of 
the People (ARP), a single chamber Parliament, 
was elected in late October 2014.  
 
2.1.2 The legislative elections were won by the 
Nidaa Tounes party with 86 out of the 217 seats, 
followed by the Ennadha Islamist party in second 
position with 69 seats.  The former Prime Minister 
during the transition period, Mr. Beji Caid 
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Essebsi, won the presidential elections and 
designated an independent senior civil servant, 
Mr. Habib Essid, to form the first government of 
the Second Republic. The maintenance of optimal 
security nationwide, the recovery of the economy 
and the reduction of unemployment as well as the 
preparation of a medium-term economic 
development strategy were the main elements of 
the new Government’s roadmap.  However, the 
new Government did not enjoy any grace period 
 
2.1.3 The year 2015 and early 2016 were 
marked by a resurgence of social conflicts against 
a backdrop of rising wage claims in the civil 
service and private sector, and the deterioration of 
the security conditions.  In particular, three (3) 
terrorist attacks1 called into question the directions 
of the existing security policy and interrupted the 
recovery of the tourism sector, which had been 
seriously affected during the post-Revolution 
period and by the outbreak of war in Libya2 but 
had recovered since 2012. The worsening of the 
economic and social situation and the absence of 
any economic recovery hastened the fall of the 
Essid government on 30 July 2016. The President 
of the Republic asked Mr. Youssef Chahed, 
former Minister of Local Affairs, to form a 
National Unity Government (NUG). The new 
Government, mainly comprising specialists from 
civil society, won the ARP’s vote of confidence 
on 26 August 2016 and took office on 30 
September 2016.    
 
B. ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
    Growth 
 
2.1.4 Despite a successful transition and some 
degree of resilience, Tunisia is experiencing 
difficulties in returning to its pre-Revolution 
growth rate. Since 2011, the average growth rate 
has remained below its potential long-term level 
estimated at around 5%. The average growth rate 
over the 2011-2016 period was 1.47% compared 
                                                          
1 The first attack was on the Bardo Museum in Tunis on 18 March 2015. 
The Sousse attack on a hotel occurred on 26 June 2015. The third attack 
was on the Presidential Guard on 27 November 2015.  
   
2  Before the 2011 Revolution, the tourism sector contributed about 7% to 
GDP, employed 400,000 people full time and part time, and was a major 
foreign exchange earner. 
to 3.6% over the 2008-2010 period. With growth 
rates of 1.1%3 in 2015 and 1% in 2016 compared 
to 3% and 2.6% in the 2015 and 2016 Budget 
Laws, the Tunisian economy has now entered a 
cycle of negative growth and stagnation. Tunisia 
has in fact produced less wealth per capita since 
2011. The GDP per capita growth rate - which is 
also a general indicator of productivity - has fallen 
since 2000 from 3.3% to - 0.8% in 2015 (see 
Figure 1). According to the World Bank’s 
classification, since August 2016, Tunisia has 
become a lower middle income country (MIC). 
 
 
 
2.1.5 The Tunisian economy’s current 
difficulties are linked to several cyclical and 
structural factors. In the case of the cyclical 
factors, the growth slowdown in the Euro zone – 
Tunisia’s main client - in the wake of the 2009 
financial crisis and the Greek debt crisis, the 
deterioration of the security situation linked to the 
Libyan conflict, a tense social climate that blocked 
production in 2015 in the mining (phosphate) and 
hydrocarbon (oil and gas) sectors, and a non-
incentive business climate seriously affected 
growth and investment. The investment rate, 
which was 24.6% in 2010, dropped to 19.5% of 
GDP in 2016. While the Tunisian economy 
remains dominated by services that represented 
61.5% of GDP at end -2014, their contribution to 
GDP has increased compared to 2010 (59.8%). 
3    The initial growth figure for 2015 (0.8%) was revised in January 
2016 to 1.1% by the National Institute of Statistics (INS) as a 
result of higher than expected agricultural GDP growth.  
  
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 1: Trend of GDP Growth and 
GDP per Capita Growth (%) (Source: 
AfDB, INS, 2016)
GDP Growth (%) GDP Per Capita Growth (%)
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This increase is mainly due to services provided to 
government departments whose contribution to 
GDP rose from 7.9% in 2010 to 9.3% in early 
2015. At the same time, the contribution of 
industry to GDP began to decline. Manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing industries, which 
represented 32% of national wealth in 2010, only 
accounted for 28.8% at end-2015 (see Annex 2). 
In this context, it is worth noting that the 
contribution of the agriculture and fisheries sector 
to GDP rose from 8.2% to 9.7%.  Fuelled by the 
increase in public sector employment and wage 
increases, public and private sector consumption 
has now become the key driver of the Tunisian 
economy’s growth and one of the main sources of 
tax revenue. From a structural standpoint, Tunisia 
is experiencing considerable difficulty in 
reforming its economic and social model (see Box 
1). This model has been unable to address the 
country’s three main challenges for the future, 
namely: (i) the resumption of strong growth; (ii) 
the reduction of inequalities and disparities; and 
(iii) job creation.  
 
Box 1: The complexity of the political economy of 
reforms in Tunisia since the Revolution 
 
The difficulties concerning the progress of reforms are 
attributable to existing political divergences concerning 
the direction to give Tunisia’s new economic and social 
model, and strong opposition from unions and part of civil 
society to attempts to call into question benefits acquired 
over three decades under an essentially State-run 
economic system. The main reforms considered urgent 
and a high priority are: (i) reform of the banking and 
financial sector; (ii) reform of the social protection and 
compensation system (subsidy system for energy and 
staple products); (iii) reform of the tax system, including 
local taxation; (iv) reform of the State and civil service; (v) 
reform of public enterprises; and (vi) reform of the labour 
market since it has been identified as one of the two (2) 
main constraints on growth (along with improvement of 
the rule of law) by the Tunisia Growth Diagnostic 
conducted by the Bank in 2012. However, there was 
symbolic but encouraging progress in 2015 in some 
strategic areas. Following audits of three public banks 
(Société Tunisienne de Banque – STB; Banque de 
l’Habitat – BH; and Banque Nationale Agricole - BNA), 
the central government initiated a TND 1.2 billion public 
banking sector recapitalization operation. These actions 
will be complemented by the adoption of a new law on the 
regulation of the banking sector in 2017. Another decisive 
                                                          
4  Excluding public enterprises and institutions.   
 
 
step was taken concerning investment financing in 
Tunisia with the ARP’s adoption of the Law on Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) on 13 November 2015. The 
new government headed by Youssef Chahed which took 
office on 30 August 2016 plans to accelerate the pace of 
reform approvals. Following a long gestation period, the 
Investment Code was approved by the ARP before the 
National Conference to be held on 29 and 30 November 
2016 and entered in force on 29 March 2017. Finally, 
considered as the overarching piece of the Government to 
boost the economy, the Strategic Development Plan 
(SDP) 2016-2020 was approved by the ARP on 12 
February 2017. These steps aimed at improving the 
institutional environment should be intensified in order for 
Tunisia to generate a sustained and high-level growth.   
 
 Macroeconomic Management  
 
2.1.6 Since 2011, Tunisia’s economic situation 
has deteriorated.  It is now characterized by a twin 
deficit situation – fiscal and current account deficits 
(see Figure 2).   
 
 
 
2.1.7 The six (6) Budget Laws enacted by 
Parliament since 2011 were imbalanced, generated 
fiscal deficits and widened the economy’s annual 
financing gap. The persisting public finance 
imbalance is mainly due to the size of the wage bill 
in recurrent expenditure that has almost doubled 
since 2010. Thus, the civil service wage bill4 
represented TND 13 billion in the 2016 Budget 
Law, i.e. 44.6% of the total budget compared to 
38% in 2010. The rising wage bill is due mainly to 
the continuing policy of civil service recruitments 
-10
-5
0
5
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 2: Trend of Budget and Current 
Account Balances (% GDP) (Source: INS, 
2016)
Budget Balance (% GDP)
Current Account Balance (% GDP)
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since 20115 under public pressure to control youth 
unemployment as well as successive salary 
increases given by the different governments since 
2011 under trade union pressure to maintain social 
peace. However, while the number of civil servants 
has risen by 15% since 2010, the productivity of the 
administration and public services has declined 
over the same period since government services 
continue to suffer seriously from absenteeism6. To 
the high wage bill must be added the high 
proportion of transfer expenditure, especially in 
relation to the compensation system that combines 
subsidies to energy, transport and staple products, 
which, in 2016, accounted for 8.7% of the   
budget7. 
 
2.18 In the absence of any significant increase 
in tax revenue and additional fiscal space, the 
increase in operating expenditure is at the expense 
of investment, which often acts as an adjustment 
variable in the preparation of Supplementary 
Budget Laws (SBL). To correct this distortion, the 
second International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
programme aims to bring down the civil service 
wage bill from 14.6% in 2015 to 11.8% of GDP by 
2019 through civil service reform.8 On the external 
front, the recovery policy based mainly on 
consumption, considerably widened the current 
account deficit. 
 
2.1.9 Current deficit represented 4.7% of GDP 
in 2010 and increased by about 85% over five years 
to 8.9% of GDP in 2016. This increase was largely 
due to the widening trade deficit for goods and 
services, and in particular that of the energy balance 
(deficit of TND 2.7 Bil. representing 22% of the 
total trade deficit). Lastly, the decline of the 
tourism sector linked to the 2015 attacks – which 
implies lower foreign exchange earnings - 
                                                          
5  The number of civil servants was reported to have risen from 580,000 in 
2011 to 650,000 in 2015. However, these are estimates since no annual 
report on the central government’s situation is produced in Tunisia. If the 
personnel of public enterprises estimated at 200,000 is added, Tunisia now 
has 850,000 public sector employees.   
 
6  According to the Ministry of Civil Service, Administrative Reform and 
Governance, the rate of absenteeism in the Tunisian civil service and 
public enterprises according to data from a survey carried out by the 
General Control of Public Departments (CGSP) in 2016 represented 2.7 
million work hours, at a cost estimated at TND 600 million, i.e. 2% of the 
budget.        
 
7      It is, however, worth noting that the cost of the compensation 
system for the General Government Budget has been halved 
represents another constraint on the current 
account balance and balance of payments (see 
Figure 5). However, Tunisia has displayed some 
resilience since foreign exchange reserves 
remained stable in 2015 in relation to the 2014 
level of around 113 days of imports9.  
 
 Monetary Policy, Inflation and Exchange 
Rate 
 
2.1.10 Since 2011, the Central Bank of Tunisia 
(BCT) has pursued an accommodative monetary 
policy aimed at supporting the economy by 
providing the banking system with the necessary 
liquidity, while attempting to control inflation. In 
this regard, BCT carried out flexible management 
of its main rate – the Money Market Rate (MMR) 
- which averaged 4.50% in 2010, 3.5% in 2012, 
4% in 2013 and 4.3% in November 2015.  
Inflation rose sharply from 3.5% in 2009 to 5.8% 
in 2013 before sliding back to 4.9% in 2015 then 
to 3.7% in 2016, especially as a result of the falling 
oil bill. However, this inflation led to a drop in the 
purchasing power of households, thus making it 
difficult to adjust the compensation programme 
and introduce a moratorium on salary increases. 
The deterioration of the economic fundamentals 
combined to a high current account deficit and 
continuing pressure on foreign exchange reserves 
has contributed to a rapid depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate of the Dinar against the 
Euro and the US dollar.   
 
2.1.11  Therefore, the nominal value of the 
dinar has depreciated on average by about 38.5% 
since 2010.  This strategy has also allowed Tunisia 
to maintain competitive prices for its exports. At 
the same time, the continuing depreciation of the 
compared to 2013 when it represented 15.7% of the Budget 
following a significant drop in oil prices. 
  
8  The IMF has intervened in Tunisia since June 2013. The first programme 
approved on 7 June 2013 amounting to USD 1.73 billion dollars produced 
mixed results and did not really help to stabilize the economy. A second 
programme of USD 2.8 billion over four years was approved on 20 May 
2016.   The programme has experienced difficulties due to the lack of 
progress in implementing reforms.  Only one tranche has been disbursed 
since approval in May 2016 
 
9  Foreign exchange reserves were maintained mainly through a USD 1 
billion bond issue on the international financial market in early 2015 but 
also to the issue of a 850 Million Eurobond in February 2017. 
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Dinar since 2011 has also contributed to higher 
import prices and weakened the current account 
balance. Insofar as the proportion of external debt 
in Tunisia’s total debt has increased considerably 
since 2011 and, as at 31 August 2016, represented 
70% of public debt, strategic trade-offs could be 
required in time, implying the need to arrive at an 
exchange rate that would make it possible to 
balance all these variables. 
 
 Public Debt 
 
2.1.12  A natural upshot of the series of high 
primary deficits since 2011 has been a significant 
increase in Tunisia’s public debt. In 2016, 
outstanding public debt had reached 63% of GDP, 
compared to 39.7% in 2010. Since 2010, 
Tunisia’s debt ratio has increased by about 55% 
i.e. an average annual rate of about 8% 
considerably higher than the average growth rate 
of the economy (1.47%).  
 
 
 
2.1.13  However, the debt service to exports 
ratio remained fairly stable over the 2014-2016 
period at around 13.5%. Currently, Tunisia’s 
public debt is deemed sustainable as it is mainly 
based on: (i) relatively long maturities averaging 
ten (10) years; and (ii) a falling weighted average 
interest rate since 2011 with the exception of the 
domestic debt rate that is twice that of the external 
debt rate. However, the important share of 
external debt in the composition of public debt 
implies that the latter could be exposed to cyclical 
                                                          
10  The Heritage Foundation (HF) awarded Tunisia score of 30/100 in 2015 
for financial independence and ranked it 131st in the world (out of 188 
countries considered). 
shocks as well as exchange rate fluctuations and 
growth-related uncertainties.  
 
 Financial Sector 
 
2.1.14 The January 2011 Revolution exposed 
structural difficulties in the highly fragmented 
Tunisian banking sector dominated by public 
banks. The fragility of the Tunisian banking sector 
is, above all, the result of inappropriate 
governance, the importance of central 
government in the sector and poor risk 
management that has resulted in an increase in 
bad debts over the past two decades,10 especially 
in the tourism sector. The tourism sector debt 
stood at TND 4 billion in June 2016. Aware of the 
existence of a potential systemic risk to the real 
economy, the Tunisian Authorities in 2011 
resolved to embark upon the necessary reforms to 
restructure the financial sector. Audits were 
performed on three public banks – Société 
Tunisienne de Banque (STB), Banque de 
l’Habitat (BH) and Banque Nationale Agricole 
(BNA). These three banks were recapitalized to 
the tune of TND 1.2 billion in 2015.  
 
2.1.15 The measures taken resulted in the 
reduction of bad debts from 24.2% in 2011 to 
16% in 2015, but this ratio remains high 
compared to the ratios recorded in other countries 
in the region. However, considerable efforts have 
been made in terms of provisioning, with an 
increase in the provisioning ratio to 56.6% in 2015 
compared to 47.5% in 2012. The average bank 
solvency ratio was 9.5% as at 30 March 2015, i.e. 
below the regulatory rate of 10%11. Further efforts 
are required to improve the profitability of the 
sector in service to the economy and to enhance 
its overall governance. The Law on the Banking 
Sector in the pipeline since 2013, which is 
expected to be approved in 2017, should 
strengthen the sector.  
 
 
 
 
11  This ratio was 12.5% for public banks and only 3.5% for public banks. 
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2.1.16 For its part, the Tunisian non-banking 
sector is barely developed. The capital and fixed 
income securities markets are still quite timid and 
market capitalization is about 24% of GDP 
compared to 76% in Morocco (see Annex 9). 
 
 Governance 
   
2.1.17 Since 2011, Tunisia has made 
undeniable progress in terms of political and 
institutional governance, especially with the 
promulgation of a new Constitution in January 
2014 that enshrines the country’s progress in the 
areas of democracy and transparency through the 
opening up and development of Tunisian society, 
and advancement in terms of the right to 
information, to mention but a few. Tunisia is 
ranked 8th out of 52 countries in the 2015 Ibrahim 
Index of Governance in Africa with steadily rising 
scores since 2010, particularly with regard to rule 
of law and accountability.  
 
2.1.18 The September 2015 Open Budget 
Survey shows that the country has also made 
strides in terms of fiscal transparency compared to 
the previous survey in 2012. Its score virtually 
quadrupled from 11/100 to 42/100.  Tunisia has 
embarked upon a vast programme of PFM 
reforms integrated into the new Organic Budget 
Law tabled before Parliament in November 2015 
and awaiting adoption. This will eventually 
provide the legal basis for implementing budget 
management by objectives (MBO), medium-term 
programming of budget envelopes, introduction 
of accounting on a double entry or full accruals 
basis that will converge towards international 
accounting standards, and certification of central 
government’s annual financial statements by the 
Court of Auditors. 
 
2.1.19 In addition, Tunisia has since 2013 
initiated the implementation of a public 
procurement reform action plan following the 
adoption of the public procurement evaluation 
system in August 2012.  Implementation of the 
first measures of this ongoing plan have clearly 
resulted in progress mainly through: (i) the 
adoption of a new Decree on public procurement 
in 2014, which is more transparent and compliant 
with international standards; (ii) the establishment 
of an e-platform for the dematerialization of 
public procurement and electronic bid submission 
- TUNEPS (2014); (iii) the initiation of 
professionalization of procurement personnel 
following the 2013 establishment of the public 
procurement control body by Decree. The 2016 
adoption of Decree 2016-498 determining the 
conditions and procedures for debarment from 
participation in public contracts, which paves the 
way for the effective enforcement of penalties on 
bidders involved in prohibited practices.  Several 
other actions contained in this action plan still 
have to be implemented.   
 
2.1.20 The Bank will assist Tunisia in 
implementing these procurement and public 
finance reforms in accordance with its fiduciary 
strategy presented in Annex 15. A PEFA 
conducted in 2015-2016 with assistance from 
AfDB, the EU and the World Bank is being 
validated and will also help to guide future 
reforms to be implemented. However, further 
efforts are required in combatting corruption, 
which has intensified considerably since 2011 
according to the conclusions of the National 
Integrity System (NIS) published in 2015, 
especially in the area of public procurement. 
Tunisia is now ranked 76th out of 168 countries in 
the 2015 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). 
 
 Competitiveness 
 
2.1.21 The recent delays in implementing 
structural reforms and deterioration in the security 
and social context have affected Tunisia’s 
competitiveness. Over the past two decades, the 
country’s competitiveness was due to its 
geographic proximity to Europe, low wage costs 
and highly favourable fiscal and non-fiscal 
incentives. The increase in social demands and 
successive wage increases since 2011 have 
reduced Tunisia’s historical comparative 
advantage. As a result, the country has slipped 
back several positions in the international 
classifications since 2011, especially in Doing 
Business, where Tunisia was classified 74th out of 
189 countries in 2015 compared to 45th in 2011.  
Tunisia has also lost ground in the 2015 Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the World 
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Economic Forum (WEF), from 87th position in 
2014 to 92nd in 2015 out of 140 countries. The 
WEF classification ranks Tunisia 133rd for labour 
market efficiency and 122nd for financial sector 
development.  
 
2.1.22 The four main constraints affecting the 
business climate identified by the WEF concern: 
(i) the inefficiency of public administration; (ii) 
political instability; and (iii) corruption. With 
regard to the last point, the most recent 
Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (2014) ranks Tunisia 79th out of 
175, which is slightly below the previous year’s 
ranking. 
 
C. SOCIAL CONTEXT  
 
2.1.23  Five years after the Revolution, the 
social climate remains tense. On the employment 
front, the situation has deteriorated. After peaking 
at 18.9% in 2011, the unemployment rate has 
remained at around 15% since 2013. By end-
2015, Tunisia had 618,000 unemployed, i.e. 
15.4% of the labour force estimated at 4 million 
people according to the National Population and 
Employment Survey carried out by the National 
Institute of Statistics (INS). The unemployment 
rate among women (22%) is almost double that 
for men (12.5%). Graduate unemployment 
(28.6%) remains worrisome since the current 
growth level prevents the absorption of the 
approximately 60,000 graduates entering the 
labour market annually. The Government 
currently allocates about 16% of its budget to 
social policies based on direct and indirect 
transfers to guarantee food security and reduce 
poverty. According to a study conducted in 2013 
by the Research and Social Studies Centre 
(CRES), transfers and subsidies have resulted in a 
one-percentage point reduction in the poverty rate 
(from 16.5% to 15.5%)12. However, these 
measures in favour of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population have revealed major 
weaknesses in terms of efficiency and targeting, 
which limits their impact. 
                                                          
12  According to Guidance Note on the 2016-2020 Strategic Development 
Plan (SDP), one out six Tunisians lives below the poverty threshold. While 
poverty had almost halved between 2000 and 2010 from 32% to 15.5%, 
it has been rising since 2011. Poverty is also most prevalent in the Mid-
Only 48.8% of poor people are reported to really 
benefit from the Government’s two flagship 
projects on social protection- Free Health Care 
(AMG) and the National Assistance Programme 
to Needy Families (PNAFN). Moreover, only 
9.8% of poor people are reported to effectively 
benefit from the budget allocated to subsidies, and 
only 12% from specific subsidies on food 
products. A global reform of the social protection 
system is essential to limit the drain of the 
compensation system on public finances. 
 
D. CROSS CUTTING THEMES  
 
 Gender 
 
2.1.24  Tunisia enjoys a special status in the 
Arab world in terms of women’s rights. The 1956 
Personal Status Code (CSP) placed Tunisia at the 
forefront of the Arab world as regards women’s 
status in society. In 2016, Tunisia was awarded a 
prize by the African Union (AU) for the best 
social protection index in recognition of its 
outstanding efforts in strengthening gender 
equality and improving women’s status in society. 
However, some disparities exist, either in law (e.g. 
continuing inequality over inheritance despite 
some debate) or customary practices. Generally, 
the indicators on women’s education show that 
women have very good access to education. The 
completion rates for the different training cycles 
are higher than for men and women only account 
for 40,4% of school drop-outs.  However, women 
are the most seriously affected by illiteracy at a 
25% rate compared to 12.4% for men. 
 
2.1.25 Furthermore, the ease of access to 
education is not reflected in economic 
opportunities, in spite of the fact that Article 5 bis 
of the Labour Code prohibits gender 
discrimination and guarantees equality at work 
pursuant to Article 40 of the new Constitution.  
Women only represent 25.8% of the employed 
working population and their unemployment rate 
is 22.2% compared to 12.4% for men (the rate 
West and Western regions of the country where the gap has widened 
between them and the rest of the country. 
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jumps to 38.4% for women graduates, against 
19.9% for men). Women’s participation in the 
legislative branch has improved significantly, 
with the adoption of the principle of gender parity 
on electoral rolls, starting with elections to the 
National Constituent Assembly in 2011. Forty-
nine (49) of the 217 seats in the Assembly were 
occupied by women (22.5% of the total). This 
number rose to 68 seats (31.3 %) in 2015. 
 
2.1.26  The significant representation of 
women in the Chahed government and the 
appointment of a woman to the strategic portfolio 
of finance indeed reflects the real progress in 
women’s participation in political and economic 
life and in decision-making. However, in spite of 
this visible progress, Tunisia is ranked 34th under 
the ‘Women in Parliament’ criterion of the 2015 
Global Gender Gap Report published by the 
WEF.  Women also remain poorly represented in 
the diplomatic corps (6 out of 61 Ambassadors in 
2015).  Furthermore, the widespread prevalence 
of violence against women persists both in the 
public (53.5%) and private spheres (45%). A 
draft organic law on elimination of violence 
against women was adopted in July 2016 at 
the Council of Ministers. Its provisions include 
the punishment of perpetrators of harassment 
against women in public places by one year’s 
imprisonment. Needless to say, gender disparities 
and discrimination are more widespread in the 
disadvantaged governorates as well as in rural 
areas. 
 
 Environment and Green Growth 
 
2.1.27 Over the past few decades, Tunisia has 
made great strides in environmental protection 
due to the establishment of different institutions 
dedicated to environmental activities, on the one 
hand, and heavy investment particularly in the 
areas of water management, pollution control and 
energy management, on the other. The country for 
long developed environmental and sustainable 
development policies. Since the eighties, Tunisia 
has established specialized structures, a legal and 
regulatory system and tools and measures for 
protecting the environment and mainstreaming 
environmental concerns in the different sectors. 
However, the country’s environment and natural 
resources have been placed under many types of 
pressure from human activity and economic 
growth. Currently, the main environmental 
problems concern: (i) the deterioration of water 
resources and the treatment of waste water 
(industrial and domestic); (ii) insufficient waste 
management (domestic and industrial); (iii) air 
pollution (mining/industrial and urban from 
transport); (iv) desert encroachment and soil 
degradation; (v) degradation of the coastal 
environment; (vi) climate change; and (vii) loss of 
biodiversity. 
 
 Regional Integration 
 
2.1.28 The issue of regional integration and the 
creation of a common market of 90 million people 
has made little progress in North Africa over the 
past two decades despite the existence of a 
dedicated regional institution –the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) – of which Tunisia is a member. 
Unlike the other African regions, North Africa 
remains a zone not closely integrated either 
politically or economically. The cost of non-
integration is estimated at 3% of regional GDP.  
 
2.1.29 In the absence of a common trade policy 
and harmonization of customs policies in North 
Africa, trade between AMU countries is limited. 
To overcome this constraint, Tunisia’s trade 
relations are based upon some ten bilateral trade 
agreements with Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and 
Algeria. About 10% of Tunisia’s trade is within 
the North Africa region and its main partners are 
Algeria and Libya, which are among the top five 
destinations for its exports. However, the 
European Union (EU) remains Tunisia’s leading 
trading partner and its main foreign investor, since 
90% of firms with foreign participation are 
European. 
   
2.1.30  In 2015, Tunisian exports to the EU 
represented 69.3% of total exports, with 65.9% of 
imports also from the EU. In the longer term, 
Europe wishes to forge closer trading ties with 
Tunisia with the signing of a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. 
(DCFTA) intended to go beyond the liberalization 
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of trade and removal of customs duties in favour 
of closer regional integration. At the same time, 
Tunisia could benefit from diversifying its trade 
relations with the African continent, in particular 
with Sub-Saharan Africa, in light of the fact that 
exports to Africa in 2014 only represented 11% of 
the year’s total.  
 
 
 
2.2 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
A. COUNTRY STRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORK  
 
2.2.1 In the wake of the January 2011 
Revolution, Tunisia temporarily suspended the 
five-year development plan system that had been 
used since the 1960s. Against a background of 
transition and in the absence of any real political 
and economic visibility, the vast majority of the 
different successive governments opted for an 
expansionary fiscal policy in order to boost 
domestic demand with a view to reviving the 
economy. The preparation of a medium-term 
economic development strategy was, however, 
one of the priorities of the Essid government 
formed in January 2015 following the end-2014 
general elections. The government opted for 
security by once again turning to a five-year plan 
for the 2016-2020 period. 
 
2.2.2 The Government decided to prepare its 
new development strategy in two (2) phases. The 
first consisted in the preparation of a Guidance 
Note that set out the main focus areas for 
government’s economic and social interventions 
over the 2016-2020 period. The second phase 
involved the preparation of a Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) on a consultative basis, 
the aim of which was to translate the strategic 
directions of the Guidance Note into investment 
and reform projects and programmes. The 
Strategic Development Plan (SDP) focuses on the 
following five (5) main thrusts: 
 
(i) Good governance and structural 
reforms 
(ii) Human development and social 
inclusion 
(ii) From a low-cost economy to an 
economic hub 
(iv) Realization of regions’ ambitions 
(v) The green economy and sustainable 
development 
 
2.2.3  The objectives of the 2016-2020 SDP are 
consistent with a logic of transforming and 
modernizing Tunisia’s long-term economic 
model aimed at bringing the average labour force 
unemployment rate down from 15.4% in 2015 to 
11.5% in 2020. To achieve that objective which 
presupposes a return to an average growth rate of 
5% by 2020, the plan provides for an increase in 
the investment rate from 19.5% in 2015 to 25% of 
GDP by 2020, based on an increase in the public 
investment budget but also on a significant rise in 
private investment in particular, in the context of 
public-private partnerships (PPP). The 2016-2020 
SDP was officially presented to investors at the 
Tunisia 2020 International Conference held from 
28 to 29 November 2016 which raised 34 billion 
dinars (EUR 14 billion) in public and private 
sector funding pledges.  The detailed objectives of 
the 2016-2020 SDP are set out in Annex 2 of this 
report  
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B. CHALLENGES AND 
WEAKNESSES 
 
2.2.4 Post-Revolution Tunisia still faces 
many challenges. 
 
 The Restoration of Security 
 
2.2.5  The first of these challenges consists in 
maintaining optimal security throughout its 
territory. Security has been undermined by the 
Libyan crisis and three successive attacks in 2015, 
which seriously affected the economy, especially 
tourism. Tunisia must not only ensure the security 
of people but also of property, in particular 
enterprises and industries, as well as public 
property. In the medium-term, maintaining the 
conditions for optimal security will require an 
increase in defence and security spending, thus 
implying strategic budget trade-offs.         
   
 The need for Fresh Impetus to 
Employment 
 
2.2.6  The second challenge lies in the need to 
reduce the unemployment rate which, in spite of 
government recruitments since 2011, affected 
15.4% of the labour force in 2015 and 28.6% of 
graduates - 2 points higher than the average pre-
Revolution rate (13.6%). However, a strong 
structural aspect underpins the issue of under-
employment in Tunisia. Tunisia does not generate 
enough jobs annually to absorb the flows of new 
entrants to the labour market. This market is 
highly regulated and is affected by the mismatch 
between businesses requirements and the skills of 
first time job seekers. This problem calls for 
comprehensive reform of education policy – since 
the quality of education in Tunisia had declined in 
OECD’s most recent PISA ranking – and stronger 
efforts to promote technology and vocational 
training. This will provide young people who 
have failed at school with an opportunity to learn 
a trade that will facilitate their integration into the 
labour force. It is also necessary to engage in 
                                                          
13  Especially in the agricultural sector (olive oil, medicinal plants, non-wood 
forest products, etc.) but also in sectors such as marble, ceramics or 
gypsum. 
reflection on how to make the labour market more 
fluid through adjustments to labour law. 
 
 Reduction of Regional Disparities 
 
2.2.7  Five years later, the wide historical 
regional disparities, which counted among the 
factors that triggered the January 2011 revolution, 
have, for the moment, only been marginally 
reduced. In addition to the key issue of access to 
employment for the inhabitants of hinterland 
regions, it is essential to restore the balance 
between the coastal regions and regions of the 
interior. This rebalancing could be achieved by 
redeploying public spending in favour of 
investment and building implementation capacity 
at the governorate level.  
 
2.2.8 It is also necessary to prepare effective 
implementation of the decentralization anchored 
in the January 2014 Constitution, which provides 
for the gradual transfer of some of the central 
government’s functions to elected local 
governments that will be required to play a greater 
role in local economic development. 
 
 An Economic Model to be Reformed 
 
2.2.9  Achieving the objectives set in the 
2016-2020 SDP presupposes changing Tunisia’s 
existing economic model. This model will have to 
shift towards a more liberalized, less directed, 
more devolved and decentralized economic 
model that will particularly foster private sector 
development.  To return to a growth level that is in 
line with its long-term potential, the diagnoses 
made since 2011 confirm that Tunisia must: (i) 
move up the value-added ladder by developing a 
strategy to increase the range of products and 
processes; and (ii) create more value-added by 
developing, strengthening and diversifying the 
value chains based on the systemic and rational 
exploitation of existing potential especially in the 
regions13. The use of the subsector/value 
chains/clusters approach as part of a new 
industrial policy and the revamping of incentives 
 11 
aimed at increasing the proportion of processing 
carried out locally should contribute to more 
inclusive regional development.  
  
2.2.10 A change in the economic model is also 
necessary to remove two of the major constraints 
that the country currently faces. The first is linked 
to the downward trend in oil prices, which is 
expected to lead to a slowdown in the oil industry 
- until recently the main focal sector in terms of 
FDI and exports.  
 
2.2.11 Tunisia also faces the depletion of its 
gas resources, which should result in changes to 
the structure of the existing energy model and 
greater use of renewable energies (see Annex 8). 
The second constraint is linked to the sharp 
contraction of the tourism industry which has 
traditionally been a key driver of growth and 
employment (395,000 direct and indirect jobs) as 
well as one of Tunisia’s main foreign exchange 
earners (see Figure 5). The gradual deterioration 
of security conditions as well as the occurrence of 
the 2015 attacks have resulted in a loss of about 1 
billion dinars in tourism revenue for the Tunisian 
economy over the 2014-2015 period, that is, a 
drop of about 30% compared to 2010. 
  
 
 
2.2.12 To take this new factor into account, it 
will be necessary to reposition the economy and 
seek new growth drivers to temporarily offset the 
expected drop in value added and employment in 
these two sectors.  
 
Agriculture and the rural-related economy could 
become a new source of growth. However, there 
is need to shift first from the existing productivity-
based agricultural development model towards a 
more inclusive model that focuses on the 
development of existing opportunities at the local 
level.  
    
 Geographical Diversification 
 
2.2.13  Since it embarked upon reforms in the 
mid-1970s, Tunisia has chosen to open up its 
economy and anchor its development on the 
European model.  Until now, this has been a wise 
decision given the quasi-exponential increase in 
Tunisia’s exports to the European Union (EU) 
with a tenfold increase in the value of exports to 
that zone. However, the Eurozone crisis has had a 
considerable impact on Tunisia. Europe – mainly 
France, Germany and Italy _ is both Tunisia’s 
main historical client from a trade standpoint but 
also its leading foreign investor in terms of 
volume and value.  It could be profitable to begin 
to diversify towards other markets and other 
trading areas to mitigate the risk of the economy’s 
dependency on the uncertainties of the European 
economic situation. Like Morocco and Egypt, 
Tunisia must also take up the challenge of 
integrating more closely into the rest of the 
African continent in order to develop business 
streams as well as promote its expertise. The 
health and education sectors are now emerging as 
major sources of foreign exchange for the country 
in the context of its cooperation and partnership 
with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
C. STRENGTHS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
2.1.14 In spite of the low growth posted since 
2011, Tunisia offers several other strengths and 
opportunities. 
 
 Proximity to the European Market 
 
2.2.15 Tunisia’s main strength is its proximity 
to Europe, which is currently its leading client and 
main provider of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
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 An Important Potential in Natural 
Endowments 
 
2.2.16 The country has significant mineral 
deposits (phosphate) and hydrocarbons (oil and 
gas), which represent major sources of foreign 
exchange.  These deposits have resulted in the 
development of a major extractive industry 
which, in 2014, represented 10% of GDP and 
contributed to the country’s energy supply and 
autonomy with the gas produced in Tunisia 
meeting 53% of the country’s demand for energy 
and accounting for 25% of exports. 
 
 A Developed Economic and Industrial 
Base and a Skilled Labor  
 
2.2.17 Tunisia has a network of high quality 
public infrastructure and services in the areas of 
energy, transport, water, etc. despite the major 
constraints imposed on these structures since 
2011 in terms of recruitment and contribution to 
the central government’s financial efforts (cash 
flow, payment arrears) that have deteriorated their 
financial situation and lowered their profitability. 
The country benefits from a highly developed and 
diversified industrial fabric (aeronautic, agro-
food, textile, mechanical industries and 
pharmaceutical products, etc.). Tunisia is ranked 
47th (out of a total of 124 countries) in terms of 
economic complexity and first on the African 
continent14. As a result of the important 
investments in education and vocational training 
during the last three decades, Tunisia benefits also 
from a well-trained labour in certain sectors 
(information and communication technologies 
(ICT), electro-mechanical, etc.).  In addition, an 
analysis of Tunisia’s product space shows that its 
economy has a high productive capacity15. The 
results of the analysis of Tunisia’s position in the 
2014 Product Space is in keeping with its level of 
economic complexity.  
                                                          
14 The economic complexity of a country is dependent on the 
complexity of the products it exports. A country is considered 
‘complex’ if it exports not only highly complex products 
(determined by the product complexity index), but also a large 
number of different products. The most complex products are 
sophisticated chemicals and machinery, whereas the world’s 
least complex products are raw materials or simple agricultural 
products. 
Furthermore, Tunisia has rapidly succeeded in 
upgrading its technology and launching new 
products on the export markets. The 2014 product 
space shows that innovations have been made and 
seen in the electronics and machinery sectors. 
This arrangement shows that firms have 
succeeded in climbing the value-added ladder. 
These major unexpected technical changes 
compared to the arrangement of products in 1980 
may be due to Tunisia’s opening up to 
international trade and investment areas which 
were initially relatively closed.   
 
2.3 AID COORDINATIONAND AfDB 
POSITIONNING IN THE COUNTRY    
 
A. AID COORDINATION AND 
HARMONIZATION 
 
 Aid Typology 
 
2.3.1  Despite its Middle Income Country 
(MIC) status, Tunisia receives considerable 
development assistance flows. These assistance 
flows have increased since the 2011 Revolution in 
a bid to support the country during its transition. 
Tunisia is the recipient of both multilateral and 
bilateral aid. At the multilateral level, in addition 
to the African Development Bank  which, as at 
March 2016, was Tunisia’s lead donor with 
10.15% of its public debt, 16% of its external debt 
and 32.3% of its multilateral debt, the country 
receives financial support from the European 
Union (EU), the World Bank, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the Islamic Development 
Bank (IsDB), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and 
the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Since June 2013, the country has also 
benefited from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) assistance.  At the bilateral level, the main 
donors engaged in Tunisia are France through the 
French Development Agency (AFD), Germany 
 
15  An analysis of the position of a given country in the product 
space gives an idea of its economy’s existing capacities and 
externalities in general and its industry in particular. For more 
information see http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/. 
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(GIZ and KFW), Japan, Italy and, to a lesser 
extent, the United Kingdom and Spain. Since 
2011, Tunisia has also received sporadic support 
from non-traditional donors including Qatar, 
Turkey and Algeria. A thematic presentation of 
donors’ commitments in Tunisia is provided in 
Annex 3. 
 
 Coordination and Harmonization 
 
2.3.2  Aid coordination remains a problem in 
Tunisia. Weak coordination between 
development partners is the result of the pre-2011 
policy pursued by the Tunisian authorities that 
sought to “compartmentalize” donor operations 
by sector, thus making it difficult for them to 
engage in dialogue with each other. These 
practices have persisted after the Revolution.  
They should, however, gradually decrease under 
the new 2016-2020 Strategic Development Plan 
(SDP) and the widespread introduction of 
programme-based budgets under the new 
Organic Budget Law that Parliament is expected 
to enact in 2017. Among others, this law should 
result in a closer alignment between the planning, 
budgeting and programming of resources in 
respect of external financing. However, it is worth 
noting that, in the area of budget support, there has 
been both functional and operational coordination 
in terms of the content and calibration of reforms 
between the World Bank, European Union and 
the Bank since 2011, then under the oversight of 
the IMF, following the effectiveness of the first 
staff-monitored programme in June 2013.   
 
B. BANK’S POSITIONING IN THE 
COUNTRY  
 
 Partnership Framework 
 
2.3.3 Tunisia is a historical partner and one of 
the Bank’s five (5) leading borrowers. 
Furthermore, it hosted the Temporary Relocation 
Agency (TRA) from 2003 to 2014, and now hosts 
the Bank’s North Africa Regional Department 
(ORNA).   
                                                          
16  See the Combined 2014-2016 CSP Completion Report and 
Portfolio Performance Review approved by CODE on 11 
November 2016 for a detailed portfolio performance analysis. 
Since 1968, Tunisia has received UA 5.747 
billion to finance projects and programmes 
(excluding grants), which makes it one of the 
main beneficiaries of the Bank’s financing and 
advisory services. While the Bank operates in 
varied and strategic areas (transport, energy, water 
and sanitation, agriculture and the financial sector, 
etc.), it has since 2011 opted to give preference 
within these sectors to projects with strong 
impacts on regional disparities. In addition, to 
AfDB’s significant financial contribution to 
Tunisia’s development, the variety of instruments 
mobilized and the presence in Tunisia of a 
multidisciplinary team will allow the Bank to 
adopt a holistic approach in terms of strategic 
policy dialogue. Hence, the Bank is engaged in 
sustained dialogue with the authorities both in 
terms of identification of operations and reforms, 
as well as public policies to be funded through 
budget support and technical assistance 
operations. 
 
 Status of Bank Portfolio in Tunisia16 
 
2.3.4 As at 1 March 2017, the Bank Group’s 
active portfolio comprised 43 operations. 37 
concerned the public sector (including 26 
technical assistance operations) and six (6) in the 
private sector.  Total commitments were UA 1.33 
billion.  
 
2.3.5 Grants totalling UA 28.2 million 
represented 2% of the overall portfolio.  In 
comparison, the portfolio comprised 40 
operations representing total commitments of UA 
1.35 billion at the previous review in May 2016.  
The portfolio disbursement rate is 64% (45.6% in 
2016), 80% of which concerned the private sector 
and 65% the public sector (average age: 2.3 years) 
excluding technical assistance. Overall, the loan 
portfolio performance (with an average age of 2.4 
years) is satisfactory. The portfolio’s averaged 
weighted score is estimated at 3.38 on a scale of 1 
to 4. On the other hand, the performance of 
technical assistance grants requires 
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improvement17.  The disbursement rate is 13% for 
an average age of 2.8 years. 
 
 
 
2.3.6 Concerning the portfolio’s composition 
excluding technical assistance operations (see 
Figure 6), as at 1 March 2017, the transport sector 
accounted for 37% of Bank commitments, 
followed by the financial sector  (26%), the water 
and sanitation sector (15%), social sector (11%), 
the energy sector (7%) and the agricultural sector 
(3%).  It must be stressed that Tunisia’s overall 
electrification rate is about 99%.   
 
2.3.7 Since 1984, the Bank has contributed 
UA 446 million to the development of energy and 
UA 389 million to the development of agriculture 
in Tunisia. The Bank’s private sector financing 
has mainly been invested in energy, infrastructure 
and the financial sector (lines of credit) (see 
Annex 19).  
 
III. BANK GROUP STRATEGY FOR 
TUNISIA OVER THE 2017-2021 
PERIOD 
 
3.1 RATIONALE FOR BANK’S GROUP 
INVOLVEMENT   
 
3.1.1 Five years after the 2011 Revolution, 
Tunisia’s economy remains fragile. Attempts 
made to revive it through public spending have 
                                                          
17  Following the most recent portfolio review in May 2016, a 
Portfolio Performance Improvement Plan (PPIP) was prepared 
and has been closely monitored with the Tunisian Authorities 
(see Annex 21).  
not always produced the expected results in terms 
of growth and job creation and have created 
significant macroeconomic imbalances. 
Unemployment, particularly among the youth, 
has risen since 2010 and wide regional disparities 
persist. A donor community-supported cycle of 
reforms was triggered during the transitional 
period (2011-2015) but is seriously inadequate 
and must be accelerated during implementation of 
the 2016-2020 SDP.  The acceleration of reforms 
and increase in public-private investment are the 
main prerequisites for the success of the SDP, and 
require considerable support from the 
international community and Tunisia’s technical 
and financial partners (TFP) including the Bank. 
There is also close convergence between the 
Bank’s five priorities (HI5s) and the SDP’s areas 
of focus. 
 
A. PILLARS AND FOCUS AREAS OF 
CSP 2017-2021 
  
 Lessons Learned from the Bank’s 
Previous Actions in Tunisia  
 
3.1.2  Post-evaluation of the Bank’s 
assistance to Tunisia over the 2004-2014 Period. 
The evaluation of Bank assistance to Tunisia over 
the 2004-2014 period conducted by the Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Department (IDEV) from 
May to June 2016 confirmed the consistency and 
overall relevance of the Bank’s operations’ strategy 
for Tunisia, based on a combination of budget 
support operations, productive sector investments 
and non-lending support operations (technical 
assistance, advisory support and analytical work) 
throughout the period concerned. While it 
recognized that a significant break had occurred in 
January 2011 affecting the capacity of the central 
government to intervene effectively, the evaluation 
did, however, recognize the Bank’s contribution to 
dialogue on reforms following the rapid 
deterioration of the economic situation and 
recommended that the dialogue be intensified 
during implementation of the new 2017-2021 CSP.  
About 10% of non-performing grants were cancelled between 
January and December 2016.  Measures aimed at improving 
the quality at entry of technical assistance operations have also 
been taken and, in particular, concern, stronger ownership by 
the authorities and acceleration of the procurement process.   
7% 3%
26%
37%
15%
11%
Figure 6: Sector Breakdown of 
Portfolio(As at 1st April 2017)  
Energy Agriculture
Finance Transport
Water and Sanitation Social
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3.1.3 In addition to the key structural reforms 
mentioned earlier, special efforts should be made in 
terms of financial sector reform to improve 
financial inclusion and mitigate the systemic risk to 
the real economy. In this regard, the evaluation 
underscored the need for the Bank to adopt a 
programme-based approach for its budget support 
operations, while backing strategic dialogue that 
should include the private sector. The Bank should 
also strengthen the inclusive nature of its strategies 
and its operations by improving selectivity and 
targeting. This will enable it to obtain sustainable 
outcomes and invest in capacity building at the 
central and regional level, as well as in executing 
agencies. Lastly, it is recommended that the Bank 
draw lessons from its operations in Tunisia’s 
agricultural sector by adopting a subsector 
approach that will provide a response to the overall 
problems experienced by Tunisian agriculture.   
 
3.1.4 Completion of the 2014-2016 
Strategy. The 2014-2016 Interim Strategy 
performance evaluation offered a number of 
lessons.   
 
3.1.5 Firstly, it confirmed the relevance of the 
two, 2014-2015 ICSP pillars (governance and 
infrastructure), pointing out that they corresponded 
to Tunisia’s priorities when the ICSP was 
formulated in 2013. However, it established that 
the absence of any medium-term strategy since 
2011 had seriously undermined the effectiveness of 
the economic policies implemented by the different 
governments by giving preference to the short-term 
(recurrent expenditure) over the long term (capital 
expenditure). It also stressed the importance of not 
under-estimating the impact of the political 
climate on the Bank’s strategies and 
recommended that closer attention be paid to 
political risk when defining the results matrix. 
Lastly, it recommended more accurate targeting 
and greater selectivity in Bank interventions, 
articularly through the rationalization and 
prioritization of technical assistance operations.  
 
 
 Pillars and Focus Areas 
 
3.1.6  Over the 2017-2021 period, the Bank 
will provide support to the implementation of the 
Strategic Development Programme (SDP) 
through two (2) main pillars and five (5) focus 
areas closely aligned on the Bank’s 2013-2022 
Long-Term Strategy and its High 5s.  In addition 
to their alignment on the High 5s, the two pillars 
were selected based on lessons drawn from 
implementing the two interim strategies. Indeed, 
despite the recovery policies implemented since 
2011, a continuing high unemployment rate, 
especially among young people and the 
announced saturation of civil service job 
opportunities require an increase in the number of 
jobs created in the commercial sector, particularly 
in industry and services, while concomitantly 
encouraging self-employment by providing 
support to the establishment of micro- and small-
sized enterprises including start-ups in the new 
technologies and innovation sector.  
 
3.1.7  It is also necessary to pursue and scale up 
efforts to reduce regional disparities and improve 
the living conditions of the populations of the 
governorates in the interior by upgrading basic 
infrastructure (roads, schools hospitals, etc.).   In 
addition to the immediate benefits for the 
communities concerned, the improvement of 
living conditions and upgrading of infrastructure 
must in time encourage the start-up of businesses 
in the governorates and improve the mobility of 
public employees.   
 
3.1.8 Therefore, the main objective of the 
2017-2021 CSP to which the two pillars will 
contribute will consist in reducing the 
unemployment rate at national and regional 
level. In this regard, the Bank will align its strategy 
on the objective retained in the 2016-2020 
Strategic Development Plan (SDP) Guidance 
Note to reduce the average national 
unemployment rate from 15.4% in 2016 to 11.5% 
by 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 16 
Table 1: Focus Areas of CSP 2017-2021 
 
Pillar I - Industrialization and Value Chains 
Development    
 
3.1.9 Under Pillar 1, the Bank’s objective will 
be to improve the cost and non-cost 
competitiveness of Tunisian industry as well as 
the business climate through a macroeconomic 
and sector reform support operation aimed at 
significantly increasing private investment, 
including FDI, and at anchoring the principle of 
public-private partnership (PPP) in investment 
policies by strengthening public-private sector 
dialogue (PPD).  As such, close attention will be 
paid to polices and reforms to be implemented 
that will contribute to the control and/or reduction 
of factor costs (labour, capital, financial services 
and communications, etc.). Furthermore, the 
Bank will provide Tunisia with support to update 
its industrial and innovation policy.  To that end, it 
will support ongoing reforms aimed at 
modernizing the education system and matching 
training supply with the needs of industry and 
businesses in the medium to long term. To support  
industry, the Bank will develop and upgrade 
strategic infrastructure (roads, ports, multimodal 
transport and digital, etc.) in order to open up 
priority regions and markets, improve the 
movement of goods and people, and facilitate 
value chains development. The Bank will also 
implement actions to facilitate trade with the 
countries of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Europe and the rest of the world, and will develop 
trading hubs and best practices in support of 
exports.  
 
Pillar II – Improvement of the Quality of Life  
for the People of the Priority Regions 
 
 
3.1.10 Under Pillar II, the Bank’s objective 
will be to support decentralization particularly by 
strengthening local government, devolved central 
government services and public services in the 
priority regions to enable them to play a more 
active role in economic development while 
improving the quality of their service delivery to 
the population. To this end, the Bank will 
prioritize the strengthening of public investment 
in basic socioeconomic infrastructure in the 
priority regions. It will also back government’s 
efforts to support young people with few or no 
qualifications to facilitate their integration into the 
labour market and/or to develop their own 
businesses. At the same time, the Bank will 
endeavour to transform the rural economy in 
priority regions by supporting local value chains 
and modernizing activities in the agricultural, 
livestock and fisheries sector, and through support 
to the development of networks of micro-, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) by 
improving access to financial services and 
advisory services in corporate development.  
 
 Preparation Process 
 
3.1.11  The 2017-2021 CSP was prepared and 
its pillars selected following a broad-based 
consultation process with the Tunisian party. It 
began with the preparation of the Combined 
2014-2016 Interim Country Strategy Completion 
Report and 2016 Portfolio Performance Review.  
A joint AfDB - Tunisian Government workshop 
in which civil society representatives participated 
was organized on 10 May 2016 to discuss the 
results achieved by the 2014-2016 ICSP, evaluate 
the ongoing portfolio’s performance and discuss 
Pillar I  Industrialization and local value chains development  
  
 Focus Area 1 Improvement of the business climate and competitiveness 
 Focus Area 2  Skills building and employability 
 Focus Area 3 Inter-regional integration and Tunisia’s integration with the rest of the world 
   
Pillar II Improvement of the quality of life for the people of priority regions  
  
 Focus Area 1 Support to decentralization and to inclusive local development  
 Focus Area 2 Improvement of the living environment in the priority regions   
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the general directions and pillars of the new 2017-
2021 CSP.  
 
 Operational Approach and Guiding 
Principles for Intervention 
 
3.1.12    The 2017-2021 CSP will be 
implemented in compliance with a number of 
principles established from the conclusions of 
previous Bank operations. A “filter” will be 
prepared that will verify the compliance of 
projects and programmes with the operational 
principles presented below. 
   
3.1.13 Contribution to employment and the 
private sector. Actions financed by the Bank 
must have a significant content in terms of direct 
and/or indirect jobs, and a leveraging effect on 
private sector development through the 
generalization of management contracts. This 
contribution to employment and the private sector 
must be accurately assessed and negotiated at the 
time of project identification and preparation, 
including upstream with ministerial departments 
and executing agencies. An evaluation of the 
impact of Bank-funded projects on employment 
will be conducted in early 2017 to fine-tune the 
analytical criteria.   
 
3.1.14 Targeting and selectivity. The Bank 
will carry out targeting as part of its annual 
programming to retain its financing for the sixteen 
(16) priority governorates under the IRD project 
to help reduce regional disparities. In the case of 
countrywide projects, the commitment ceiling for 
regions defined as non-priority may not exceed 
20%18 of the total planned financing. National 
projects with a medium-to-long term positive 
impact on the inter-connectivity of North African 
countries and connectivity with Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Europe, Tunisia’s natural markets will 
be given preference. In line with its desire to 
improve the targeting of its operations, the Bank 
will be more selective in its choice of operations 
to be financed. The selectivity principle will be 
applied both to the lending and non-lending 
programme. 
                                                          
18  With the exception of private sector and financial sector 
projects. 
3.1.15 Private sector and entrepreneurship 
support. The Bank will prioritize private sector 
and entrepreneurship support under the 2017-
2021 CSP in terms of the level of financing and of 
advisory support to be provided to entrepreneurs, 
and strategic dialogue (see Annex 11). In this 
regard, it will support the rollout of the Souk-at-
Tanmia Programme throughout Tunisia through 
the establishment of a Centre for Entrepreneurial 
Excellence (CEE) (see Annex 12). In addition to 
Tunisia, this centre will aim to disseminate the 
achievements and replicate the Souk-at-Tanmia 
concept across North Africa and other parts of the 
continent. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
IDEV evaluation recommendation, the Bank will 
open a specific dialogue space for private sector 
operators possibly in the form of six-monthly or 
annual meetings. Lastly, the Bank will make an 
annual appropriation for funding private sector 
operations either through direct financing or 
equity participations in capital, or through lines of 
credit awarded to banks.  
 
3.1.16 Balance between programme and 
project support. To comply with the objectives 
of PSD 2016-2020, which aims to significantly 
boost public investment, the Bank will opt for a 
70/30 ratio between loans awarded for investment 
and lending in support of structural reforms.  
 
3.1.17  Catalysing effect. In consultation with 
the Tunisian Authorities, The Bank will adopt a 
catalytic approach by systematically seeking co-
financing from technical and financial partners 
(TFP) for operations that it seeks to finance, 
particularly public investment projects.  
 
3.1.18 Efficient use of technical assistance 
and analytical work. The Bank will provide 
evidence of targeting and selectivity in its choice 
of technical assistance operations and analytical 
work. The latter will be closely aligned on the 
2017-2021 CSP objectives. The volume of 
technical assistance approved each year will be 
subject to the performance of the ongoing 
technical assistance portfolio.  
 
 18 
3.1.19  An identical principle of selectivity will 
be applied for analytical work that will focus on 
assistance to public decision-making.  
  
 Resources  
 
3.1.20 For the 2017-2021 CSP’s 
implementation, the Bank is planning to provide 
Tunisia with an indicative amount of between UA 
300 million and UA 350 million over the 2017-
2019 period and UA 400 million in 2020 and 
2021, that is, total commitments of between UA 
1.8 and 2 billion. Other resources will be 
mobilized from the AGTF window in respect of 
co-financing in the infrastructure sector. The Bank 
will also mobilize thematic trust fund resources to 
finance technical assistance operations and 
conduct analytical work as well as dedicated 
climate and environmental funds (Green Fund, 
Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, etc.) 
and resources allocated to PPP development.  It 
will also seek to mobilize special funds as well as 
funds established by the EU intended to prevent 
migration to Europe from North Africa.  The total 
amount allocated to the 2017-2021 CSP will be 
updated yearly based on several specific 
parameters for Tunisia and the Bank, including 
the sovereign rating and increase in the Bank’s 
business volume in all regional member countries. 
 
3.2  TARGETS AND EXPECTED 
OUTCOMES.  
 
3.2.1 The 2017-2021 CSP will be closely 
aligned on the 2016-2020 SDP. Consequently, the 
main expected outcome following 
implementation of the 2017-2021 CSP will be a 
reduction in the average unemployment rate from 
15.4% in 2015 to 11.5% by 2020, which is in line 
with the targets set by the Tunisian Authorities 
and the assumptions underpinning the SDP, in 
particular, the return to average growth of 5% by 
2020. In order to achieve these outcomes, the 
Bank will implement a lending programme and 
also an ambitious analytical work programme. 
The lending programme is presented in Annexes 
1 and 2 and the analytical work programme in 
Annex 4.  
 
3.2.2  Pillar I. There are two expected 
outcomes under Pillar 1. The first outcome will 
consist in the improvement of the overall 
competitiveness and productivity of Tunisian 
industry, the industrial value added (IVA) of 
which will increase by at least 20% by 2020. This 
objective will be achieved through global action 
combined with the reduction of factor (labour, 
energy, water, telecommunications, etc.) and 
logistic costs (reduction in logistic costs 
representing 5% of GDP), significant 
improvement in the business climate reflected in 
a rapid gain of twenty (20) places in the annual 
Doing Business ranking and an 80% increase in 
FDI by 2020. The second outcome will be a 
qualitative improvement in the supply of labour 
provided by the Tunisian educational system 
through a closer matching of business demand 
with training supply from the education system. 
This will lead to a reduction in the unemployment 
rate of higher education graduates registered with 
the National Employment and Self-Employment 
Agency (ANETI) by an average of 33% in 2015 
to 23% by 2020, with special attention to the 
regions. Concomitantly, through technological 
and vocational education activities, the CSP will 
improve the labour force participation rate of non-
graduate youths by an average of 30% by 2020, 
especially in the priority regions.  
     
3.2.3  Pillar II. Two main outcomes are 
expected under the second pillar of the 2017-2021 
strategy. The first is an improvement in the quality 
of service provided by government services and 
local government, and in access by the population 
of priority regions to basic public services. In this 
regard, the Bank will work in partnership with the 
Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and 
Quantitative Studies (ITCEQ) to establish a multi-
criteria Quality of Life Index (QVI) at the regional 
level. The second expected outcome will be a 
30% increase in the income of the population of 
the priority governorates by 2020 through a 
holistic development strategy for the regions. 
Such development will cover the whole spectrum 
of existing investment opportunities through 
increased exploitation of local agricultural and 
non-agricultural value chains (marble, ceramics, 
agro-food, etc.).  
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At the same time, priority will be given to the 
establishment and strengthening of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem for women and young 
people by providing support to MSME, and 
improving market access.    
 
3.2.4 Monitoring and Evaluation. The 
progress made in implementing the 2017-2021 
CSP’s objectives will be monitored and evaluated 
based on the results measurement framework (see 
Annex 1) which is fully in keeping with the 
objectives of the 2016-2020 Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP). The Bank will 
organize a specific dialogue mission each year to 
review progress made with the Tunisian 
authorities towards achieving the Plan’s 
objectives. In this area, in addition to the results 
measurement framework, the Bank will also rely 
on the monitoring/evaluation system established 
for the 2016-2020 PSD at the Ministry of 
Development, Investment and International 
Cooperation (MDICI). These missions will 
coincide with Country Portfolio Performance 
Reviews (CPPR).  The Bank will conduct the 
CSP Mid-Term Review in June 2019 to confirm 
the relevance of the pillars to the country’s 
development objectives. A completion report will 
be prepared following the CSP implementation 
phase in June 2021.  
 
3.3 DIALOGUE THEMES 
 
3.3.1 The main dialogue issues with the 
Tunisian authorities during implementation of the 
2017-2021 CSP will focus on the adaptation of 
Tunisia’s economic and social model to the new 
regional and international challenges. Since 2011, 
these issues have been the focus of the Bank’s 
dialogue with the Government alongside the 
development partners, and advocacy activities 
developed at the thematic conferences and 
meetings in which it is frequently invited to 
participate on major challenges facing the 
reforms. 
 
3.3.2  In connection with the strategy’s main 
objective, the Bank will pay close attention to 
employment and labour market reform and, to 
that end, will embark upon a series of analytical 
studies aimed at enriching strategic dialogue with 
stakeholders. At the operational level, dialogue 
will focus on portfolio performance and removal 
of constraints with a view to accelerating project 
implementation rates. Special attention will be 
paid to the continuing restructuring of the non-
lending portfolio in order to increase the 
implementation rate of the said portfolio to 50% 
by 2019 and to 75% by 2021.  
 
3.4 RISKS AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
 
3.4.1  Three types of risk could compromise 
the expected impact of the Bank’s assistance 
strategy over the 2017-2021 period.  
 
 Political Risk. 
 
3.4.2 Despite a successful political transition, 
Tunisia’s political and social context remains 
unstable and the balances achieved following the 
October 2014 legislative elections fragile. 
Therefore, the confidence expressed by the ARP 
on 26 August in Youssef Chahed’s National 
Unity Government (NUG) must be seen as a 
positive sign of awareness by the entire political 
class of the gravity of the country’s situation, and 
the need to embark upon a cycle of structural 
reforms that will help Tunisia to emerge from the 
current economic crisis. Nevertheless, to address 
the expected social cost of some of the reforms, 
especially those concerning the central 
government and the civil service, and the social 
disturbances that could emanate from them, the 
coalition of parties in support of the Chahed 
cabinet could disintegrate, making the formation 
of another government or the holding of early 
legislative elections inevitable.  
 
3.4.3 This uncertainty at both the political and 
trade union levels could seriously undermine the 
economic plan and compromise the recovery 
efforts. While the partial or total mitigation of this 
risk is by its very nature problematic, it should 
require the Bank along with the technical and 
financial partners (TFP) present in Tunisia to 
engage in very high-level political dialogue with 
political officials, Tunisian authorities, civil 
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society representatives and the UGTT on the need 
to define and implement a social pact throughout 
the 2016-2021 period in order to provide the 
government with some fiscal leeway and to 
restore the competitiveness of Tunisia’s 
businesses and economy.      
 
  Macroeconomic Risk.  
 
3.4.4 The second risk is macroeconomic. It 
could arise following the incomplete 
implementation of the Strategic Development 
Plan (SDP) both at the level of the investment 
objectives on which the recovery of growth 
depends, and on the reforms (particularly the 
strategic reform of central government and the 
civil service). These reforms are intended to create 
a new fiscal space that could be allocated to public 
investment as a priority, in order to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the economy and foster 
growth and employment. The Bank, alongside the 
development partners (especially the IMF, the 
World Bank and the European Union) will 
maintain permanent dialogue with the Tunisian 
authorities, especially in the context of its budget 
support operations, in order to mitigate this risk. 
Furthermore, since Tunisia’s growth is closely 
linked to Europe’s economic health, it could be 
affected by the possibility of shocks similar to the 
2009 financial crisis. In order to mitigate this risk, 
the Bank will support the establishment of a 
strategy to diversify Tunisia’s trade with North 
Africa in particular by providing technical 
assistance to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.   
 
 Security Risk. 
 
3.4.5  The third risk likely to affect 
implementation of the 2017-2021 strategy is 
security-related. Until a political solution is found 
to the crisis in Libya, Tunisia will have to step up 
its efforts to maintain optimal security nationwide, 
to guarantee and protect the recovery of 
investment, among others. Implementation of the 
IMF Programme could, however, prevent the 
central government from fulfilling its territorial 
protection mission. To minimize this risk, the 
Bank should sensitize the Tunisian authorities on 
the need to ring-fence the interior and defence 
budgets by enacting a multi-year programming 
law. From 2017, the Tunisian authorities may also 
have to manage the return of Tunisian combatants 
from Syria, which could constitute a major 
destabilizing factor. While criminal justice 
responses are, for the most part, expected, the 
Bank could, where necessary, back the 
Authorities’ efforts to reintegrate the ex-
combatants into the labour market through 
specific support programmes. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 The 2017-2021 CSP for Tunisia is aligned 
on the Government’s 2016-2020 Strategic 
Development Plan (SDP) whose objective is to 
put the Tunisian economy back on the path of 
sustainable, inclusive and job-creating growth by 
2020. The CSP is also aligned on the Bank’s 
2013-2022 Long-Term Strategy, the sector 
strategies approved recently and the High 5s. The 
stated objective of CSP 2017-2021 is to support 
the Tunisian authorities in establishing favourable 
conditions for job creation. To achieve this 
objective, the 2017-2021 CSP will mobilize an 
envelope of between  UA 1.5 and 1.8 billion over 
five (5) years to support investment and policy-
based programmes focused on two (2) pillars - (i) 
Support to industrialization and value chains and 
(ii) improvement of the quality of life in the priority 
regions. Apart from ADB window resources, the 
Bank will also endeavour to secure AGTF 
resources for the strategy in addition to other 
bilateral and multilateral sources of financing as 
well as general or thematic trust funds at the Bank. 
 
4.2 Management invites the Board of Directors 
to consider and approve this 2017-2021 Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) for Tunisia. 
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19  Implementation of budget support operations will depend on the progress made in terms of structural reforms and on the implementation performance of the IMF programme 
ANNEX 1 – INDICATIVE PROGRAMMING BY PILLAR (2017-2019) 
LENDING PROGRAMME 
Pillar I – Industrialization and Support to Local Value Chains 
Sector Dpt. HI5 Project Name Instrument  
Amount (MUA) 
ADB  AGTF Total  
2017  
Transport  PICU HI5 Project to Improve Road Connectivity in the North-West  Investment 70 30 100 
Telecoms PICU HI5 Support to the Digital 2020 Strategy Investment 50 30 80 
Education  AHHD HI3 Programme to Support Technical and Technological Skills Development Investment 60  60 
Non-sovereign PFID HI3 Line of Credit to Hannibal Lease  Investment 6,5  6,5 
Non-sovereign   PIFD HI3 Line of Credit to finance SME Investment 38,5  38,5 
Non-sovereign PISD HI3 Fertilizer Production Project Investment 15  15 
Total 2017     240 60 300 
2018  
Energy PENP HI3 Electricity Network Development Programme  Investment 60 30 90 
Water and Sanitation AHWS HI5 Sanitation Project for 30 Priority Municipalities Investment 40 30 70 
Multisector ECGF HI3 Industrial Competitiveness and Business Climate Support Project (1st tranche) 
(programme-based support)19 
Budget Support 50  50 
Multisector  PIFD HI3 Financial Sector Modernization Support Programme II (PAMSFI II) - (1èt tranche) 
(programme-based support) 
Budget Support 50  50 
Non-sovereign PISD/PIFD HI3 Private Sector Support/Line of Credit Investment 60  60 
Total 2018     260 60 320 
2019       
Transport   PICU HI5 Road Infrastructure Modernization Programme II (PMIR II)  Investment 50 30 80 
Multisector PICU HI3 PAMSFI II – (2nd  tranche) Budget Support 50  50 
Multisector  ECGF HI3 Industrial Competitiveness and Business Climate Support Project  (2nd tranche) Budget Support 50  50 
Non-sovereign  2019 Private Sector Support/Line of Credit Investment 60  60 
Total 2019     280 50 330 
Pillar II – Improvement of the Quality of Life of People in Priority Regions 
2017       
Agriculture AHHR HI2 SIA Development Project Investment 30 10 40 
Multisector AHHD HI5 Inclusive Regional Development Support Programme II (PADRI II ) Budget Support 100  100 
Total 2017     130 10 140 
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ANALYTICAL WORK PROGRAMME20 
2017 
Pillar I Public Spending Review 
Industrial and Innovation Policy Evaluation  
Study on the Optimization of Industrialization in Tunisia 
Pillar II Study on the Establishment of Annual Growth Statistics at Governorate Level  
Study on the Establishment of a Quality of Life Index (QLI) (pilot) 
2018 
Pillar I  Study on Tunisia’s Structural Transformation (transition from lower-to-upper MIC) 
Study on Tunisia’s Trade Integration with Africa 
Study on Labour Market Modelling in Tunisia  
Pillar II Flagship Study on Rural Economic Transformation 
2019 
Pillar I  Study on Skill Needs of Industry and the Private Sector up to 2030   
Pillar II Study on Agro-Food Industries 
                                                          
20 Also refer to Annex 4 for a detailed description of the Analytical Work Program.  
2018        
Multisector AHHD HI5 Project to Support Economic Development, Entrepreneurship  and Employment 
in the Priority Governorates 
Investment t  50 30 80 
Agriculture AHHR HI2 Olive Oil Subsector Support Project Investment 40  40 
Total 2018     90 30 120 
2019       
Agriculture  AHHR HI2 Rural Economy Transformation Support Project Budget Support 50  50 
Governance ECGF HI5 Project to Strengthen Deconcentrated Services Services and New Municipalities Investment 50  50 
Total 2019    100  100 
       
Total Pillar I  2017-2019     780 170 950 
Total Pillar II  2017-2019    320 40 360 
Total 2017-2019 Pillars I + II    1100 210 1310 
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Annex 2: TUNISIA – 2017-2021 CSP RESULTS FRAMEWORK 
Objectives of 
2016-2020 
SDP 
Main Constraints 
Actions under 2017-
2021 CSP 
Expected Outcomes 
(qualitative) 
Output Indicators 
Baseline 
Expected Outcomes 
(*)21  
Linkages 
with LTS 
and HI5 
2015 
At Mid-
Term 
(2019) 
In 2021 
PILLAR I – INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SUPPORT TO LOCAL VALUE CHAINS 
P
ro
m
o
te
 
g
o
o
d
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
g
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
 a
n
d
 r
ef
o
rm
s 
 
Instability of the 
macroeconomic framework 
and directions of current tax 
and fiscal policies are not 
conducive to long-term 
growth and employment 
Programme-based 
budget support for 
structural reforms22, 
competitiveness and 
improvement of the 
business climate  
Support to strategic reforms 
will in particular make budget 
savings and generate new 
resources to increase public 
investment.  
Ratio of tax revenue/GDP (%) 25.5% 26.5% 28% 
C
ro
ss
cu
tt
in
g
 l
in
k
 t
o
 H
I5
s 
Fiscal balance (as % GDP) (+/-) - 4.4% - 4% - 3% 
GDP growth rate (%) (*) 0.8% 3% 5% 
Average unemployment rate (%) 
(*) 
15.4% 13% 11.5% 
    
The low level of resources 
allocated to public 
investment prevents the 
development of the 
country’s strategic 
infrastructure 
Public spending 
review 
Stabilization of the economy, 
increased private investment 
revitalized  by the creation of 
leveraging effect from the 
establishment of PPP  
Proportion of resources allocated 
to public investment in the budget 
(%) 
16% 19% 20% 
Investment rate (% GDP)  (*) 18.5% 21% 25% 
Number of operational PPP  1 3 5 
 F
ro
m
 l
o
w
-c
o
st
 e
co
n
o
m
y
 t
o
 i
n
d
u
st
ri
a
l 
h
u
b
 
           
Deterioration of the quality 
of the business climate since 
20111 is adversely affecting 
both national and internal 
private investment  
Lines of credit to 
banking sector 
Improvement of the business 
climate will contribute to the 
revival of domestic private 
sector domestic investment as 
well as FDI. The recovery of 
private investment will be 
supported by targeted lines of 
investment. 
Doing Business classification 
(rank) 
75th  55th  40th  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industrialize 
HI5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of private investment 
in total investment (%) (*) 
50% 55% 65% 
Increase in FDI (% GDP) (*) 3% 4% 5.5% 
Credit to private sector (% GDP) 
75.9% 80% 90% 
Competitiveness and total 
factor productivity (TFP) of 
the Tunisian economy have 
deteriorated since 2011.  
Road Infrastructure 
Modernization 
Support Project 
The construction of 
motorways and development 
of the railway network will 
facilitate the opening up of the 
country’s territory, reduce 
travel times as well as the 
average cost of transport while 
facilitating access to local 
value chains 
Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI)23 (rank/score 1 to 7) (*) 
92/3.9 85/4.2 80/4.5 
 
Railway Sector 
Modernization 
Support Project 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
(%) (*) 
- +1.5% + 2.5% 
Number of km of motorways 420 800 1200 
Proportion of logistic costs (as % 
of GDP) (*) 
20% 17% 15% 
                                                          
21 Indicators  with an (*) correspond to 2016-2020 SDP indicators 
 
22  In particular tax reform, labour market reform, reform of central government and public enterprises, civil service reform, financial sector reform and reform of the system of public subsidies to energy and staple products 
(Compensation).  
 
23 Rank out of 140 countries covered by the annual survey carried out by the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
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Industrial value added (IVA) 
remains low due to the 
positioning of industry in 
low value-added sectors  
Industrial and 
Innovation Policy 
Assessment Study 
Provide decision-makers with 
guidance  on the sector 
positioning of industry and 
optimization of  public 
resources allocated to support 
industry   
Proportion of high technology 
sectors in GDP (%) 
20% 25% 30%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industrialize 
HI5  
 
Study on industrial 
specialization in 
Tunisia and the 
transition to higher 
value-added industry 
Average value added of exporting 
sectors (%) (*) 
15% 17% 20% 
    
There is a considerable 
mismatch between the 
supply of labour trained by 
the Tunisian education 
system and demand of 
industry and businesses 
Higher education and 
Research Reform 
Support Project 
Gradual matching by 2020 
between skill requirements at 
industry and business levels 
and training supply provided 
by the national educational 
system 
 
Number of patents filed per year 
(units) 
Note: According to the 2016-2020 
PSD, the number of patents filed 
will double by 2020 
Number of manufacturing sector 
jobs   
   
Graduate unemployment rate (%) 32.7% 30% 25% 
Technological 
Education Streams 
Support Project  
Number of senior technicians 
trained and employed   
-  +10% +20% 
Prospective study on 
requirements in terms 
of managerial staff 
and senior technicians 
for industry and the 
private sector by 2030 
     
Study on the 
modelling of the 
Tunisian labour 
market  
    
 
 
PILLAR II – IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR PEOPLE OF THE PRIORITY REGIONS24 
  
F
u
lf
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b
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n
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The persistence of wide 
regional disparities and 
development gaps between 
the regions and governorates 
hinder the promotion of 
inclusive growth 
Deconcentrated and 
Public Services Skill 
Building Support 
Project     
Improved efficiency of public 
expenditure management and 
performance of public services 
in the regions of the interior   
Average budget execution rate in 
priority governorates (%) 
30% 50% 75% 
 
Quality of 
life HI5  
 
 
 
 
Regional Development Index 
(RDI) (average of 16 priority 
governorates) 
Note: According to the 2016-2020 
PSD, there will be a 30% reduction 
in the existing gap between the RDIs 
of coastal governorates and 
governorates in the interior  
                                                          
24  The activities described under Pillar II concern the 16 governorates considered to be priorities in the 2016-2020 according to the Regional Development Index (RDI) 
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Local Investment 
Financing Support 
Project25  
Local investment increased  Average investment rate of local 
governments (% budget) - + 10% +20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Digital Tunisia 2020 
Strategy Support 
Project 
Improved attractiveness of 
regions  
Average coverage rate of priority 
governorates in broadband  (%) 
and fibre optics 
80% 90% 100% 
% of average investment in ICTs 
in priority regions 
- +5% 10% 
Study on the definition 
of a Quality of Life 
Index (QLI) (pilot) 
Availability of a 
complementary indicator 
specific to the RDI that will 
facilitate the adaptation and of 
public resources and their 
channelling towards the 
improvement of living 
conditions in the priority 
governorates 
    
The economic development 
of rural regions is impeded 
by the absence of a holistic 
approach based on the 
development of agricultural 
and non-agricultural value 
chains  
SIA Development 
Project 
Increased agricultural yields Increase in agricultural sector 
growth rates (%) 
Note: According to the 2016-2020 
PSD, there will be a 5% annual 
increase in the agricultural sector 
growth rate. 
 
HI5 
Feed Africa  
 
Olive Oil Subsector 
Support Project 
Higher proportion of products 
processed in rural areas based 
on agricultural and non-
agricultural value chains 
Average growth rates in priority 
governorates (%)26 
 
- - - 
Rural Economy 
Support Programme  
Boosting key reforms to 
support the rural economy will 
help to increase growth and 
employment in the 
governorates of the interior  
Average investment rates (%)27 in 
priority governorates   
- - - 
Average unemployment rates in 
priority regions (%) 
- - - 
Graduate unemployment rate in 
priority regions (%)  
- - - 
 
 Study on agro-food 
industries 
Formulation of 
recommendations to enhance 
the performance of agro-food 
industries, in particular for 
export. (*) 
    
                                                          
25  By strengthening the available resources of the Local Government Loan and Support Fund (CPSCL) to finance basic infrastructure projects such as waste management, urban road works, management of 
urban parks, rehabilitation of administrative buildings and infrastructure, equipment, etc. 
 
26  Data on this indicator will only be available when the study on the public accounting framework that will provide a regional growth statistic has been prepared.    
 
27  Same for this indicator. 
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 Flagship study  on 
rural economic 
transformation  
Provision of operational 
policy guidance to implement 
reforms aimed organizing and 
monitoring the rural economy 
and making it a new growth 
relay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
T
h
e 
E
co
n
o
m
y
 
Electricity produced in 
Tunisia is heavily dependent 
on fossil fuels (gas, oil) 
Renewable Energy 
(solar and wind) 
support project 
Prepare the energy transition 
and over time reduce  the 
average generation cost per 
kWH for industry and 
businesses 
Share of renewable energy in 
energy mixi  
3% 7% 12% 
Light up and 
power HI5  
 
Energy intensity (%)28  Note: According to the 2016-2020 
PSD, there will be a 3%/year annual 
reduction in energy intensity by 
2020. 
 Tunisia-Italy 
Interconnection 
Project 
Improve the energy balance by 
selling electricity to Europe 
Energy balance (in million dinars)  -180 0 +50 
Climate change increases 
water stress and creates 
tension at the level of water 
resource management 
(meeting human versus 
economic needs)   
Surface Water 
Harvesting Support 
Project 
Increase in the volume of 
usable water resources by the 
population and economic 
operators  
Water resource harvesting rate (% 
of total harvestable capacity) (*) 
92% - 95% 
 
Feed Africa 
HI5 
 
 
Project to support the 
harvesting of non-
conventional water 
resources (waste water 
and desalinized water)  
Connection rate to public 
sanitation networks of 
municipalities covered by ONAS 
(%) (*) 
86% 87% 90% 
Recycling of waste water (%) (*) - +30% +50% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28  Ratio between energy consumption measured in tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) and GDP 
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Annex 3 
Donor Focus Areas in Tunisia 
 Human Development Transport Energy Governance
29 
Financia
l Sector  
Regional 
Dev.30  
Water Private 
Sector31 
Natural 
Resources
32 
Agriculture
33 
CSO 
Education
34 
Emplo
yment 
Health            
Multilateral 
Cooperation  
             
World Bank35              
AfDB              
EIB              
EU36              
EBRD              
UNDP              
IsDB              
Bilateral 
Cooperation  
             
AFD                
GIZ              
KFW              
Swiss 
Cooperation 
             
JICA              
USAID              
Note: The focus areas described cover the 2014-2016 period  
                                                          
29  Including budget support, strengthening the rule of law, justice, public finance management (PFM), local finances, public enterprises and reform of central government and government services   
30  Including decentralization and support to local government 
31  Including industry, MSME and handicrafts 
32  Including climate change 
33  Including fisheries and forestry 
34  Including higher education and vocational and technological training 
35  The World Bank approved its new strategy for  the  2016-2020 period in October 2015 
36  Like the Bank, the EU established a 2014-2015 interim strategy extended to 2016. Its new 2017-2020 strategy is being prepared.  
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Annex 4 
Note on the Analytical Work Programme 
1. Context. Since 2011, Tunisia has benefited from significant advisory support from the Bank. This 
advisory support has been in the form of diagnostic reviews, flagship studies, economic notes and research 
articles that have been widely disseminated amongst civil society and served as a basis for strategic dialogue 
with the Tunisian Authorities. These activities mainly financed from the Bank’s administrative budget were 
supplemented by studies financed by the Middle Income Countries Technical Assistance Fund (MIC-TAF) 
and the Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund (MENA -TF). Tunisia has also benefited from the 
Bank’s knowledge products such as the African Economic Outlook Report (AEOR) published annually as 
well as the Africa Competitiveness Report (ACR) but also from regionally-focused knowledge products. 
The Bank will continue to provide Tunisia with advisory support during the implementation of CSP 2017-
2021. In a concern to rationalize and maximize the Bank’s resources, this support will however be provided 
on a selective and targeted basis and will be strictly aligned with the two (2) pillars as well as with the CSP’s 
five (5) focus areas. One of the thrusts of the economic and sector work programme will be to identify 
reform packages aimed at providing a basis for future budget support operations but also at building existing 
knowledge on themes not yet covered by Tunisia. 
 
2. Analytical work programme. Based on discussions held with the Authorities  and pre-
identification work carried out during the preparation of the 2014-2016 Interim CSP, the indicative 
analytical work programme by Pillar for the 2017-2019 period is expected to be as follows:  
 
3. Pillar I.  The analytical work programme under Pillar I could comprise a public spending review 
carried out in partnership with the World Bank. The objective of this review would be to assess the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public spending in achieving the economic policy objectives defined by the government 
and to make recommendations on the optimization of public spending against a backdrop of increased 
budget constraints and on its role in the acceleration of growth. The programme would also include a study 
on the structural transformation of the Tunisian economy enabling the country to graduate from Low-Middle 
Income Country status to High-Middle Income-Country status.  Another major study would concern the 
modelling of the labour market that would simulate the impact of a change in the institutional and legislative 
framework governing the functioning of the labour market in order to support the transformation of the 
Tunisian economic and social model. Two other studies concerned the assessment of   the industrial and 
innovation policy and optimization of Tunisia’s method of industrial specialization and transition towards 
a high value-added industry in accordance with the 2016-2020 PSD objectives.  Finally, a prospective study 
would also be conducted on managerial staff and senior technicians required for industry and the private 
sector up to 2030 in order to more accurately focus the national training efforts.  
 
4. Pillar II. Under Pillar II, the analytical work programme would comprise a pilot study on the 
establishment of an accounting framework at regional level that would facilitate the calculation of an annual 
growth statistic that would improve economic development management in the governorates. The work 
programme includes the definition of a Quality of Life Index (QLI) in the priority regions in partnership 
with the Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies (ITCEQ) the objective of which 
will be to complement the existing disparity measurement indicators in particular, the Regional 
Development Index (RDI). 
 
5.  The programme under Pillar II will also include a flagship study on rural economic 
transformation, the objective of which will be to make recommendations on policies aimed at increasing the 
rural economy’s contribution to economic growth and employment as well as a diagnostic study on 
Tunisia’s agro-food industry accompanied by operational recommendations that would boost the sector and 
transform it into a new driver of growth and job creation.    
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Box 3: The Concept of Rural Economic Transformation  
 
The concept of rural economic transformation considers the rural economy as a whole where many economic 
opportunities co-exist including agriculture. The theory on the structural  transformation of developing 
economies assumes that a country’s economic structure changes over time and that the share of the primary 
sector, mainly agriculture, decreases in favour of industry (secondary sector) then services (tertiary sector). 
This movement is accompanied by an increase in agricultural competitiveness, which releases labour that 
could be employed in industry. Such a transformation has occurred in Tunisia since the 1960s but remains 
imperfect. The growth of industry and services, which now represent 90% of GDP, is not strong enough to 
resolve the underlying problem of unemployment.  In such a situation, rural economic transformation assumes 
actions that will combine agriculture with industrial and services activities to boost synergy and diversification 
and to seize new opportunities in information and communication technologies (ICT), tourism, 
biotechnologies, environmental productions and the production of renewable energy, for example. These 
integrated approaches also include the forging of ties between public and private sector actors, the 
development of professional organizations, facilitation of dialogue between structures and the authorities, 
building the capacity and developing the expressiveness of youths and women who are the real drivers of 
innovation and growth in rural areas. 
 
6. Implementation Schedule. Depending on available resources that could be mobilized and the 
thematic priorities, the implementation schedule for the first phase of the analytical work programme 
including preparation of the concept note and the search for financing would be as follows:  
 
2017 
Pillar I Public Spending Review 
Industry and Innovation Policy Evaluation  
Study on the optimization of Tunisia’s Industrial Specialization 
Pillar II Study on the Establishment of Annual Growth Statistics at Governorate Level.  
Study on the Establishment of a Quality of Life Index (QLI) (pilot) 
2018 
Pillar I  Study on Tunisia’s Structural Transformation  (transition from lower MIC to upper MIC)  
Study on the  Trade Integration of Tunisia with Africa 
Study on the Modelling of Tunisia’s Labour Market  
Pillar II Flagship Study on Rural Economic Transformation 
2019 
Pillar I  Study on Skill Needs of Industry and the Private Sector up to 2030   
Pillar II Study on Agro-Food Industries 
 
7. Definition of the 2019-2021 Analytical Work Programme will be initiated in 2018 and confirmed 
at the 2017-2019 Mid-Term Review     
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Annex 5 
 
Synthesis of the Guidance Note for the Preparation of the 2016-2020 Development Plan 
(Author: MDICI)  
 
1. Introduction.  In 2021, the Tunisian people rose up in revolt for their freedom and dignity 
demanding a complete break with the method of governance based on exclusion and advocated for a new 
model and new development strategy. This Guidance Note on the first development plan of the Second 
Republic is in keeping with this context. It outlines the new blueprint for society and determines the 
development model desired by Tunisia based on a diagnostic review of the country’s economic and social 
situation.  The Guidance Note, therefore, constitutes a basis for dialogue between all the actors in society 
and a reference framework for the preparation of the development plans covering the 2016-2020 period. 
 
Development Diagnostic 
 
2. The development diagnostic reveals many structural problems in particular the non-existence of 
good governance, the proliferation of corruption, the ineffectiveness of public polices, low productivity and 
widening disparities between social categories and regions in additions to cyclical difficulties inherent in 
the democratic transition period stemming from political, security and social instability. 
 
3. The development model and its employment generating capacity. The development policies 
contributed to the achievement of an average annual GDP growth rate of about 4.5% during the 1984-2010 
period. Although this rate was considered high compared to similar countries, it concealed several 
vulnerabilities because of its inability to achieve equitable distribution of wealth. Nor did this high growth 
rate address the demographic challenge in the late 90s and create the required number of job positions to 
absorb the additional demand. 
 
GDP Trend, 1984-2015 
 
 
 
4. Based on the traditional sectors with low productivity and value added as well as unskilled labour 
and an over-protected local market, the development model began to lose momentum in the early 2000s.  
5. Contribution of Investment to Development Efforts. Special attention was paid to investment 
reflected in the number of measures taken to promote private initiative and support the investment drive. As 
a result, the public investment rate reached 8% of GDP up to the late 2000s but then fell to 6% in the years 
preceding the Revolution. For its part, private investment increased without, however, reaching rates that 
were comparable to those of rival countries, not exceeding 61% of GDP. While progress was made in the 
-4
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industry sector, foreign direct investment rarely exceeded 3% of GDP with the dominance of the energy 
sector representing over 50% of all FDI. The low level of local and foreign private sector investment is 
mainly due to bad governance, the proliferation of corruption, complexity of administrative procedures, 
limited market access and a burgeoning black market, which is both a cause and consequence. 
 
6. Regional Development. Over the past few decades, the development policies adopted have 
largely contributed to the widening of regional disparities. Indeed, the centralized approach did not take into 
consideration regional specificities and did not encourage the effective participation of civil society or the 
private sector as well as professional structures both at the regional and local levels in the preparation of 
development guidelines and policies. While public investments were channelled towards certain regions, 
they were more concentrated on basic social services and internal infrastructure within these regions rather 
than on infrastructure connecting these regions to the main coastal cities and ports, which did not help to 
attract private investment. 
 
2015 Regional Development Index Map 
 
7. Social Policies. Over the past two decades, the volume of social-related transfers and expenditure   
represented between 16% and 20% of the budget, which helped to create a strong middle class representing 
80% of the population. However, these efforts revealed their limitations in terms of well-being and social 
justice as reflected in the deterioration in living standards of many socio-professional categories (SPC), 
widespread unemployment, the spread of unemployment and the parallel market and in financial imbalances 
in the social security funds. 
 
8. Financial Balances. Control of overall financial balances was one of the economic performances 
achieved that was largely responsible for the improvement of Tunisia’s ranking by the institutional 
institutions up to 2010. However, as with most transitions, the political, security and social instability that 
prevailed during the period of democratic transition had a negative impact on financial balances, resulting 
in rising public debt and a deterioration in Tunisia’s sovereign rating. 
 
9. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.  The economic choices made by Tunisia 
over the past few decades, especially with regard to energy-intensive consumption, production with high 
water consumption and adoption of an over-intensive urbanization policy, have had a negative impact on 
the environment and natural resources.  Furthermore, pressure has increased on the sustainability of natural 
resources, as a result of the degradation of a large part of the forest cover and of soil quality due to the 
phenomena of erosion, desert encroachment and over-tapping of the groundwater table. 
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10. Tunisia in its external environment. Tunisia’s external economy is well integrated into its 
environment in spite of the weak diversification of its external markets; 80% of its trade is concentrated in 
four (4) European countries. 
 
The Blueprint for Society and Alternative Development Model 
 
11. The new blueprint for society and development model desired by Tunisia are based on four (4) 
key objectives: 
 
 Provide the economy with the required efficiency; 
 
 Mainstream the inclusion of all categories and regions in the development process; 
 
 Guarantee the sustainability of development and; 
 
 Strive to achieve equity and social justice. 
 
12. An evolving blueprint for society The blueprint for society in the new Tunisia is based on the 
principles and values set forth in the constitution in particular: 
 
 Consolidation of the foundations of democracy, establishment of the rule of law, protection 
of freedoms, strengthening of security and confirmation of consultation. 
 
 Establishment of the pillars of the civilizational blueprint in order to restore confidence 
among young people, women, children and the family as development actors. 
 
 Consolidation of the foundations of integral good governance and all it implies in terms of 
transparency, accountability and participation while working to modernize the 
administration and public service management methods. 
 
13. An alternative development model. The economic dimension of the new development approach 
aims to achieve access to higher levels of inclusive and sustainable growth: 
 
 Economic efficiency based on innovation and partnership through: 
 
 Transformation of the economic structure to facilitate access to global value chains; 
 
 Creation of an enabling environment for investment and establishment of a legal and 
regulatory framework that will be able to ensure complementarity between the public 
and private sectors and structures of the social and solidarity economy.  
 
14. Inclusion, a key determinant of equity through  
 
 Reconciliation between economic efficiency and social justice; 
 Inclusion of regions and strengthening the protections of categories with specific needs; 
 Integration of women and young people into the development process and consolidation of 
human resource capacity. 
15. Sustainability of the Development Process and Promotion of the Green Economy through 
 
 Implementation of a new regional development policy; 
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 Rationalization of natural resource management and environmental protection; 
 
 Use of non-conventional resources (desalination of seawater, brackish water,); 
 
 Sustainable and participatory waste management. 
 
16. Redefinition of the roles of the three development actors: 
 
 Central Government plays a key role in wealth distribution, improvement of living 
conditions, guarantee of service delivery (education, higher education, vocational training, 
health), establishment of infrastructure and public utilities as well as arbitration, regulation, 
guidance, forecasting and the promotion of partnerships with the private sector. 
 
 The private sector is a key actor in the creation of wealth, investment and employment. 
 
 The third sector comprising the institutions and structures of the social/solidarity economy 
and civil society organizations are full-fledged partners in the effort towards integral 
development. 
 
17. Requirements. The success of the integral development process in particular requires: 
 
 Establishment of the institutional framework by setting up independent constitutional 
bodies, the supreme council of magistrates, the constitutional court, the supreme council of 
local government and the national social dialogue council; 
 
 Preservation of peace and security and combat against terrorism ; and 
 
 The consolidation of social peace, restoration of working values and the preparation of the 
prerequisites and instruments for decentralization. 
 
Main Thrusts of the Strategy: Objectives, Policies and Reforms  
 
18. The government’s strategy for the 2016-2020 period has five (5) main thrusts including one 
crosscutting thrust on good governance and the combat against corruption.  The four (4) other thrusts are as 
follows:  
 
Thrust 1 – From low-cost economy to economic hub mainly due to an enviable geographical location and 
qualified human resources.  
 
More Diversified Economic Fabric with a High Employment Content 
 
Positioning in global value chains and promotion of promising sectors by increasing the share of sectors 
with a high knowledge content from 20% of GDP in 2015 to 30% in 2020 
 
 Development of infrastructure and logistics by bringing down logistics costs from 20% of 
GDP in 2015 to 15% in 2020; 
 
 Promotion of innovation by doubling the number of patents nationwide; 
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 Development of integral and sustainable complementary economic subsectors by increasing 
the level of integration of exporting sectors from 15% at present to 20% by 2020; 
 
 Productivity as a source of competitiveness by accelerating the pace of total factor 
productivity to over 2.5% in 2020; and 
 
 Promotion of employment and employability especially among higher education graduates 
and in the hinterland regions. 
 
Promotion of Investment and Improvement of Business Climate 
 
 Private investment, key driver of growth and employment; with the objective of raising the 
investment rate to 25% of GDP in 2020; 
 
 Improve the return on public investment by increasing the share of private sector investment 
in total investment to above the 65% threshold by 2020; 
 
 Improvement of the business climate by improving Tunisia’s Doing Business ranking to 
40th  position from its 60th position at present. 
 
Support for the export drive and to Tunisia’s integration into the global economy 
 
 Deepen economic integration and promote the export drive by bolstering export efforts to 
reach   42% of GDP by 2020. 
 
Promote Employment and Improve Employability 
  
 Reduce the unemployment rate from 15% to 11.5% by 2020 especially among young 
graduates; 
 
 Accelerate the rate of growth and strengthen its employment content; 
 
 Ensure the effectiveness of the active employment policy (AEP); and 
 
 Encourage and promote the spirit of initiative, and strengthen the social and solidarity 
economy. 
 
Thrust 2 – Human Development and Social Inclusion 
 
 Reduce the absolute poverty rate from 4.6% to 2.5% by 2020 and raise the Human 
Development Index (HDI) from 0.721 in 2013 to 0.786 in 2020; 
 
 Enhance the efficiency and quality of the educational system for higher education and 
vocational training and its adaptation to the needs of the productive system while creating 
bridges between its components and striving to consolidate the professionalization of 
streams and specialties; 
 
 Transform youth and childhood into real partners in the development process; 
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 Safeguard and consolidate women’s vested rights, take their concerns into account 
especially in rural areas, eliminate all forms of violence against women and prevent school 
drop-outs, especially girls and build women’s economic and social capacity; and 
 
 Integrate Tunisians living abroad into the development effort, safeguard their rights and 
consolidate their participation in the development drive. 
 
Social Promotion 
 
 Fulfil the provisions of the social contract, promote professional relationships and improve 
occupational health and safety, 
 
 Modernize the health sector and distribute health services equitably among the regions in 
accordance with the health map while strengthening medical specialties and developing 
research in the sector, 
 
 Improve living conditions (decent housing, drinking water, electrification, sanitation and 
transport,), 
 
 Establish a social protection floor and identifier while allocating to social transfers and 
spending resources corresponding to at least 20% of GDP, and 
 
 Introduce a global reform of the social security system especially in the pensions and health 
insurance divisions. 
 
Thrust 3 – Regional Development and fulfilment of the regions’ aspirations 
 
19. The regional development strategy for the 2016-2020 period aims to fulfil the aspirations of 
disadvantaged regions and reduce by 30% the existing gap reflected in the Regional Development indicator 
(RDI). The strategic regional development thrusts aim to: 
 
 Provide links and communication between the regions by expanding and modernizing 
transport and logistic services infrastructure. Reorganization of administrative divisions and 
equitable allocation of public investment as well as the distribution of specific budgets and 
programmes between regions and channelling of benefits towards regional development 
zones will help to open up the regions;  
 
 Promote development in the regions and enhance their attractiveness by diversifying the 
economic base in the regions in line with available capacity and natural resources. 
 
 Ensure an appropriate business environment by improving socio-collective infrastructure, 
equipment and services as well as encouraging and supporting private initiative and the 
territorial marketing strategy; 
 
 Develop trade between border regions and their Libyan and Algerian counterparts; 
 
 Develop economic subsectors and promote competitiveness and scientific research as well as 
support to the green economy which are strategies to be developed and operationalised in order 
to boost regional development; 
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 Modernize the regional development financing system and make it more flexible by 
establishing a legal framework that will enable local governments to promote their own financial 
resources. Further support is envisaged for the financing mechanisms through the establishment 
of banks for the regions or development and investment funds in the regions; 
 
 Improve living conditions at the local and regional levels by intensifying specific 
programmes in order to strengthen infrastructure and improve drinking water supply, 
electrification and sanitation and to modernize community facilities and administrative services 
and provide support to sporting and cultural activities for young people. Additional efforts will 
be made to support access to social coverage and public medical services and to improve 
telecommunication network infrastructure and housing conditions; and 
 
 Develop decentralization and lay the foundations for local and regional good 
governance through the establishment of a political and institutional system by organizing 
municipal and regional council elections, the establishment of a new administrative 
territorial structure, revision of development plans, support to the devolution and restructuring 
of the central, regional and local administration. New measures will also be envisaged to 
consolidate the good governance foundations at all levels and in different areas in order to 
guarantee equitable, inclusive and sustainable development.  
 
Thrust 4 – The green economy, guarantor of sustainable development. The protection and good 
governance of natural resources is the main pillar of the green economy. Thus, the main objectives in this 
area are: 
 
 Provide water security.  
 
 Guarantee food security.  
 
 Provide energy security. 
 
 Adoption of equitable regional development that includes all regions and respects 
ecological balances 
 
 Ensure complementarity between rural and urban areas. 
 
 Establish and develop new integrated economic hubs that will become centres of influence 
and engines of development. 
 
 Develop border areas so that they are able to attract investment and create jobs. 
 
 Management and rationalization of the use of water resources  
 
 Achieve a water resource harvesting rate of 95% in 2020 compared to 92% at present. 
 
 Improvement of the drinking water network yield to 80% by 2020 compared to 76% at 
present. 
 
 Achieve a drinking water supply rate in rural areas of 96% by 2020. 
 
 Reuse 50% of treated water. 
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 Modern agriculture, guarantor of food security 
 
 Supervision of, and support to farmers. 
 
 Establishment of new mutual funds that will help small-scale producers to manage the 
production and marketing chain. 
 
 Raise the agricultural sector growth rate to achieve an average annual rate of 5% throughout 
the 2016-2020 period. 
 
 Increase the share of food products in exports. 
 
 Control of energy consumption 
 
 Reinforcement of research, exploration and investment in the energy sector. 
 
 Diversification of energy sources and shale gas exploration. 
 
 Increase in the share of renewable energies in the energy mix to 12% in 2020 from 3% at 
present. 
 
 A 3% annual reduction in energy intensity. 
 
 
 Protection of natural heritage 
 
 Fight against illegal fishing and protection of maritime wealth. 
 
 Fight against desert encroachment, erosion and sand silting. 
 
 Development of forest stock and integration of local residents into its governance. 
 
 Protection of the environment and natural habitats 
 
 Environmental upgrading of industrial enterprises and especially those operating in the 
chemicals and phosphate sectors in the Governorates of Gabes, Gafsa and Sfax. 
 
 Achieve a household waste recycling rate of 50% by 2020. 
 
 Increase in the public sanitation network connection rate in municipalities covered by 
ONAS to 90% in 2020 from the current 85.9%. 
 
 Reduction of the risk of natural  and technological disasters 
 
 Build national natural disaster surveillance capacity and develop early warning systems. 
 
 Build national resilience and adaptation capacity.  
 
20. 2016-2020 Growth Pattern Achievement of the objectives set by the 2016-2020 Strategic 
Development Plan (PSD) will depend on a growth path that in particular envisages the gradual   
return of growth to its historical growth path of 5% and an increase equivalent to 7% of GDP in 
the investment rate by 2020.   
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Table 1: Growth Pattern (2016-2020) 
(Constant Prices) 2015-2011 2020-2016 
Increase   
Average GDP growth at market prices 1.5% 5.0% 
Consumption   
Public consumption  5.4% 4.3% 
Private consumption 4.1% 4.4% 
Investment (Current Prices)   
GFCF in TND 77 048 125 000 
Average over the period 0.9% 17% 
Investment rate (end of period) 18.5% 25% 
Unemployment Rate 15.2% 11.5% 
   
Trade   
Exports of goods and services -0.7% 6.0% 
Imports of goods and services -0.1% 5.2% 
Revenue (TND)    
 8 283 12 400 
Savings Rate   
Savings rate/AGNI 10.5% 17.7% 
Balance of Payments   
Current Deficit (end of period) 8.5% 6.8% 
Inflation (end of period) 5.4% 3.6% 
Source: MDICI, 2015 
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Annex 6 
 
Note on Industry in Tunisia 
 
1. Role of Industry. Tunisia, historically an agricultural country, decided in the early 60s to link its 
economic development to the development of an industrial base, initially focused on meeting domestic 
demand as part of an import substitution strategy. However, this turned out to be a partial failure because of 
the narrowness of the Tunisian market. From the early 1970s, the Tunisian Authorities began to change 
strategy by promoting a transformation policy based on a controlled opening up of the economy. This was 
mainly dependent on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), increasing medium and high value-added 
industrial exports to Europe and establishing a national tourism industry. An extremely attractive fiscal and 
non-fiscal incentive system was established with a specific regime for industrial exportersii. In 1995, with a 
view to the lowering of tariff barriers planned for 2008, a major programme was set up to upgrade Tunisian 
enterprises supported by the European Union (EU) aimed at modernizing their equipment, resources and 
method of management. This 
programme’s objective was to improve 
their productivity and enable them to 
withstand international competition. This 
programme had a significant impact on 
the competitiveness of Tunisian 
enterprises. The share of industrial 
exports in total exports rose from 40% in 
1995 to 84% in 2008 before falling back 
to an average of about 76% over the 2011-
2014 period.    
 
2. Tunisia’s existing industrial 
fabric is relatively diversified and, as at 30 
March 2016, comprised 5591 enterprises, 
2506 (45%) of which operate under a 
regime for totally exporting (TE) 
enterprises and 3085 under the regime for 
‘other than totally exporting companies’  
(OTE). The existing industrial nomenclature comprises nine (9) sectors (see figure above). The textile and 
clothing industry (TCI) and agro-food industries (AFI) currently represent 50% of Tunisia’s existing 
industrial fabric followed by Mechanical and Metalworking Industries (MMI) and the Chemical Industry 
(CHI). In all, these four (4) sectors currently represent 73% of Tunisian industry. This distribution is slightly 
modified in terms of employment. In fact, 80% of industrial employment is provided by the textile and 
clothing industry (TCI), agro-food industry (AFI), electrical and electronic industry (EEI) and the Chemical 
Industry (CHI). However, a detailed analysis confirms the existence of a certain dynamic between the 
number of jobs and the tax regime of the enterprise. Thus, while the number of enterprises benefiting from 
the totally exporting regime currently only represents 45% of the existing industrial fabric, these enterprises 
represent 63% of total employment in industry representing 499,000 jobs in 2016, 47% of which were in 
the textile and clothing sector alone and 24.2% in the electrical and electronic sector.  
 
3. However, jobs in the textile and clothing sector are mainly low or moderately skilled jobs. This 
finding is currently the main problem of Tunisian industry.  
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Figure 9:  Tunisia's Industrial Fabric in 2016 (Source: 
APII)
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4. The industrial specialization 
method and adoption of the workshop strategy 
mainly based on imports of semi-finished 
goods intended for re-exporting mainly to 
Europe to Tunisia since the 1970s, is unlikely 
to facilitate the establishment of an industrial 
base able to absorb the highly skilled jobs that 
Tunisia needs to integrate its higher education 
graduates entering the labour market each 
year.  
 
5. This objective assumes an 
upgrading of Tunisian industry and 
revamping if not reassessment of its industrial 
strategy and resources allocated by central 
government to support its industrial policy. 
Therefore, it is worth noting that since 2015, 
the Ministry of Industry has initiated an evaluation of Tunisia’s industrial and innovation policy with Bank 
support. This will be used to enrich reflection and dialogue on the adjustment of the industrial model.                 
 
Author: Philippe Trape, RDGN 
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Annex 7 
Note on the Agricultural Sector  
 
1. The agricultural sector is a lifeline for Tunisia’s economy. It contributes 10% to GDP, 16% to 
employment and about 10% to export revenue. Over the past few decades, the Bank has provided significant 
support to this sector, in particular through: (i) integrated agricultural development projects (IADP) in the 
regions of Gabès and Gafsa; (ii) the Second Water Sector Investment Project (PISEAU II) co-financed by ADB, 
AFD and the World Bank and; (iii) several project preparation-related grants. As a reminder, the financing of 
agricultural sector operations has represented about 4% of the Bank’s commitments in the country since 2006.  
 
2. The scarcity of water resources is one of the main challenges for the development of the 
agricultural sector in Tunisia. Indeed, about 80% of the water used for agricultural purposes is the main 
constraining factor. There are fewer and fewer opportunities for harvesting additional water resources and 
competition between the different water uses could in future become a serious threat. This constraint is 
compounded by the uneven distribution of rainfall and recurrent droughts that seriously affect rain-fed 
agriculture. The scarcity of arable land and erosion are other factors limiting the development of agriculture. 
The agricultural sector also faces technical and institutional constraints, including farmer’ indebtedness which 
prevents about 120,000 farmers from accessing credit, the poor organization of agro-food subsectors such as 
the edible oil subsector, insufficient enhancement of exported products, problems related to productivity and 
the competitiveness of certain value chains, constraints associated with the land tenure system and the sub-
division of farmland, low intensification of public irrigated areas and a downward trend in public investment. 
 
3. However, this sector can provide many opportunities to stimulate the national development 
process. Tunisia’s comparative advantage for the agricultural products it exports such as olive oil, fishery 
products, dates and citrus fruit is that the latter provide opportunities for value chain development in these niche 
areas. Especially in the case of olive trees, the country has very large areas (around 1,700,000 ha) dedicated to 
growing them and there is significant scope for increasing yields and improving quality. The private sector has 
invested considerably in processing. Significant industrial capacity is already available to scale up existing 
output. The country has a storage capacity of 350,000 tonnes. Manufacturers have already invested in packaging 
and have begun to penetrate the international market. A private sector glass packaging industry is already 
established, even though it will have to further increase its investment in the quality of its products to meet the 
demand of oil exporters more effectively. There are real opportunities for the country to position itself in the 
organic oil niche market. All these assets provide opportunities for the development of the olive oil value chains 
by improving olive grove production and the quality of the oil, more efficient subsector organizations and an 
increase in Tunisia’s market share in the traditional/organic bottled/packaged olive oil. 
 
4. Tunisia’s agricultural policy has remained almost unchanged since the early 90s. Its aim is ensure 
the country’s food security while supporting farmers’ income. The main components of the policy are: (i) 
constant support to small-scale family farming through agricultural and rural development projects (irrigation, 
drinking water, electrification, soil and water conservation works, roads): the Bank has been very active in 
financing several projects in this area; (ii) large-scale natural resources mobilization for agriculture; (iii) support 
to investment under the Agricultural Investment Code; the Special Fund for the Development of Agriculture 
and Fisheries (FOSDAP) is the instrument used to provide this support; (iv) price support by fixing a minimum 
price, especially for cereals and milk, and protection of the domestic market by customs duties and quotas; (v) 
subsidies on agricultural inputs (improved cereal seeds, fodder seeds, energy, irrigation water…); and (vi) 
incentives to export agricultural products for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage (olive oil, citrus fruit, 
dates and fishery products). Primarily concerned with improving agricultural production over the past few 
decades, the Ministry of Agriculture is beginning to change its approach to the design and implementation of 
agricultural products by using a subsector approach that also takes into account issues related to logistics, 
marketing and processing. 
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5. The prospects for the Bank’s future partnership with Tunisia in the agricultural sector will be 
guided by support to the strategic options adopted by the country to create more wealth and employment, 
thereby reducing regional disparities. These options are to: (i) adopt a subsector approach focused on income-
generating activities and; (ii) develop agribusiness, by encouraging reforms that will facilitate access to land, 
markets, logistics hubs, especially in the most disadvantaged regions. The Bank could support the sector’s new 
development approach concerning integrated projects containing aspects relating to the organization of farmers, 
training, certification and harmonization in terms of quality with those of partner countries to facilitate access 
to markets. Since 80% of those working in rural areas are women, the Bank could pay special attentions to their   
involvement in the projects concerned.  
 
Author: Mohamed Tolba, RDGN 2 
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Annex 8 
Note on the Energy Sector 
 
1. The Bank is one of Tunisia’s traditional partners for the development of this strategic sector. It 
began operations in the sector in 1975 with the El Borma Gas Pipeline Reinforcement Project. The Bank’s total 
net commitments in the sector amount to UA 254 million. Nine operations, including 8 electricity projects, have 
been financed, thus contributing to improving the people’s living conditions. The rural electrification rate in 
Tunisia rose to 99.5% in 2014 (compared to 6% in 1976). The national electrification rate was estimated at 
99.8% over the same period (compared to 37% in 1976). Several other donors contributed to the achievement 
of this result, but there is no formal coordination mechanism for their respective interventions to ensure more 
effective use of resources. However, it is worth noting the recent interest expressed by IsDB and the Bank in 
the Italy-Tunisia interconnection project initiated by the operators of the two countries concerned with, in 
particular, support from the World Bank and European Union. 
 
2. The contrasting trend between declining national resources and a sustained increase in demand 
is the major challenge facing the energy sector in Tunisia. Over the past few decades oil and gas production 
has fluctuated between 6 et 7 million tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE)  while the average annual growth rate in  
demand for primary energy was 3%, rising from 8.4 million TOE in 2010 to 9.2 million TOE in 2015. In light 
of the resources estimated at 5.2 million TOE, Tunisia had an energy gap of 4 million tonnes of TOE in 2015. 
In fact, a structural energy gap has emerged since 2000 in spite of all the exploration and demand control efforts. 
Moreover, for various reasons, the subsidy has increased since 2010 and now represents a heavy burden on 
public finances, although it has been significantly alleviated by the fall in world oil prices. 
 
3. As regards the energy mix, the sharp increase in gas resources has, over forty years, transformed the 
country from a situation of almost complete oil monopoly to one of more or less balanced sharing with natural 
gas. In 2015, natural gas represented 53% of the country’s primary energy; 47% of this gas is produced locally 
and 53% imported from Algeria. Electricity has been the main driver of this massive gas penetration due to its 
use in electric power plants where the electricity generated uses 73% of natural gas consumption. The existing 
pattern cannot be identically replicated in future, since gas resources would not be able to meet demand should 
the trend be the same as in the past. Under these conditions, it will be necessary to envisage other types of 
consumption that will lead to a reduction in natural gas requirements. 
 
4. Tunisia’s energy sector has opportunities.  Tunisia is located between two major oil and gas 
producers, namely Algeria and Libya and its national reserves have not yielded all their promises. The potential 
for non-conventional oil and gas resources as estimated by the International Energy Agency could largely cover 
the country’s needs for at least a decade. As regards the development of renewable energy, the country enjoys 
excellent sunlight conditions and has significant wind potential.  The country also has power interconnections 
with its neighbours: 5 with Algeria and 2 with Libya, currently used on a net-zero-energy trade basis but which 
could be used to increase power trading. There is also a gas connection with Algeria, which exports its 
natural gas to Europe through Tunisia. With Libya, a joint gas pipeline project has reached an advanced 
stage of development but has not yet been able to be implemented. Moreover, with an electrification rate of 
99.5%, Tunisia has been able to develop industrial fabric for the production of electrical equipment ranging 
from meters to cables and transformers in compliance with international standards and a high proportion 
earmarked for export. 
 
5. In the area of renewable energy, the programme to promote photovoltaic solar roofs launched over 
the 2011-2015 period has exceeded 60% of its objectives and fostered the emergence of private assembly (5)   
and installation (210) firms. The implementation of renewable energy programmes could create positive 
externalities by creating a new industrial subsector in these job-creating areas. It is, therefore, important that the 
reforms embarked upon aimed at improving the business environment for private sector participation in electric 
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power generation, especially in the area of renewable energies are pursued and accelerated. Publication of the 
implementing texts of the Law on Renewable Energy and the establishment of a sector regulatory authority are 
among the priorities.                                  
 
6. The Government’s policy and strategy to reduce the country’s vulnerability and more effectively 
safeguard its supplies, is to initiate a real energy transition. It will be necessary to address the following 
challenges: (i) secure, continuing and affordable supply through, in particular, the adoption of sustainable 
energy mixes, (a) by intensifying the development of conventional, and possibly non-conventional oil  and gas 
resources, (b) by diversifying natural gas sources of supply, (c) by developing the contribution of renewable  
energy in electric power generation, and (d) developing the power trade with neighbouring countries (including 
an interconnection with Italy); (ii)  combatting energy insecurity by providing all citizens with access to energy 
with a special focus on the supply of natural gas to the urban communities of  the country’s hinterland; (iii) 
economic streamlining by adopting an energy-efficient economic development model and stepping up efforts 
to diversify the energy mix through the use of renewable energy, in particular, wind and solar energy, aimed at 
achieving 12% of total electric power generation from renewable sources by 2020 and 30% by 2030; (iv) the 
development of regional integration through the intensification of regional electricity and gas trading; (v) 
implementation of the necessary institutional reforms for the sector’s future development through, in particular, 
revision of the Hydrocarbons Code, by adopting the implementing texts of the Law governing Electricity 
Generation from Renewable Sources in order to promote the private sector’s contribution to the development 
of these energies. 
 
Author: Amadou Bassirou Diallo, RDGW 3    
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Annex 9 
Note on the Financial Sector 
 
1. Government strategy. Reform of the Tunisian financial sector plays an important role in the 2016-2020 
National Reform Programme. Modernization of the financial sector aimed at improving financial intermediation in 
Tunisia (banking, SME financing, micro-financing, financial market and insurance) merges as a major strategic 
direction to strengthen economic competitiveness and regional development in the 2016-2020 Strategic Development 
Plan.  The financial sector modernization is based on the following components: (i) improvement of the governance 
regulatory framework, (ii) strengthening of banking supervision, (iii) building the banking sector’s resilience by 
completing the restructuring and upgrading of the banking system, (iv) improvement of financial inclusion, (v) 
facilitation of access to financing by micro-enterprises, SME, innovative venture capital companies; and (vi) the 
development/deepening of capital markets.  
 
2. Constraints and challenges of the Tunisian financial sector.  In spite of the reforms achieved to-date 
in the Tunisian financial sector, major challenges remain, which must be tackled in order for the sector to 
play its expected role in financing the economy and in fostering the economic inclusion of the most 
disadvantaged segments of the population). The Tunisian financial sector: (i) plays a limited role in 
financing the economy, with bank credit to the private sector barely representing 73.6% of GDP in 2015; 
(ii) has a fairly narrow scope with a financial inclusion rate of 36% and only 13% of bank credit benefiting 
SMEs; (iii) suffers from a low level of diversification of financial services; and (iv) presents  considerable 
fragility, especially in the form of a high bad debt ratio of 16% at the end of 2015. The regulatory and 
governance frameworks for some subsectors also require strengthening.  Therefore, the Tunisian 
Government cannot overlook the financial sector if it is to fulfil its ambitions for accelerated and inclusive 
growth. 
3. The banking sector remains small by international standards, with estimated assets equivalent to 
115% of GDP, well below the levels recorded in Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon.  The banking sector is 
characterized by a triple paradox37. First, the banking landscape comprises a significantly high number of 
banking institutions (21), but there is insufficient competition.  Second, despite the lack of competition the 
sector’s average profitability is low, particularly reflecting weaknesses in the management of some 
institutions’ operating costs, in particular those of public banks.  Lastly, surveys point out that even though 
the majority of businesses have outstanding bank credit, they consider access to financing to be a major 
constraint to their expansion.  Structurally, the banking system provides little credit to the Tunisian economy 
compared to countries with economic similarities.  Its capacity to innovate and develop is inhibited by the 
threat of bad debts, control exerted over and regulation of bank credit interest rates which could impede 
adequate risk assessment and pricing, but also by the lack of mechanisms to facilitate SME access to credit 
(e.g. credit bureaux). It is also worth noting that Tunisia has the highest guarantee rate in the MENA region 
with USD 1.78 required in the form of a guarantee for each US dollar awarded in the form of a loan.  
However, it should be stressed that the authorities are making considerable efforts to offset these 
weaknesses, in particular through the restructuring of the banking sector, improvement of the guarantee 
mechanism and diversification of financing instruments, especially in the regions.  
                                                          
37  Summary Diagnostic Review of the financial sector in Tunisia: inventory, main challenges and opportunities for reforms (June 2014). 
 
 
 - 26 - 
 
4. Financial inclusion weaknesses also limit the economic opportunities available to vulnerable 
and rural segments of the population and rural communities, to allow them to emerge from 
unemployment and exclusion through entrepreneurship and self-employment. The microfinance sector 
in Tunisia remains far below its potential with a number of active borrowers (300,000) significantly below 
its potential of 950,000 individuals and about 245,000 micro-and small enterprises, as estimated by the study 
on financial inclusion published in 201338.  
5.  This potential corresponds to diversified demand for financial services credit, means of payment , 
transfers  and insurance) which is largely unmet since the supply is mainly concentrated on the granting of 
microcredits. The sector is now characterized by its high degree of bipolarity, represented by organized 
microfinance institutions (5) meeting the requirements of the regulatory framework established in 2011, and 
by a large number of microcredit associations (289 identified, 176 of which were reported to still be active 
in 2015) that are currently experiencing considerable difficulties in complying with the regulatory 
framework in force.  The planned adoption of a national financial inclusion strategy and the establishment 
of adequate support mechanisms such as a risk registry and inclusion observatory will ensure progress in 
terms of inclusion. 
6. Historically, the Government has adopted a policy of encouragement of investment capital activities 
based on fiscal incentives but the sector remains underdeveloped. Since the Revolution, real progress has been 
made in the sector, fostered in particular by the adoption of the 2011 Decree-Law. This sector’s role is especially 
important for the financing of industrial activities (over 75%) in the regional development areas (2/3). However, the 
contribution of venture capital to the financing of private investment and the Tunisian economy remains highly limited 
with a penetration rate of about 0.3% in 2015 and a strong concentration on development capital activities.39 This 
limited progress particularly reflects the inflexibility of the regulations governing the sector, especially in terms of the 
eligibility of businesses concerned by the investments 
7. The insurance sector is also poorly developed in Tunisia, with a volume of policies equivalent to 1.9% 
of GDP at the end of 2015, despite a high number of actors (over twenty companies) mainly concentrated in non- 
insurance activities. While Tunisia is positioning itself as an emerging insurance market, the sector is not very buoyant, 
with an average annual growth rate of claims paid of only 0.8%.  Insurance covering specific sectors such as agriculture 
are embryonic and coverage of farmers does not exceed 8% and is often linked to the financing of an agricultural 
activity. An analysis of the sector reveals the following: (I) the automobile subsector dominates and is loss-making 
and the life insurance sector is poorly developed, (ii) mandatory insurance is not complied with, (iii) the solvency of 
actors is very heterogeneous and (iv) and there are weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework. 
 
8. The capital markets do not fully play their role as drivers of the financing of the Tunisian economy. 
Funds raised on the Tunisian capital markets remain very limited (1.7% of GDP in 2015). Market capitalization and 
corporate bond markets represent 21% and 2.8% respectively of GDP (compared to 61% in Morocco and 93% in 
Jordan). The primary markets for corporate equity and bonds are small and the secondary market lacks liquidity. The 
equity market is not used for the placement of long-term investments and enjoys only limited participation of 
institutional investors, thus depriving the economy of substantial financing resources. Similarly, listed companies do 
not reflect the structure of the Tunisian economy (no companies listed in the textile and tourism sectors)40 and the 
alternative market to attract SMEs has very limited appeal 
 Authors: Ashraf Tarsim RDGN, Emmanuel Diarra RDGW  
                                                          
38  ADB-IRAM (2013) 
39  However, this rate is above the MENA region average. 
40  Summary Diagnostic Review of the financial sector in Tunisia: inventory, main challenges and opportunities for reforms (June 2014). 
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Annex 10 
 
Note on the Transport Sector 
 
1. Transport plays a major role in the Tunisian economy. It contributes 6% to GDP and generates 
almost 140,000 direct jobs, i.e. over 4.5% of the employed labour force.  Tunisia’s tenth and eleventh 
National Development Plans assigned a key role to the transport sector with a view to promoting a trade-
focused economy. The Bank’s operations are mainly concentrated in the road subsector where it has 
contributed to the rehabilitation and modernization of over 4000km of roads and to the construction of over 
one hundred road structures. These interventions have significantly improved the network’s level of service, 
by (i) ensuring the security of certain routes by building permanent crossing structures, (ii) reducing capacity 
constraints linked to the narrowness of road pavements and (iii) by facilitating access to socioeconomic 
facilities by opening up the regions. 
 
2. The sector’s main development-related challenges. The strategies adopted in recent years to 
improve the transport sector have not produced the expected results. Thus the organization of land transport 
governed by the Law of April 2004 is not yet effective, the quality of maritime and air transport services is 
inadequate, and issues of transport financing and organization have not yet been resolved. Moreover, the 
modal choices linked to public polices and an incoherent transport tax system required the national 
community to bear the additional economic, environmental and social-related costs. In Tunisia, multimodal 
transport is little developed. Irrespective of whether passengers or goods are concerned, transferring from 
one transport mode to another results in additional charges and delays. However, it is essential to seek 
complementarity and substitutability in transport in order to become established on the domestic and 
external markets which Tunisian enterprises want to do. The difficulties encountered in export pre-shipment 
and import post-shipment, particularly because of the non-existence of interoperability between transport 
modes and logistic services, are the causes of additional costs and travel times that affect the efficiency of 
transport services, consequently reducing the competitiveness of Tunisian goods. 
 
3. Opportunities. In accordance with the country’s new economic directions, the transport sector 
must endeavour to reduce regional disparities in Tunisia. This will provide fresh opportunities for the 
sector’s development. It will entail achieving a regional balance mainly of road and rail infrastructure. 
Indeed previous economic policies favoured the coastal areas of the country at the expense of the hinterland 
regions which have little economic infrastructure.  Paved road density varies from 6 km/100 km2 in the 
governorates of Kabila and Tetouane to 93 kilometres/100 km2 in the vicinity of Tunis, with an average of 
70km/100km2. The Government’s policy and programme for addressing the above-mentioned challenges  
as set out in the 2016-2020 plan is focused on the following four themes: (i) the transport sector as a growth 
driver: 15% of the investments under the 2016-2020 Five-Year Plan will be allocated to the transport sector; 
(ii) reduce regional disparities by focusing on the most disadvantaged regions in terms of infrastructure; (iii) 
the sector as a social factor; by reaffirming the social and inclusive character of transport, and; (iv) transport 
in the service of logistics development in order to improve the economy’s competitiveness: development of 
inter-modality and improvement of port supply. The short-to-medium term operational priorities concern:  
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(i) Building the planning and management capacity of the Transport Sector through the 
Transport Master Plan Study and technical support under the PMIR for upgrading the road 
sector  by focusing on the sustainability of transport infrastructure; 
 
(ii) The completion and upgrading of road and motorway infrastructure as part of investment 
programmes focused on the connectivity of hinterland regions; 
 
(iii) Support to the National Railway Network Rehabilitation and Upgrading Programme aimed 
at improving the supply of rail goods and passenger transport by the SNCFT with a view to 
ensuring complementarity and interoperability with the road and maritime modes and 
improvement of railway services in the hinterland governorates; 
 
(iv) Implementation of the logistics development strategy in Tunisia for the construction and 
upgrading of port, rail and road infrastructure in the main towns and cities by prioritizing 
the reduction of negative externalities (pollution, accidents, etc.) of urban transport systems 
and provision of transport services for the most disadvantaged urban areas; and 
 
(v) Support for the government’s efforts to improve the governance and performance of 
national transport sector enterprises. 
 
 
Author: Papa M. Fall, RDGN 4  
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Annex 11 
Note on the Water and Sanitation Sector  
 
1. Due to its scarcity, water represents a major challenge for Tunisia’s current and future 
development. Most of the Tunisian territory is arid. Tunisia is classified among the least water resources 
endowed countries in the world. The estimated available volume of water is 440 m3/year/per capita and this 
ratio is likely to become lower and is projected to be about 360 m3/year/per capita by 2030. Irrigated 
agriculture is the subsector, which consumes about 80% of water resources and experiences competition from 
other uses of water in particular demand for drinking water (domestic, tourism and industrial). Drinking water 
needs will grow as the population increases, its living standards improve and its economic activities (in 
particular industry) expand.  Agriculture will then be required to reduce its consumption of water and increase 
its agricultural production, which must grow at least as rapidly as the population in order to ensure food security. 
Water sector constraints are of different types (physical, technical, environmental, economic, socio-institutional 
and legal). 
2. The main opportunities in this sector stem from the conclusions of several water sector studies 
conducted over the last few decades and which generally proposed an integrated water management 
approach. The main concepts aim to promote efficient uses of water by managing demand and enhance the 
resource as much as possible in a context that gives it a social, economic and environmental value. These studies 
also recommended the channelling of institutional reforms towards more decentralized methods of 
administration along with the gradual disengagement of central government, by encouraging user participatory 
management and increasingly involving private sector operators. Furthermore, the new Tunisian Constitution, 
adopted on 27 January 2014 states that the right to water shall be guaranteed and that the conservation and 
rational use of water is a duty of the State and of society. (Article 44). 
 
3. The Government’s water sector development policy and programme is enshrined in Tunisia’s 
2009-2014 Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan, in which the Government set its water 
security objectivities up to 2050. It was, therefore decided to carry out a prospective and strategic study in 
order to improve water resources governance in an integrated long-term vision. It was against this backdrop 
that the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Fisheries (MARHP) launched the ‘’Water 2050’’ project 
in 2009 and asked the Bank to finance it through the African Water Facility (AWF). This project is fully 
consistent with the new strategy adopted by the Government for sustainable development, equity and regional 
balance the starting point of which is the new programme (2016-2020) which is being finalized. The “Water 
2050’’ project is pivotal to the new strategy by enhancing long-term visibility and contributing to the creation 
of favourable conditions for its effective implementation. 
 
4. The Bank has also assisted Tunisia in the drinking water and sanitation sector since 2010 with two 
investment projects financed by ADB loans: (i) the Rural Drinking Water Supply Programme (PAEPR) and (ii)  
the Treated Wastewater Quality Improvement Project (PAQEE) as well as through five (5) studies financed by 
grants (4 from the MIC-TAF Fund and one AWF grant). DWSS sector financing commitments represent over 
10% of total commitments in Tunisia. A second PAEPR phase was approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors 
in September 2016. Tunisia’s other main partners in the sector area: the World Bank, KfW, IsDB and AFD, 
also support the financing of DWSS projects and studies. 
 
 
Author: Belgacem Bensassi, RDGN 2 
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Annex 12 
Note on the ICT Sector 
1. The ICT is, and remains one of the most dynamic in the Tunisian economy with an average 
growth rate equal to 17.5% of its value added over the 2007-2011 period. Its contribution to GDP has 
risen steadily since the mid-80s reaching 13.5% in 2011. Tunisia may also legitimately nurture its great 
ambition to be become one of the continent’s leading digital destinations in terms of job creation, and scaling 
up the use of ICT in all sectors of activity.  Indeed, the country has undeniable assets in the sector (quality of 
higher education, existing infrastructure, attractiveness of the business environment etc.). This should help to 
make the ICT sector in time the main source of central government tax revenue, but also a major source of 
employment in a post –Revolution context (with low economic growth, 0.8% in 2015, a national unemployment 
rate of 15% and 28% among higher education graduates and wide social and geographical disparities, etc.). 
ICTs will be accorded national priority status by the Tunisian Authorities because of the performances the sector 
has achieved in recent years using cutting edge infrastructure in which the country has heavily invested both 
through the public authorities and private sector operators.  It should also be noted that, on Tunisian territory, 
there are many technology parks, several undersea links with Europe in particular, call centres, regional and 
national offices of major international groups such as Alcatel, Ericsson, Sofrecom, etc.   
 
2. Despite the recent preparation and  validation of the National Strategic Plan (NSP) ‘’Digital 
Tunisia 2020’’,  the development of e-government does not yet have a standardized reference framework 
that would have allowed closer interaction between the different central government information systems the 
design and use of which remains highly fragmented. The Portal of the Government of Tunisia proposes a series 
of services for its citizens based on an aggregate process model around a set of themes (Life and Education, 
Culture and Leisure, Family Life, Legal Services, etc.) without however providing the user with guidance on 
all the procedures to be followed in the case of a specific event such as the loss of his/her job. As regards ICT 
equipment, there are some wide disparities in levels of equipment. Moreover, in terms of high and very high 
bandwidth infrastructure, the Tunisian territory is largely covered with the exception of white areas that are 
concentrated in the disadvantaged areas of the country’s interior. On Tunisia’s coastal strip, the urbanized and 
densely populated nature of the area is a factor that could facilitate the only technology that could provide the 
reliability, longevity, capacity and sustainability for the new users of tomorrow (i.e. fibre optics) and ensure the 
attractiveness and international competitiveness of the zone (particularly from the standpoint of innovation and 
off-shoring), which concerns most of the country’s 600,000 enterprises. This explains why territories outside 
the coastal area are excluded.   
 
3. Despite the difficulties the country has faced in recent years in a post-Revolution context, the 
ICT sector in Tunisia is one of the few to have maintained  its momentum with, in the end, considerable 
spinoff in terms of: (i) economic development (digital value added: TND 4.5 billion (2014), digital exports: 
TND 0.95 billion (2014), annual number of jobs created: 7500 ; (ii) social development (% of households with 
internet access: 1/5 (2014), mobile broadband penetration rate: 8.9% (2014)) ; (iii) international positioning 
according to the NRI (world: 87, Africa: 4 and Arab countries: 8). To that end, through the Digital Tunisia 2020 
NSP, Tunisia aims to significantly improve the quality of life of its citizens by more efficient digital use 
(Strategic Thrust 1: “Uses”). In concrete terms, it will be necessary: (i) to increase the percentage of internet 
users from  51% (2014) to 85% (2020) ; (ii) the fixed mobile broadband penetration rate from 4.9% (2014) to 
10% (2020) ; (iii) the mobile broadband penetration rate from 8.9% (2014) to 50% (2020) ; and (iv) the 
percentage of households with access to internet from 20.9% (2014) to 60% (2020).  
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4. In terms of prospects of a partnership with the Bank to support the NSP policy. Digital Tunisia 
2020 is the reference framework. It is the successful conclusion of an exercise on the prioritization of 64 
projects collected using a bottom-up approach by the MTCEN team responsible for the Digital Tunisia NSP 
(excluding projects of a military or security nature). The prioritization exercise carried out by these teams led 
to the selection of 13 projects based on their degree of maturity (number of projects having passed the concept 
stage or ideally having been the subject of a feasibility study). The NSP’s main objectives are: (i) connection of 
2.7 million families to internet 4Mb/s; (ii) a connected digital school (access terminals, connectivity, teaching 
content, etc.); (iii) paperless administrative services.  
 
Author: Samatar Omar Elmi, PICU 2  
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Annex 13 
Elements of a Strategy to Create Jobs and Develop Networks of Micro-Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (MSME) in Tunisia  
 
Introduction  
 
1. Tunisia’s 2016-2020 Strategic Development Plan aims among others to achieve a 5% average 
inclusive and sustainable growth rate, reduce the unemployment rate from 15.4% to 11.5% in 2020, increase 
the share of renewable energies in the energy mix from 3% to 12% in 2020 and narrow the disparities 
between the least developed hinterland regions and the coastal regions by an average of 30% according to 
the Regional Development Index (RDI) 
 
2. Unemployment, especially among young graduates and women, is one of Tunisia’s main 
challenges. In a report published in 2104, the World Bank painted an alarming picture of the socioeconomic 
situation of Tunisian youth: one out of three young people in urban areas aged between 15 and 29 is not in 
employment, education or training (NEET). In rural areas, over two out of five young people are completely 
destitute. This situation is one of the main obstacles to the inclusion of Tunisian youth not only in the labour 
market and the national economy but also in society in general. This is compounded by the precarious 
working conditions, including young people, who are in employment. Indeed, those are mostly employed 
in the informal sector (over 55% of young working people in urban areas). Moreover, when they do have 
work contracts, these are short-term contracts that do not provide social protection or stable employment. 
The second challenge concerns regional disparities. Five years after the January 2011 Revolution, most 
economic activities continue to be concentrated in the coastal regions. Over the past two decades, the gap 
has widened between the coastal villages and towns of the interior and between urban and rural areas. 
 
3. Against this backdrop, ADB, at the request of the Tunisian Government, and in close cooperation 
with the main public and private sector actors in Tunisia has prepared a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 
the 2017-2021 period aimed at contributing to the successful implementation of Tunisia’s 2016-2020 
Strategic Development Plan and, in particular, actions aimed at reducing unemployment, regional disparities 
and increasing the use of renewable energies. The proposed approach will be based on a contribution to the 
local development of the disadvantaged governorates the implementation of value chains and developer 
clusters. Such an approach will more effectively enhance natural resources, local expertise and specific 
cultural heritage in the beneficiary, disadvantaged governorates, as well as facilitate access to and 
partnership with the coastal towns. 
 
4. Tunisia’s CSP comprises two pillars: (i) Industrialization and support to value chains and (ii) 
Regional development and improvement of living conditions. Focus area 2.2 of the second pillar aims to 
support job creations and promote networks of micro, small-and medium-sized enterprises (MSME). The 
MSME are in fact widely considered in developing and in industrialized countries to be the engine and 
drivers of sustained, job-creating economic growth. In Europe, for example, over 99% of all European 
enterprises are, in fact MSME.  
 
5. They provide two out of three private sector jobs and contribute over half of valued added created 
by enterprises in all the countries of the European Union. MPME are also the real backbone of the Japanese 
economy, since they are the main creators of wealth and economic growth alongside their key roles in 
innovation and R & D.  
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6. This is clearly recognized in the Guidance Note on the Government’s Strategic Development Plan, 
which proposes the development of a diversified economic fabric with strong export and job-creating 
potential. The Bank’s 2013-2017 Private Sector Development Strategy also attaches considerable 
importance to “a competitive private sector that will be an engine of sustainable economic growth, 
generating a decent work environment that offers productive employment in Africa in the next decade and 
beyond.”  MSMEs are dynamic and, to some extent, flexible enterprises. They make a specific and 
significant contribution to local economic development. Their impact may be measured, for they contribute 
to wealth and job creations. 
6. The Bank has already successfully implemented in Tunisia the Souk At-Tanmia Programme aimed 
at promoting the employment of young graduates. This pilot programme (launched in 2012) may serve as a 
basis for the development and implementation of focus area 2.2 of CSP 2017-2021. The objective is to 
sensitize 50 to 70% of future graduates in the priority regions (14 regions identified by the Government) 
and provide assistance to young people to establish their own micro-or small enterprise. The following 
diagram presents the four actions proposed: 
 
    
 
a) Promotion of Mass Entrepreneurship: through the following actions: 
 
 Organize sensitization and information sessions to stimulate the corporate spirit and 
entrepreneurial culture from high school to university;  
 
Creation of 
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 Review the entrepreneurial training curricula at university level and adapt them to good 
international practices and experience; 
 
 Organize training of trainer sessions in entrepreneurial training in universities and 
incubators in the priority regions; 
 
 Organize sensitization and training sessions for future graduates to guide them towards the 
creation and development of their own projects;  
 
 Direct technical assistance to students in their final year at high school who have innovative 
ideas (direct support for the preparation of business plans, search for markets and financing, 
coaching technique (quality, design, packaging and standard, …); 
 
 Support young entrepreneurs before and after the establishment of their enterprise; and 
 
 Provide individual post start-up support to young entrepreneurs who have established their 
enterprise  
 
b) Capacity Building for Technical Structures which Support the Establishment of MSMEs in 
the Priority Regions 
 
 Identify the strengths and weaknesses of support structures and incubators in the priority 
regions and prepare an plan to build the capacity of these structures; 
 
 Build the supportive capacity of service providers located in the targeted priority regions; 
 
 Update and upgrade the necessary tools adapting them to the new technologies; 
 
 Provide assistance to support structures to prepare and adopt an operational manual that will 
describe in detail the approach to be adopted in a business start-up support process; 
 
 In each priority region, create a Regional Entrepreneurship Committee (REC) that will bring 
together all the support structures as well as all the actors in the entrepreneurial chain 
(representatives of support structures, banks, UTICA the University and Higher Institutes, 
etc.). This committee will be tasked with defining a strategy and action plan for 
entrepreneurship development in the region, coordinating support structures, creating 
complementarities and synergy, monitoring the objectives of the structures and evaluating 
their performance; 
 
 Establish a mechanism to define project opportunities at the regional, national and 
international levels by maintaining relations with European and African regions, 
participating in trade fairs, business partnerships and sector work; 
 
 Train trainers in the intensified and simplified use of internet technologies (collection of 
technical data on technologies, manufacturing processes, suppliers of equipment, standards, 
quality and the market…),   
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c) Development of value chains with strong growth and employment potential 
 
 Study to identify and obtain specific knowledge of the regional economic basin (mapping 
of value chains with strong employment and export potential, human resources and 
employment, economic fabric and potential markets) for the priority regions; 
 
 Study on national and international positioning and promotion of productive sectors in 
particular agro-food chains (for example for organic olive oil, prickly pears, tomatoes and 
harissa, alfalfa grass, medicinal and aromatic plants,  renewable energies and handicrafts 
(tableware, ceramic products and mosaics) which offer potential for employment and 
growth in the priority regions; 
 
 Promote two to three value chains to be selected on a competitive basis for each priority 
region;  
 
 Technical assistance for the development and upgrading of enterprises in the selected value 
chains; and 
 
 Promotion and communication of local development achievements through a value chain 
approach.  
  
d) Establishment of an MSME Financing Fund  
 
 This Fund’s objective will be to offset MSME financing shortcomings in Tunisia.  This 
Fund will: (i) provide subsidies to formal sector micro-and small enterprises at their start-
up, (ii) make equity investments in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises after their start-
up, (iii) guarantee credits for the financing of investment projects initiated by young 
entrepreneurs and facilitate access by enterprises, especially SMEs to bank credit to finance 
their own projects (establishment or expansion)41. Morocco has introduced for example the 
Microcredit Youth Start-Up Loan and many other MSME financing instruments. The Bank 
could support the establishment of a feasibility study and contribution to financing and to 
the start-up of activities. 
 
  Author: Lamine Dhaoui, Consultant, RDGN   
 
  
                                                          
41  The Micro-Credit Youth Start-Up Loan is a joint loan awarded by the government and banking establishments and available from almost all 
Moroccan banks. It is intended for natural persons of Moroccan nationality as of the date of the loan applications. These persons must have 
higher education degrees, training certificates or professional qualifications.  
 
 Terms and Conditions:  
 
-  Amount: 90% of the project amount with a ceiling of MAD 1 million; 45% of the 90% is financed by the government and 45% by 
commercial banks. 
- Tenor: 12 years’ minimum and 15 years’ maximum for government loans.  7 years’ minimum for bank loans. 
- Interest Rates: 5% for government loans, 9% for bank loans. 
- Guarantee: Guarantee funds, assets. 
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Annex 14 
 
Note on the Souk-at-Tanmia Entrepreneurship Support Programme 
 
 
1. Context and Presentation 
 
1.1 In the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, the African Development Bank (AfDB) together with 19 
partners representing the donor community, public and private sectors and Tunisian civil society launched 
the Souk At-Tanmia initiative aimed at tackling the problem of unemployment in Tunisia. The Souk At-
Tanmia objective is to generate new opportunities for badly served entrepreneurs by helping them to start-
up their own businesses. To that end, the partnership provides integrated support combining financing and 
supportive services in order to remove the financial constraints and aggress the weak capacity encountered 
by Tunisian entrepreneurs. 
 
1.2 Indeed, Souk At-Tanmia occupies a special position in the Tunisian entrepreneurial ecosystem 
because of its specific characteristics. First, this initiative proposes to provide its recipients with financial 
support in the form of grants awarded under the partnership and supplementary financing by loans from two 
partner banks but also with non-financial support (training, supervision, coaching and market access).This 
sets Souk At-Tanmia apart from most of the programmes existing in Tunisia that offer either supervision, 
coaching or financing. Furthermore, Souk At-Tanmia is a partnership, which benefits from the comparative 
advantages and the network of different national and international public and private sector entities. Souk 
At-Tanmia, therefore, provides integrated support to recipients and maximizes both the impact and visibility 
of its intervention.  
 
2. Outcomes and Outputs 
 
2.1 Launched in July 2012 and closed in December 2013, the pilot phase was successful. Therefore, 
a second phase was launched on 30 April 2014 in order to capitalize on the lessons learned from the pilot 
phase and to generate new jobs. Souk At-Tanmia has given hope to and fostered the entrepreneurial spirit 
among young people and created fresh economic momentum in Tunisia’s least developed regions. The 
positive outcomes in terms of job creation and support to disadvantaged communities are further evidence 
of the initiative’s success. The experience has also helped to create synergies and forge strong partnerships 
in the areas of entrepreneurship and SME development in Tunisia.  
 
2.2 The main Souk At-Tanmia outputs are summarized in the following table: 
 
 
  
 - 37 - 
 
 
Table 2: Outputs of the Souk-at-Tanmia Programme (as at 30 June 2016) 
 Pilot Phase  Second Phase 
Beneficiaries 61 projects 100 projects 
Leverage Effect  Grants awarded: TND 1.78 million  
Total resources leveraged:  TND 4 
million, which represents a leverage 
effect of 2.2. 
Grants to be awarded: TND 3.6 million  
Total resources leveraged:  TND 12 million, 
which represents a leverage effect of 3.3. 
Development 
Impact  
54% of beneficiary projects 
implemented by young people 
64% of beneficiaries are located in 
disadvantaged regions   
33%  of beneficiary projects 
implemented by women 
34% of beneficiary projects 
implemented by unemployed people 
66% of beneficiary projects implemented by 
young people 
50% of beneficiaries are located in disadvantaged 
regions   
36% of beneficiary projects implemented by 
women 
50% of beneficiary projects implemented by 
unemployed people 
Jobs Created and 
Project 
Performances  
To-date, 530 direct jobs have been 
created.  
54 Projects are currently benefiting 
from a technical assistance mission. 
Declared aggregated turnover as at 30 
June 2016: 3.3 M TND  
 800 potential direct jobs   
As at 30 June 2016: 202 jobs created comprising 
78 for women and 156 for under 35 year old young 
people. 
49 enterprises are in operation and 84 legally 
established. 
Declared turnover as at 30 June 2016: TND 1.3 
million 
Building the 
Capacity of 
Tunisian 
Entrepreneurs   
Capacity Building 
* 3 days entrepreneurial training on the 
preparation of a business plan and on 
business management for 300 
participants.   
Coaching and Mentoring 
* A 12-month coaching and mentoring 
period. 
Capacity Building 
* 60 hours of capacity building for 250 applicants 
 Coaching and Mentoring 
* 19 months coaching with 9 months allocated to 
fund raising and 10 months to the start-up of 
activities. 
* 6 to 12 months mentoring. 
Improvement of 
the 
entrepreneurial 
culture and 
economic 
empowerment of 
young people  
Participation in 8 events for the 
promotion of employment, 
entrepreneurship and youth economic 
empowerment   
Launching of an innovative cycle of conferences 
on entrepreneurship with the organization of 
thematic workshops   
Participation in 17  events to promote 
entrepreneurial culture 
Reducing 
bureaucracy 
 Reduction in the time taken to award public grants 
(FOPRODI) from 128 to 86 days.   
Reduction in the time taken to process a loan 
application from 4.5 to 2.5 months.  
 
3. Achievements and lessons. Given the relevance of the approach adopted, AfDB’s catalytic role 
and efforts of all the Souk At-Tanmia partners, the initiative in its two phase has helped in: 
 
(i) Building a reputation of credibility due to the transparency and rigour of its selection 
process, which is reflected in the popularity of the programme among Tunisian developers. 
 
(ii) Acquiring confirmed experience through the establishment and development of 
employment generating enterprises;  
 
(iii) Developing resource mobilization expertise reflected in a leverage effect of 2,2 for the pilot 
phase and 3.3 for the second phase  
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(iv) Building know-how in coordination with the different public and private sector operators in 
order to strengthen the ecosystem and optimize synergies to achieve a significant and 
sustainable impact 
 
(v) Building an extensive network of local and international partners to resolve the different 
problems facing Tunisian entrepreneurs; and 
 
(vi) Establishing a team that has experience in the management of the different actors in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in order to optimize synergies and prevent the dilution of efforts. 
 
4. Development Prospects   
 
4.1 In light of the achievements of these two phases of the Programme, the traditional donors wanted 
to renew the experience and launch a 3rd phase for Tunisia in order to consolidate, and capitalize on the 
expertise acquired by the Bank in terms of job creation. The Bank and its partners have, therefore initiated 
the conceptualization of a platform that will sustain the impact of, and expand the programme regionally 
and continent-wide. Thus, the expertise acquired and the expertise accumulated by ORNA in the supervision 
and management of the Souk At-Tanmia Programme could constitute a strong basis for establishing a Centre 
of Entrepreneurial Excellence in Tunisia.  Fully consistent with the Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy as 
well as the operational priorities (the High-5s) and the Bank’s new Decentralization Strategy, this Centre of 
Entrepreneurial Excellence dedicated to the development of entrepreneurial ecosystems and the regional 
integration of SMEs in Africa could be instrumental in ensuring a lasting impact on youth employment.  
 
Notes 
 
In addition to ADB which was the initiator of the Programme, the following actors participated in the pilot phase: the 
Bank for the Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises (BFPME), the Tunisian Solidarity Bank (BTS), the British 
Council Tunisia,  the Tunisian Centre of Young Business Leaders (CJD), the Confederation of Tunisian Citizen 
Enterprises (CONECT), the Government of Denmark, the British Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Government of the United States of America, the Mediterranean School of Business (MSB), Microsoft Tunisia, 
Talan Tunisia, Total Tunisia, the Tokens Association Network, Tunisiana, and the following five Agencies of the 
United Nations System: United Nations Industrial Development (UNIDO), International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Office (ILO) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The participants in the second phase were: ADB, BFPME,  
BTS, British Council Tunisia, CJD, CONECT, the Government of Denmark, DFID, the Government of the United 
States of America, MSB, Microsoft Tunisia, Talan Tunisia, UNIDO, IOM, UNDP, Tunisia Marketplace (TPM) and 
the Association of Tunisian Grandes Écoles [top-ranking higher education establishments] Alumni (ATUGE). 
 
Author: Souk Team, RDGN  
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Annex 15 
Country Fiduciary Risk Assessment (CFRA) 
1. Introduction. The main objective of the Country Fiduciary Risk Assessment (CFRA) is to assess 
the fiduciary risk associated with each sub-system of a country’s public finance management system, with 
a view to using its findings to implement projects financed by the Bank, then to identify capacity building 
requirements. This assessment covered Tunisia’s main public finance management systems, namely 
preparation and control of budget execution, cash flow management, accounting management and financial 
information, internal control, external audit, procurement management and the fight against corruption.  The 
assessment was carried out in accordance with the related Bank guidelines, in particular, the CFRA User 
Guide of April 2014. It draws on the most recent diagnostic review reports, regulatory texts, guidelines and 
reports communicated by the Tunisian Administration or available on its websites. It also reflects the 
conclusions of working sessions with Ministry of Finance (MF) Departments, the Court of Auditors, the 
Ministry of Civil Service, Governance and Fight against Corruption as well as technical and financial 
partners actively supporting Tunisian public finance management capacity building in particular, the 
European Union, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. This annex presents a summary of the 
CFRA, the full detailed version of which is also available.  
 
2. Executive Summary  
 
2.1 Budget management. The budget preparation and execution mechanisms are managed and controlled. The 
budget preparation process follows clearly established rules and the budget timetable. However, the 
development of Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) and programme-based budgets has been 
gradual and the forecast horizon for all public finances remains one year. Budget management by objectives 
(MBO), which has accelerated since 2010, is promising. It will encourage the use of performance objectives 
through strategic sectoral reflection and medium-term programming of budget envelopes. To-date twenty 
Ministries representing 80% of the General Government Budget have tested the budget management by 
objectives and the performance indicators but effective MBO implementation remains subject to the 
adoption of the new Organic Budget Law tabled before Parliament since November 2015.  
 
2.2 In recent years, despite the political transition that Tunisia has experienced, the budget has 
remained a credible tool for budget forecasting and execution and expenditure has remained close to forecast 
overall. The central government expenditure nomenclature is based on the standards of the IMF’s 1986 
Manual on Government Finance Statistics (GFS) but does not distinguish in any detail between the 
economic and functional classifications, which affects their readability and complicates the assessment of 
their effectiveness. In the case of development expenditure, the parts financed by Tunisia and external 
contributions are clearly indicated in the Budget Law with one line per development project. 
 
2.3 As regards budget and financial transparency, the Tunisian Authorities have complied with the 
January 2014 Open Government Partnership (OGP) and undertaken to comply with an action plan, which 
aims to ensure the timely publication of the budget documents recommended by the OGP. The open budget 
subsequently improved from 11/100 in 2012 to 42/100 in 2015. The local government budget risk is under 
control and central government guarantees are subject to consolidated monitoring. However, budget risks 
related to ownership of public enterprises and social security funds are not adequately managed or 
documented. In a context where the situation of some of them has deteriorated it is important that this risk 
be identified and documented.  
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2.4 Cash Flow Management. The main purpose of cash flow management is to cover expenditure in 
a timely and sufficiently predictable manner. The Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the BCT is credited 
and debited by the General Treasurer of Tunisia (TGT) and centralizes on a daily basis transactions made 
by the public accountant network. External resources are generally positioned in special bank accounts 
opened at the BCT but some donors’ grants are disbursed into accounts opened in commercial banks and 
are not traceable in central government accounts. Generally, external resources are monitored with some 
delay using a regularization procedure, which considerably delays the production of budget review laws. 
Reconciliation between the TGT’s accounting entries and its account statement at the BCT is done monthly 
for transactions affecting the Treasury Single Account. It will also be necessary to include in this 
reconciliation exercise cash allocated to co-financed projects from accounts mainly held at the Central Bank 
but also in commercial banks. 
 
2.5 Internal Control. The Tunisian public finance management system has adequate internal 
controls. Internal controls on wage and non-wage expenditure are efficient and are based on an expenditure 
cycle where the functions of payment authorization officers, expenditure controllers and accountants are 
correctly separated and fall within the remit of different authorities. A new Code of Conduct for Tunisian 
civil servants was approved by Decree 4030 of 3 October 2014 and its implementation strategy approved 
on 22 February 2016. Its scope covers all civil servants, local government employees and personnel of 
public enterprises (845 000 employees). However, the internal audit function is not yet compliant with 
international good practices. It is divided among several bodies with similar mandates but reporting to 
different authorities: the General Financial Control (CGF) Committee at the Ministry of Finance, the 
General Public Services Control (CGSP) Committee reporting since March 2016 to the Ministry of Civil 
Service and Fight against Corruption and the General Control of State Property and Land (CGDE), which 
is under the Ministry of State Property and Land. Their programmes and annual reports are not published 
but submitted through management to the High Commission for Administrative and Financial Audit 
(HCCAF), which is responsible for the coordination of their activities. Although their methods are evolving, 
they have not yet incorporated the risk-based approach. The controls they carry out mainly cover compliance 
with the legal and regulatory framework with close attention to the regularity of processes without paying 
much attention to the significance of the challenges, or to efficiency, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
operations. Rationalization of the central government control bodies by merging the three ex post control 
bodies (CGF, CGSP and CGDE) into a central government internal audit function with the necessary critical 
mass to ensure efficient functioning and with an institutional anchoring that will guarantee its independence 
has not yet been carried out. It has, however, been discussed and supported by the main donors and the 
groundwork  has been laid by the preparation of common working tools for the 3 bodies, in particular a 
procedures manual, a code of ethics and the establishment of an association of controllers working on the 
harmonization of control processes and the certification of controllers. Asset and liability management is 
not sufficiently developed, which prevents any strategic and active management. While non-financial asset 
registers exist, they are not necessarily exhaustive and are not developed. This situation will make it difficult 
in the longer term to shift to an accrual-based accounting system and in the near-term reduces income from 
assets. Domestic and external debt are well known and monitored with comprehensive files that are updated 
and reconciled monthly with the accounts.  
 
2.6 Account management. Existing accounting standards are not compliant with international 
accounting standards. They are derived from the 1973 Public Accounting Code which requires single entry 
bookkeeping (and not double entry for central government) and produces data which provide little financial 
information. This accounting system records revenue as it is collected and expenditure as it is paid, with no 
accounting relationship between them. Debts and claims are not traceable in the accounts, which provide no 
information on central government’s assets. While accounting remains rudimentary in comparison with 
modern standards, the gradual approach adopted for reforming the central government accounting system 
is coherent.  
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2.7 This reform will first introduce double entry bookkeeping, then the gradual shift towards accrual 
accounting converging with IPSAS standards and a general chart of accounts that is consistent with and 
complements the budget nomenclature. The Higher Norms and Standards Commission established by 
Decree on 22 May 2015 will guide the reform towards convergence with IPSAS standards. The significant 
delay in presenting central government accounts and preparing budget review laws is mainly due to the 
delay in closing the complementary period (established by law as 20 January of the following year but in 
practice not complied with) and more specifically to accounting delays in recording some transactions 
corresponding to direct payments on external borrowings. There are currently ongoing efforts by the 
Authorities to shorten the delays and adhere to the legal deadlines for the presentation of accounts. It is 
necessary to establish a better controlled accounts closure procedure. The budget execution monitoring 
reporting system is ADEB (Budget Decision Support System, developed and maintained by the MF data 
centre) which processes events from the opening of credits to authorizations to pay and editing of transfers. 
The expenditure is then taken over by TREASURY, which monitors the accounting part without manual 
rekeying. ADEB provides all the information on the status of the expenditure in real time. ADEB is an 
integrated system: the users (Ministries, expenditure and accounts control) have simultaneous access and 
receive updated information but the existing system generates cash-based budget accounting for expenditure 
and revenue. There is no general accounting in established entitlements or in asset valuation. 
 
2.8 External audit. The Court of Auditors does not certify the annual central government accounts. 
Pursuant to the Organic Budget Law in force and the Accounting Code, the Court of Auditors reviews (i) 
management accounts of public accountants and the Treasurer General, (ii) Government General 
Accounting Statement (CGAF) that consolidates the accounts of the payment authorization officer, and (iii) 
the draft budget review law. It is required to issue a declaration of conformity between the public 
accountants’ management accounts and the CGAF and comments on issues identified. The accounts will be 
certified as soon as an accrual accounting system is established and financial statements of central 
government land and property assets produced from the system in accordance with the provisions of the 
new Organic Budget Law. The change in political regime in 2011 greatly revitalized the external control of   
public funds. The Court of Auditors has been able to strengthen its influence and its position as a guarantor 
of their efficient use.  These developments have not yet been reflected into a more timely presentation of 
reports and their due consideration by the Executive Authority. Finally, Parliament’s resources should be 
increased to ensure expanded, high quality work that will enable it to fulfil its external oversight role more 
effectively. 
 
2.9 Procurement. The evaluation concluded that there was a moderate procurement risk. The existing national 
public procurement system (NPPS) stems from a comprehensive structural reform implemented recently (following 
the 2011 political changes) supported by the Bank. It began with the adoption n March 2014 of Decree no 2014-1039 
governing public procurement, which enhanced governance, efficiency and transparency in the area. This Decree also 
led to the introduction of modern new tools, likely to increase the degree of participation and transparency, such as the 
electronic submission of bids (e-procurement) effective since 2014. The existing NPPS makes public procurement the 
normal means of access to public contracts. It requires widespread publication (including free access to a website42) 
programming, purchasing opportunities and all bid results. The system does not allow for any hindrance and allows 
the participation in competitive bidding of any potential bidder who is qualified, interested and not on the debarment 
list for having engaged in prohibited practices43.   
 
 
  
                                                          
42  See National Public Procurement Observatory (ONMP) website. 
 
43  Decree no.  2016-498 of  08 April determines the public procurement conditions and exclusion procedures 
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2.10 It makes open competition the default procurement method and requires the use of standard BDs with relevant 
predetermined criteria and satisfactory procedures, with the exception of those relating to the mechanism for opening the 
proposals of consultants that have been considered inappropriate44. Same conditions of contract45 required for the 
preparation of standard BDs are not always available compelling the actors to use earlier documents that are not harmonized 
with the newly established system. The NPPS contains an effective public procurement control and audit system that is 
deemed satisfactory even though it is necessary to reorganize the general control function in a bid to improve efficiency of 
actions and the monitoring of recommendations. In the event the bidder is not satisfied, the system grants all bidders the right 
to appeal, free of charge, and against the decisions handed down that have caused him/her harm. To that end, it makes 
provision for an impartial (with the presence of the private sector on the complaints management body), autonomous and 
efficient mechanism for taking legally binding decision for the parties unless they decide to refer the case to the competent 
tribunal. One weakness of the existing redress mechanism which, while efficient, is its failure to stipulate a maximum legal 
deadline for the publication of decisions dealing with complaints with the result that to-date while required, none have been 
published. For the contract execution phase, the system provides for a pre-litigation mechanism to settle disputes that is 
satisfactory but does not make arbitration the preferred method for settling public procurement-related disputes. This is partly 
due to constraints relating to the provisions of Article 7 of the existing Arbitration Code. Rulings made relating to 
procurement disputes arising during contract execution do however benefit from a legal environment that facilitates their 
effective enforcement.  Moreover, as a country that has ratified the New York Convention, Tunisia recognizes the authority 
of res judicata of any arbitration ruling irrespective of the country in which it is made. Finally, the legal and regulatory 
framework deals satisfactorily with issues relating to conflicts of interest and the fight against corruption as well as the related 
penalties. However, the application of administrative penalties to bidders is not yet possible mainly because the New 
Commission for the Debarment of Economic Operators to be established pursuant to the provisions of Decree 2016-498 of 
8 April 2016 is not yet operational. 
 
Fight against corruption. In the years following the 2011 Revolution large-scale reforms were embarked upon 
to fought corruption.  These resulted in (i) the adoption of Decree-Law no. 2011-120 of 14 November 2011on 
the fight against corruption and Circular no. 23 of 31 December 2011 on the declaration of assets by senior 
government officials; (ii) the establishment in 2012 of the National Anti-Corruption Commission as an 
independent constitutional body with clearly defined competencies to identify and investigate cases of 
corruption ; (iii) the establishment of an electronic portal for anonymous denunciations of cases of corruption ; 
(iv)  facilitation of access to information and the administrative documents of public organizations by the 
adoption of Decree 2011-41 ; (v) the conduct in 2013 of a compliance review of Tunisian legislation and 
provisions relating to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCC) ratified in 2008 ; and (vii) the 
preparation of a Code of Conduct and Ethics for civil servants approved by Decree no. 2014-4030 of 3 October 
2014. Tunisia still has challenges to address in these areas as reflected in the Corruption Perceptions Index score 
of 38/100 in 2015 ranking Tunisia 76th out of 168 countries. In order, therefore, for Tunisia to consolidate its 
anti-corruption efforts, it will have to finalize and adopt the national anti-corruption strategy and action plan, 
support the operationalisation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission and strengthen the legal framework 
for combatting corruption, particularly those aspects relating to illicit enrichment and protection of whistle-
blowers. 
 
Public finance management (PFM) is being rapidly reformed in Tunisia resulting in the revision pending   
adoption by Parliament of the Organic Budget Law. At this stage, the Authorities should envisage the possibility 
of establishing unified planning, coordination and monitoring framework linked to public finance management 
with a view to ensuring synergy and efficiency.  In light of the foregoing, the country risk assessment for Tunisia 
concludes that the risk level is moderate. 
 
  
                                                          
44  This raises a problem of the credibility of technical bid evaluation insofar as no provision is made for the simultaneous opening of technical 
and financial bids 
 
45  This is the case for example of the GCC and TCC. The SCC were recently finalized but only in Arabic. 
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3. Bank’s Fiduciary Strategy for Tunisia 
 
3.1.  Government’s PFM policy and programme:  the Tunisian Government has embarked upon a 
vast PFM reform programme under the guidance and coordination of the Performance-Based Budget (PBB) 
Unit. The PBB objectives are to: (i) maintain the country’s financial and economic equilibrium, (ii) 
guarantee discipline in the execution of the national budget, (iii) ensure transparent public action, and (iv) 
make government officials accountable. The related reforms are incorporated in the new Organic Budget 
Law (OBL) tabled before Parliament in November 2015 for expected adoption by the end of 2016 and entry 
into force in 2017. The reforms concern (i) Multi-Year Programme-Based Budgeting (Medium-Term 
Budget Framework-MTBF), (ii) strengthening of budget management transparency with, in particular, a 
Performance–Based Budget and publication of citizens’ budget since 2014. The following reforms are also 
concerned: (iii) modernization of the public accounting system and its convergence with international 
standards, (iv) shortening of the time required to present accounts and (v) strengthening external 
jurisdictional control by expanding the status and role of the Court of Auditors.  
 
3.2. The Bank’s strategic approach. The Bank’s Fiduciary Strategy for Tunisia is in line with its 
Fiduciary Management Policy. It aims to achieve more frequent use of Tunisia’s PFM system, including the 
national procurement system, while helping to build the capacity of management and control bodies and 
institutions in order to provide good financial governance and ensure efficient public service delivery to 
citizens. It remains consistent with the above objectives defined by the Government in the PBB context.  
 
3.3. The degree of utilization of the country system and related objectives. To-date in Tunisia, 
apart from the Bank’s budget support operations whose financial implementation is based on full use of the 
PFM system with only national procedures (and not the entire system) being used for National Competitive 
Bidding for Goods and Works. The same applies to some aspects of PFM sub-systems integrated into the 
fiduciary management systems for the Bank’s public investment programmes implemented by the public 
administration. These include the following: (i) the effective entry in the Budget Law of the annual 
allocations of some projects in terms of external resources and counterpart funds, (ii) execution of 
expenditure for these projects in real time using the ADEB application concerning counterpart funds, (iii) 
opening of special accounts at the BCT on which transactions are authorized by the central government 
services as executing agencies of the projects concerned, and (iv) ex-ante control of expenditure and internal 
auditing of projects by the FMU.   Following approval of the Bank’s new Procurement Policy approved in 
October 2015 and the qualitative reforms implemented in this area in Tunisia since 2012 (and ongoing), the 
conditions have been met to use the procurement system in Bank-funded projects. As regards financial 
management, the use of other aspects of the Country system by the Bank is closely linked to the concrete 
implementation of reforms. The OBL approval schedule must be scrupulously adhered to so that the 
implementation of reforms becomes mandatory and that of the performance-based budget (APP and APR) 
already initiated is regularized and widely disseminated.  
 
3.4. Therefore, the Government must ensure the full inclusion of externally financed resources in the 
Budget Law, and the configuration of the programme-based nomenclature in ADEB (public expenditure 
circuit application). It should ensure the progression of the public accounting system towards a modern, 
accrual-based system compliant with international standards. In this regard, it should operationalise the 
Norms and Standards Commission and finalize the appointment of its members.  
 
3.5. It should also accelerate the integration of the budget and accounting systems in order to facilitate 
crosschecking and the real time capture of information on disbursements on external resources in ADEB. 
This would be the best way to shorten the timelines for the presentation of public accounts and publication 
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of the budget review laws. The Government should also address the challenge of adapting the different 
internal control bodies (ex-ante and ex post) to the new PBB approach.  In this regard, and among others, it 
should rationalize the three ex post control bodies (CGF, CGSP and CGDEAF) in terms of their statutory 
merger, their institutional and operational anchoring as well as their professional capacity building. 
Similarly, it must continue its efforts to reform the external audit system, in order to strengthen the 
guarantees of autonomy of the Court of Auditors and the monitoring of reports by Parliament. 
Concomitantly, dialogue engaged between the TFPs and Authorities on the external auditing of operations 
on external financing should lead to solutions that will provide the Court of Auditors with resources to fulfil 
its mandate. This will enable the central organs and four regional chambers of the Court of Auditors to cover 
the full range of its duties and responsibilities effectively, including the performance and compliance audit 
of local governments and in the medium-term certification of central government statements.  
 
3.6. Bank support to public finance management reforms including public procurement. In light 
of the foregoing this would be chiefly focused on (i) improving the Public Accounting and accounts 
presentation systems and (ii) building the capacity of ex-ante and ex post control bodies and institutions. 
This could be achieved through financing instruments such as budget support operations, public investment 
project support, technical assistance and institutional support. In this regard, the Bank should, over the 
period covered by the CSP be able to continue to support the country through the MIC-TAF and MENA-
TF grant to implement capacity building activities. The following major actions must be completed: (i) 
development of a comprehensive, integrated information system for the collection of procurement statistics; 
(ii) capacity building for public procurement controllers and revisers with training and certification in 
procurement audit techniques, (iii) support for training actors in the use of the TUNEPS e-procurement 
platform. Finally, the national public procurement training strategy which has been prepared and will shortly 
be approved by the Government will provide the Bank with an opportunity as soon as the related budgeted 
operational action plan is approved, to support the country in implementing some well thought out actions 
within a cohesive framework to ensure sustainability and a stronger impact. 
 
3.7. Bank support to the management of portfolio performance and individual projects. The 
Bank will continue to encourage the application of rules and procedures as well as good practices in 
fiduciary management to achieve stronger performances of the projects and programmes financed by it. 
This will be achieved through the following activities: 
 
 Provide executing agencies with guidance and technical assistance to enable them to resolve 
general or specific fiduciary management problems relating to projects and programmes; 
 
 Persuade projects and programmes in close collaboration with Project or Programme 
Officers to submit audit reports within the Bank’s deadline; 
 
 Encourage and participate in fiduciary clinics and launching workshops that meet the 
information and training requirements of project and programme executing agencies, 
officials of the Ministry of Finance and external auditors; 
 
 Take the initiative to establish harmonized fiduciary management mechanisms for projects 
and programmes co-financed with other TFPs; and 
 
 Use reliable mechanisms of the national fiduciary management systems for implementation 
of the Bank’s public investment operations. 
 
Authors: Mamadou Yaro, Selma Ennafair RDGN 4 
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Annex 16 
 
Tunisia – Country Financing Parameters 
 
Introduction  
 
1. This Note presents the country financing parameters for Tunisia in accordance with the Bank’s 
policy on expenditure eligible for financing46. This policy enables the Bank to finance the necessary 
expenditure to be able to achieve the development objectives of the operations financed by the institution’s 
resources. The Note is designed as a framework for assessing the risks concerning the viability of public 
finances with a view to ensuring that the Bank’s resources are used appropriately and in accordance with 
the terms of its mandate. Moreover, the new policy offers greater flexibility in the use of loans and grants 
to finance expenditure. 
 
2. Macroeconomic context and public finance situation. Tunisia has suffered from a lack of 
growth since 2011. The growth rate fell from 3.6% in 2010 to 0.8% in 2015 but could reach 1.6% in 2016. 
The fall in growth has been mainly due to uncertainties concerning security, the different strike actions 
which have affected the production rate in the mining and hydrocarbons (phosphates and gas) sector but 
also weak public investment. Since 2011, the composition of public expenditure is mostly focused on current 
expenditure. The civil service wage bill has more than doubled since 2010 as a result of recruitments and 
consecutive salary increases. In 2015, it accounted for 46% of the budget and 13% of GDP. This 
deterioration is also linked to the continuing subsidies on some staple products and energy, which represent 
about 16% of the annual budget. In all, current expenditure accounts for between 60 and 65% of the overall 
budget and between 75% and 80% of the budget net of debt servicing. The five draft budget laws have all 
been passed with deficits since 2011 and the cumulative financing gap stood at 42 billion dinars in 2016. 
For its part, the public debt increased significantly from 40.7% to 62% in 2016, i.e. an average annual growth 
rate of 7.4% much higher than the 1.76% economy growth rate. Moreover, 70% of outstanding debt is 
composed of external debt and Tunisia is exposed to an exchange rate risk since the Tunisian Dinar has lost 
32% of its value since 2010.   
 
3. Portfolio. The Bank Group’s active portfolio currently comprises 43 operations, representing total 
commitments of UA 1.43 billion. There are 14 public sector operations representing 86.3 % of 
commitments. Tunisia’s portfolio also includes twenty-five (25) technical assistance operations for a 
cumulative amount of UA 20.8 million. The lending portfolio’s performance is deemed satisfactory overall 
despite slippage on the implementation of the technical assistance portfolio due to the complexity of the 
functioning of the public procurement system. 
 
4. Cost sharing. Due to the specific macro-fiscal context described above, increased vulnerability 
of the economy and public finances and pressure on the budget which is expected to continue during 
implementation of the PSD up to 2929  concerning current expenditure, the Tunisian government’s fiscal 
leeway and ability to increase its counterpart funding of Bank-financed operations is expected to remain 
limited. Consequently, in a prudential and pragmatic approach, the Bank proposes to apply two (2) rates for 
financing its projects and programmes: the Bank will finance 50% of the cost of projects with an immediate 
return in the productive sector (water, agriculture, industry and services) and 60% of projects with a high 
social content (education, health, employment, women, etc.) with a limited and /or gradual rate of return. 
The balance will be covered by the Government and/or other donors. The Tunisian Government will 
undertake to finance at least 10 % of all project costs. 
 
 
                                                          
46  “Policy on Expenditure Eligible for Bank Group Financing”, ADB/BD/WP/2007/106/Rev. 2, May 2008  
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5. Financing of recurrent costs. The Bank will not finance recurrent expenditure of projects 
financed by it.  Such expenditure should normally be covered by the Government. However, the Bank may 
consider the possibility of financing them on a case-by-case basis. 
 
6. Financing costs in local currency. The Bank’s practice is to finance the foreign exchange costs 
of projects financed by it and consequently, most disbursements are made in foreign exchange. In view of 
the deep public finance deficit and the existence of large construction companies and the use of savings on 
loans, the financing of local currency costs should not be limited and actual amounts should be fixed on a 
project-by-project basis. 
  
7. Taxes and duties. Projects financed by the Bank are not generally subject to specific taxes. The 
Bank consider on a case-by-case basis the possibility of financing taxes and duties for its projects.  The 
financing parameters for Tunisia are described below.   
 
Table 3 – Country Financing Parameters 
Item  Parameter  Explanation/Comments  
Cost sharing. Maximum 
proportion of project costs that the 
Bank can finance.  
Productive sector with a high 
economic rate of return 
(structures, public services, 
industries, agriculture, mines, 
etc.): 50% 
Social sector with a limited and 
gradual rate of return 
(education, health, 
employment, women and 
youth, etc.): 60%    
The effective share of Bank financing will be 
limited to 60% of all costs for projects of a 
social nature and to 50% of all costs for 
projects in the productive sector (in 
particular, infrastructure).  The balance will 
be covered by co-financing. The Government 
shall undertake to finance a minimum of 10% 
of the total project cost excluding wages and 
salaries 
Financing of recurrent costs. 
Limits if necessary concerning the 
total amount of recurrent 
expenditure the Bank may finance.  
Flexible  The Bank  can finance some recurrent costs 
on a case-by-case basis  
Financing of costs in local 
currency. The Bank’s financing 
conditions for expenditure in local 
currency are met, in particular: (i) 
the financing requirements of the 
country’s development 
programme exceed the own 
resources of the public sector (for 
example, tax and other revenue) 
planned borrowings on the 
domestic market; and (ii) the 
financing of expenditure in foreign 
exchange alone would enable the 
Bank to contribute to the financing 
of individual projects.  
Yes  The financing conditions for local currency 
costs are met. The Bank may finance local 
currency costs in order to achieve the 
objectives of individual projects  
Taxes and duties. Are there taxes 
and duties that the Bank would not 
finance?  
Yes  There are no unreasonable taxes and duties. 
There is, however, a slight probability that the 
Tunisian Government may borrow to pay 
taxes and duties. The Bank will not finance 
the payment of taxes and duties by 
borrowings  
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Annex 17   TUNISIA – Macroeconomic Indicators (2000-2016) 
 
  
Indicators Unit 2000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (e) 2016 (p)
National Accounts
GNI at Current Prices Million US $ 22 405 43 573 45 376 46 334 ... ... ...
GNI per Capita US$ 2 310 4 050 4 170 4 210 ... ... ...
GDP at Current Prices Million US $ 19 443 45 811 45 044 46 257 47 604 41 280 42 572
GDP at 2000 Constant prices Million US $ 19 443 29 442 30 591 31 337 32 045 32 216 32 857
Real GDP Growth Rate % 4,3 -1,9 3,9 2,4 2,3 0,5 2,0
Real per Capita GDP Growth Rate % 3,3 -3,0 2,7 1,3 1,1 -0,6 0,9
Gross Domestic Investment %  GDP 27,3 23,1 24,4 22,7 23,2 21,7 21,0
     Public Investment %  GDP 4,4 8,8 9,3 8,6 8,8 8,3 8,0
     Private Investment %  GDP 22,9 14,3 15,2 14,1 14,4 13,5 13,0
Gross National Savings %  GDP 22,3 16,2 16,1 13,6 13,1 16,7 19,3
Prices and Money
Inflation (CPI) % 3,0 3,5 5,6 6,1 5,5 5,0 4,0
Exchange Rate (Annual Average) local currency/US$ 1,4 1,4 1,6 1,6 1,7 2,0 2,0
Monetary Growth (M2) % 85,8 6,7 8,8 7,3 7,7 5,5 ...
Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP % 90,1 111,2 110,9 111,3 111,5 117,4 ...
Government Finance
Total Revenue and Grants %  GDP 23,0 26,0 26,3 26,6 26,0 21,3 20,2
Total Expenditure and Net Lending %  GDP 25,2 28,4 29,0 31,2 30,5 25,0 23,4
Overall Deficit (-) / Surplus (+) %  GDP -2,4 -2,4 -2,7 -4,6 -4,4 -4,2 -3,9
External Sector
Exports Volume Growth (Goods) % 7,3 -0,2 1,4 4,7 1,4 4,8 3,7
Imports Volume Growth (Goods) % 6,5 3,8 8,5 5,1 2,4 2,0 2,1
Terms of Trade Growth % -2,2 69,9 -6,0 -4,2 -3,3 -15,4 1,3
Current Account Balance Million US $ -821 -3 386 -3 721 -3 879 -4 302 -3 136 -2 497
Current Account Balance %  GDP -4,2 -7,4 -8,3 -8,4 -9,0 -7,6 -5,9
External Reserves months of imports 2,4 3,5 3,8 3,3 3,2 3,8 ...
Debt and Financial Flows
Debt Service %  exports 55,7 55,5 57,7 65,4 70,4 86,1 71,0
External Debt %  GDP 52,9 48,1 54,0 55,0 59,3 60,2 58,8
Net Total Financial Flows Million US $ 660 881 2 467 1 326 1 961 ... ...
Net Official Development Assistance Million US $ 222 922 1 017 710 921 ... ...
Net Foreign Direct Investment  Million US $ 779 1 148 1 603 1 117 1 060 ... ...
Source :  AfDB Statistics Department;  IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2015 and International Financial Statistics, October 2015;  
                AfDB Statistics Department: Development Data Portal Database, March 2016. United Nations: OECD, Reporting System Division.
Notes:            …      Data Not Available   ( e ) Estimations   ( p ) Projections Last Update: April 2016
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Annex 18   TUNISIA – Socioeconomic Indicators 
 
Year Tunisia Africa
Develo-    
ping         
Countries
Develo-       
   ped  
Countries
Basic Indicators
Area ( '000 Km²) 2016 164 30 067 94 638 36 907
Total Population (millions) 2016 11,4 1 214,4 3 010,9 1 407,8
Urban Population (% of Total) 2016 66,9 40,1 41,6 80,6
Population Density  (per Km²) 2016 73,2 41,3 67,7 25,6
GNI per Capita (US $) 2014 4 210 2 045 4 226 38 317
Labor Force Participation *- Total (%) 2016 47,7 65,6 63,9 60,3
Labor Force Participation **- Female (%) 2016 25,1 55,6 49,9 52,1
Gender -Related Dev elopment Index  Value 2007-2013 0,891 0,801 0,506 0,792
Human Dev elop. Index  (Rank among 187 countries) 2014 96 ... ... ...
Popul. Liv ing Below  $ 1.90 a  Day  (% of Population) 2008-2013 2,0 42,7 14,9 ...
Demographic Indicators
Population Grow th Rate   - Total (%) 2016 1,1 2,5 1,9 0,4
Population Grow th Rate   - Urban (%) 2016 1,3 3,6 2,9 0,8
Population < 15 y ears  (%) 2016 23,5 40,9 28,0 17,2
Population >= 65 y ears  (%) 2016 7,8 3,5 6,6 16,6
Dependency  Ratio (%) 2016 45,5 79,9 52,9 51,2
Sex  Ratio (per 100 female) 2016 97,6 100,2 103,0 97,6
Female Population 15-49 y ears (% of total population) 2016 27,0 24,0 25,7 22,8
Life Ex pectancy  at Birth - Total (y ears) 2016 75,2 61,5 66,2 79,4
Life Ex pectancy  at Birth - Female (y ears) 2016 77,6 63,0 68,0 82,4
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 2016 17,6 34,4 27,0 11,6
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 2016 6,6 9,1 7,9 9,1
Infant Mortality  Rate (per 1,000) 2015 12,1 52,2 35,2 5,8
Child Mortality  Rate (per 1,000) 2015 14,0 75,5 47,3 6,8
Total Fertility  Rate (per w oman) 2016 2,1 4,5 3,5 1,8
Maternal Mortality  Rate (per 100,000) 2015 62,0 495,0 238,0 10,0
Women Using Contraception (%) 2016 64,7 31,0 ... ...
Health & Nutrition Indicators
Phy sicians (per 100,000 people) 2004-2013 122,2 47,9 123,8 292,3
Nurses and midw iv es (per 100,000 people) 2004-2013 328,0 135,4 220,0 859,8
Births attended by  Trained Health Personnel (%) 2010-2015 98,6 53,2 68,5 ...
Access to Safe Water (% of Population) 2015 97,7 71,6 89,3 99,5
Healthy  life ex pectancy  at birth (y ears) 2013 66,7 54,0 57 68,0
Access to Sanitation (% of Population) 2015 91,6 39,4 61,2 99,4
Percent. of Adults (aged 15-49) Liv ing w ith HIV/AIDS 2014 0,1 3,8 ... ...
Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000) 2014 33,0 245,9 160,0 21,0
Child Immunization Against Tuberculosis (%) 2014 95,0 84,1 90,0 ...
Child Immunization Against Measles (%) 2014 98,0 76,0 83,5 93,7
Underw eight Children (% of children under 5 y ears) 2010-2014 2,3 18,1 16,2 1,1
Daily  Calorie Supply  per Capita 2011 3 362 2 621 2 335 3 503
Public Ex penditure on Health (as % of GDP) 2013 4,0 2,6 3,0 7,7
Education Indicators
 Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)
      Primary  School       -   Total 2010-2015 113,1 100,5 104,7 102,4
      Primary  School       -   Female 2010-2015 111,4 97,1 102,9 102,2
      Secondary  School  -   Total 2010-2015 87,6 50,9 57,8 105,3
      Secondary  School  -   Female 2010-2015 94,2 48,5 55,7 105,3
Primary  School Female Teaching Staff (% of Total) 2010-2015 59,3 47,6 50,6 82,2
Adult literacy  Rate - Total (%) 2010-2015 81,1 66,8 70,5 98,6
Adult literacy  Rate - Male (%) 2010-2015 89,7 74,3 77,3 98,9
Adult literacy  Rate - Female (%) 2010-2015 72,8 59,4 64,0 98,4
Percentage of GDP Spent on Education 2010-2014 6,2 5,0 4,2 4,8
Environmental  Indicators
Land Use (Arable Land as % of Total Land Area) 2013 18,4 8,6 11,9 9,4
Agricultural Land (as % of land area) 2013 64,0 43,2 43,4 30,0
Forest (As % of Land Area) 2013 6,6 23,3 28,0 34,5
Per Capita CO2 Emissions (metric tons) 2012 1,9 1,1 3,0 11,6
Sources  :  AfDB Statistics Department Databases;  World Bank: World Development Indicators; last update :
UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO, UNICEF, UNDP; Country Reports.
Note  :    n.a. : Not  Applicable ;  … : Data Not Available. * Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+)
** Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) 
COMPARATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Tunisia
August 2016
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Annex 19 - Tunisia : Data on the Bank Group’s Active Loan Portfolio (as at 1 March 2017) 
Dpt. Project Name Sector Source Approval Completion Approved 
Amount  
Total 
Disbursements 
Disbursement Rate 
(%) 
Age 
PESD NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION AND 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT 
Energy ADB 04/01/2015 12/31/2019 38,643,298.65 0.00 0 1.9 
PISD SOUTH TUNISIAN GAZ PIPELINE 
(ETAP/NAWARA) 
Energy ADB 06/26/2014 05/30/2016 55,500,876.91 55,500,876.91 10 2.7 
  TOTAL - ENERGY    
 
    94,144,175.56 55,500,876.91 59 1.9 
AHAI NORTH GAFSA INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
Agriculture ADB 02/13/2013 06/30/2019 17,303,027.93 3,874,256.51 22 4.1 
AHAI GABES INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT (IADP) II 
Agriculture ADB 11/26/2014 06/30/2020 16,158,360.07 3,712,758.56 23 2.3 
  TOTAL - AGRICULTURE   
 
    33,461,388.00 7,587,015.07 23% 3.2 
PISD IInd  LINE OF CREDIT TO THE BANQUE DE 
L'HABITAT (HOUSING BANK) 
Finance ADB 02/27/2002 02/28/2006 21,072,883.77 21,072,883.77 100 15.0 
PISD HOUSING BANK TUNISIA - LOC II Finance ADB 07/21/2003 03/31/2008 62,592,911.35 62,592,911.35 100 13.6 
PIFD TRADE FINANCE LINE FO CREDIT TO  BH  Finance ADB 10/19/2016   46,944,683.51 0.00 0.00 0.4 
PIFD FINANCIAL SECTOR MODERNIZATION 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
Finance ADB 07/13/2016 12/31/2017 209,686,253.03 209,686,253.03 100 0.7 
  TOTAL - FINANCE   
 
    340,296,731.66 293,352,048.15 86% N/A 
PICU ENFIDHA AIRPORT PROJECT Transport ADB 01/14/2009 03/31/2010 52,993,005.95 52,993,005.95 100 8.2 
PICU CONSTR.  GABES-RAS-JEDIR MOTORWAY 
LINK 
Transport ADB 06/21/2011 12/31/2017 107,456,380.56 40,859,522.61 38 5.7 
PICU ROAD PROJECT VI Transport ADB 9/15/2010 12/31/2017 186,015716.75 178,133694.86 96 6.5 
PICU ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION 
PROJECT (PMIR) 
Transport ADB 10/28/2015 12/31/2020 112,667,240.44 5,946,326.58 5,0 1.4 
PICU ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION 
PROJECT (PMIR) 
Transport AGTF 10/28/2015 12/31/2020 36,084,813.39 1,877,787.34 5,0 1.4 
  GRAND TOTAL - TRANSPORT   
 
    495,217157.1 
 
279,810,337.34 57% 3.8 
AHWS RURAL DWS PROGRAMME (RDWS) DWSS ADB 10/12/2011 12/31/2017 74,188,248.18 65,590,897.63 88 5.4 
AHWS RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLY 
PROGRAMME (Loan) 
DWSS ADB 09/06/2016 12/31/2021 96,784,289.18 0.00 00 0.5 
AHWS TREATED WASTEWATER QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 
DWSS ADB 01/11/2012 12/31/2017 25,389,249.67 7,741,490.46 0.30 5.2 
  GRAND TOTAL – WATER AND SANITATION   
 
    196,361,787.03 73,332,388.09 37% 3.7 
AHHD INCLUSIVE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME (PADRI) 
Social ADB 11/02/2016 12/31/2017 140,834,050.54 140,834,050.54 100 0.4 
  GRAND TOTAL - SOCIAL   
 
    140,834,050.54 140,834,050.54 100% 0.4 
  GRAND TOTAL – LOAN PORTFOLIO   
 
    1,300,315,289 850,416,716.1 65% 2.4 
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Annex 20 - Tunisia : Data on the Bank Group’s Active Grant Portfolio (as at 1 March 2017)) 
Dpt. Project Name Sector Source Approval Completion Approved 
Amount  
Total 
Disbursements 
Disbursement Rate 
(%) 
Age 
AHAI STUDY-RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AGRICULTURAL 
INSURANCE SYSTEM 
Agriculture  MIC/TAF 08/02/2016 12/31/2018 325,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.6 
AHAI PREPARATION OF ZAGHOUAN IADP AND 
IADP EVALUATION 
Agriculture  MIC/TAF 10/27/2014 02/28/2018 390,000.00 56,934.84 0.15 2.3 
  TOTAL - AGRICULTURE    
 
    715,000.00 56,934.84 8% 1.5 
PITD STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND 
SUPPORT TO GROWTH NICHES 
Industry and 
Mines 
MIC/TAF 08/14/2015 02/28/2018 798,310.00 0.00 0.00 1.5 
PITD PROJECT TO SUPPORT THE DESIGN OF AN 
INNOVATIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY  
Industry and 
Mines 
MIC/TAF 08/14/2015 09/30/2017 791,380.00 0.00 0.00 1.5 
  TOTAL – INDUSTRY AND MINES   
 
    1,589,690.00 0.00 0% 1.5 
PISD TUNISIA : INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT TO 
BFPME 
Finance FAPA 08/05/2013 12/31/2017 703,011.11 20,098.36 0.03 3.6 
  TOTAL – FINANCE   
 
    703,011.11 20,098.36 3% N/A 
PICU ROAD SAFETY STRATEGY STUDY Transport MIC/TAF 09/30/2013 12/31/2017 1,000,000.00 7,951.98 0.01 3.4 
PICU STUDY ON NATIONAL TRANSPORT MASTER 
PLAN TO 2030 
Transport MIC/TAF 07/14/2014 06/30/2018 800,000.00 90,391.46 0.11 2.6 
PICU ROAD INFRASTRACTURE MODERNIZATION 
PROJECT (PMIR) 
Transport MIC/TAF 10/28/2015 12/31/2020 1,200,000.00 0.00 0.00 1.3 
  TOTAL - TRANSPORT   
 
    3,000,000.00 98,343.44 3% 2.5 
AHWS RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLY 
PROGRAMME 
DWSS RWSSI 09/06/2016 12/31/2021 782,411.39 0.00 0.00 0.5 
AHWS PREPARATION OF THE TUNISIA WATER 
VISION AND STRATEGY 2050 
DWSS AWF 06/20/2016 12/31/2019 1,052,343.32 0.00 0.00 0.7 
  TOTAL – WATER AND SANITATION   
 
    1,834,754.71 0.00 0% 0.6 
ECGF STATISTICAL CAPACITY BUILDING 
PROGRAMME PHASE II (SCB II) 
Multisector MIC/TAF 03/30/2011 12/31/2014 244,679.43 244,679.43 100 5.9 
ECGF PROJECT TO SUPPORT 
OPERATIONALISATION OF THE PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT REFORM ACTION PLAN 
Multisector  MIC/TAF 12/27/2013 12/31/2017 530,100.00 219,454.52 0.41 3.2 
PICU OPERATIONALISING PPPS IN TUNISIA (PPP 
ADVISORY) 
Multisector MIC/TAF 06/14/2013 06/30/2018 789,000.00 81,438.03 0.10 3.7 
  TOTAL - MULTISECTORS   
 
    1,563,779.43 545,571.98 35% 4.3 
AHHD HEALTH SERVICES EXPORT SUPPORT 
PROJECT 
Social MIC/TAF  06/03/2015 06/30/2018 296,373.00 0.00 0.00 1.7 
  TOTAL - SOCIAL   
 
    296,373.00 0.00 0% 1.7 
  TOTAL - GRANTS 
(MIC/TAF+AWF+RWSSI+FAPA) 
  
 
    9,702,608.25 720,948.62 7% 2.0 
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Annex 20 - Tunisia : Data on the Bank Group’s Active Grant Portfolio (as at 1 March 2017)) (cont.) 
Dpt. Project Name Sector Source Approval Completion Approved 
Amount  
Total 
Disbursemen
ts 
Disbursement 
Rate (%) Age 
RDGN SOUK-AT-TANMIA I Social TFT 17/12/2012 31/12/2017 647,000 540,501.40 83.5 4.2 
RDGN SOUK-AT-TANMIA II Social TFT 30/12/2015 31/12/2018 1,975,102 1,214,895.39 61.5 1.3 
RDGN SOUK-AT-TANMIA III Social TFT - 31/12/2019 1,169,180 93,849.62 8.0 N/A 
AHHD 
TUNISIA EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION 
SUPPORT PROHRAMME 
Social TFT 12/17/2012 31/12/208 66,000 59,661.73 90.40 4.2 
AHHD 
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION   
Social TFT 4/5/2013 31/12/2017 249,000 203,622.84 81.78 3.9 
RDGN PORTFOLIO IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT Multisector TFT 4/5/2013 31/12/2018 351,312 300,738.29 85.60 3.9 
AHHD 
STUDY ON MOBILITY OF LABOUR IN NORTH 
AFRICA 
Social TFT 4/5/2013 30/06/2018 120,000 20,148.98 16.79 3.9 
AHHD WORK READINESS PROJECT Social 
MENA 
TF 
- 28/02/2018 2,560,000 0.00 0.0  
RDGN OPERATIONALISATION OF PPP Multisector 
MENA 
TF 
2/20/2013 30/06/2018 1,500,000 48,611.41 3.24 4.1 
OSGE 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
SUPPORT 
Multisector 
MENA 
TF 
12/5/2013 30/06/2018 2,943,900 550,360. 18.69 3.3 
RDGN 
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND 
GROWTH  
Multisector 
MENA 
TF 
06/11/2014 30/08/2017 2,298,900 0.00 0.00 2.8 
RDGN 
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
REFORMS  
Multisector 
MENA 
TF 
30/05/2016 30/06/2019 4,607,859 0,00 0,00  
  TOTAL GRANT PROJECTS (TFT + MENA TF)        18,488,253.46 3,032,389.66 16%  
  GRAND TOTAL GRANTS        28,190,861.71 3,753,338.28 13%  
  TOTAL LOAN AND GRANT PORTFOLIO    1,328,506,152 854,170,054.4 64%  
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Annex 21 – 2016 Portfolio Performance Improvement Plan (PPIP) – Generic Problems 
PROJECT/PROBLEMS RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
RESPONSIBLE 
STRUCTURES 
TIMELINE 
OUTCOME MONITORING 
INDICATORS 
1. Audit/Reports 
Delay in the production and 
submission of audit reports to the 
Bank  
Ensure periodic planning and 
monitoring by the executing 
agencies of the preparation of 
periodic and annual project 
financial reports and coordination 
with the auditors to guarantee the 
preparation and  submission of 
audit reports within the stipulated 
timeframe,  
 
Improve the programming and 
conduct of audit missions by CGF 
taking into account the list 
communicated by the Bank of audit 
reports due each year.   
 
Ensure that MDCI, in collaboration 
with the Bank, monitors the 
submission of audit reports within 
the stipulated timeframes 
Executing Agencies and 
Oversight Ministries 
 
 
 
 
CGF/Ministry of 
Finance/MDICI/ADB 
30 June 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
30 June 2017 
 
 
The number of audit reports 
submitted within the deadlines for 
the country in general and by 
sector (target: 80%).   
 
 
Percentage of audit reports 
produced by CGF in relation to the 
audit reports due for the year under 
consideration and officially 
assigned to CGF (target: 100%) 
The audit performed by CGF does not 
meet the independence criteria 
applicable to financial statement audit 
missions provided for under the Code 
of Ethics of the International Ethics 
Standards Board for Accountants and 
of INTOSAI.   
Pursue dialogue with the public 
authorities in order to reach a 
consensus on the external auditing 
of projects financed by donors and 
provide the Court of Auditors with 
sufficient resources to perform this 
task 
ADB/MDCI/Court of 
Auditors/ Ministry of 
Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
End-2017 
 
 
 
Audit missions assigned to the 
Court of Auditors  
 
2. Submission of project activity reports 
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Irregular submission of activity 
reports. 
Systematize the submission of two 
(2) half-year project activity 
reports each year  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executing 
Agencies/Oversight 
Ministries/ MDCI 
Ongoing Compliance of executing agencies 
with the agreed timeframes for the 
preparation and submission of 
100% of half-year activity reports 
to AfDB. Quarterly water sector 
activity reports were submitted on 
31/01/2017 for PAQEE and 
14/02/2017 for PAEPR I. These 
concerned the 4th quarter of 2016 
(and due on 31/01/2017). 
3.  Poor performance  of technical assistance and some operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delays in commencement of 
operations 
 
 
   
Ensure signature and effectiveness 
for 1st disbursement as soon as 
possible. 
 
 
MDCI/ADB 
 
 
All new projects 
from 2017 
Letters of agreement are prepared 
within two weeks of TA approval 
and are immediately singed by 
both parties. 
From project start-up designate a 
single project preparation and 
implementation team. This will 
help to strengthen ownership and 
responsibility for achieving results 
MDCI and Institutions 
concerned 
 
From 2017 100% of technical assistance 
teams are implemented by the 
same tem that designed the project 
and apart from exceptional cases at 
least 90% of new operations 
comply with the implementation 
schedule 
Attach greater importance to the 
quality of consultants’ Terms of 
Reference (ToR) and achieve a 
balance between the allocated 
budget and ToR requirements 
 
MDCI and Institutions 
concerned/ADB 
 
From 2017 AfDB provides the Government 
with systematic support to ensure 
the quality of consultants’ ToR  
Ensure that launching missions are 
carried out for all new operations 
ADB/ MDCI and 
Institutions concerned 
From 2017 Launching mission carried out for 
each operation no later than two 
(2) months after its effectiveness 
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Large number and cumbersome 
nature of formalities required to 
implement lines of credit 
Eliminate non-productive 
requirements and provide support 
to institutions that are the direct 
beneficiaries of lines of credit in 
the areas of environmental 
procedures and assessment as well 
as reporting; 
 
In the case of lines of credit jointly 
financed with other development 
partners, see to the harmonization 
of procedures and mechanisms 
envisaged for their 
implementation. 
Executing Agencies 
/ADB/MDICI 
Ongoing The line of credit implementation 
rate rises significantly.  
Lack of harmonization of Bank’s 
rules and procedures for the 
procurement of goods and works with 
Tunisian regulations 
Recommend more flexible 
measures for the procurement of 
goods and services planned for 
operations 
 
 
HAICOP/ADB Improvement of 
implementation 
rate of projects 
whose 
disbursement rate 
is below 15% 
Only one ongoing project has 
disbursement rate below 15% after 
two years 
 
 
Programme activity implementation 
rates are slowed down by 
procurement procedure control 
systems 
Facilitate communications with 
expenditure controllers; 
Ensure the periodic upgrading of 
some controllers through training 
workshops in order to enhance 
efficiency. 
ADB/Executing 
Agencies/MDICI and 
Supreme Control Bodies 
Ongoing Expenditure commitment-related 
delays are reduced by 30% 
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Annex 22 
MATRIX OF ANSWERS TO CODE COMMENTS CONCERNING THE 2014-2016 ICSP COMPLETION REPORT AND 2016 
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
  COMMENTS ANSWERS 
1.  
Cumbersome disbursement procedure The cumbersome nature of procurement procedures chiefly concerns the grant portfolio. It is to a great extent 
linked to the weak capacity of executing agencies responsible for grants and the confusion, if not, 
overlapping between the rules of the Bank and those of the country. To resolve this, the Bank’s procurement 
experts, assisted by a consultant provided immense support to the portfolio’s technical assistance operations 
by providing them with specific support. Thus, as mentioned in the 2015 Portfolio Performance Review: 
‘’considerable progress has been made towards reducing the time taken to recruit consultants and 
contractors for technical assistance operations and studies due to the sustained support provided by the 
Bank’s procurement experts. Lead times were therefore reduced from sixteen (16) months in 2013 to eight 
(8) months in 2015. The Bank and Government are pursuing their efforts to reduce them further, in 
particular in the case of technical assistance operations and studies where performance must be improved’’. 
It is also worth noting that, pursuant to the Bank’s new procurement policy, provided certain conditions are 
met, the national system may be used in certain projects as well as for grants financed under the Middle 
Income Country Technical Assistance Fund (MIC/TAF). A Bank Country Procurement Assessment of the 
Tunisian system was carried out in consultation with the High Authority for Public Procurement (HAICOP) 
and the report is currently being finalized. On the basis of the initial elements of the assessment, a first 
project approved in the last quarter of 2016 (PAEPR II) has already benefited from this modality.  
2.  
Constraint linked to the clearing of rights-of-way in road 
infrastructure projects 
The problem concerning the vacation of rights-of-way linked to the implementation of infrastructure projects 
arose after the 2011 Revolution. Under the former regime, there were very limited opportunities for owners 
to refuse expropriation by central government or challenge the central government’s price for the purchase 
of expropriated land.  The 2011 Revolution and gradual spread of judicial control have changed the 
established order. Owners who had accepted a price they considered too low before 14 January 2011 have 
decided to challenge it before the courts. After 14 January, it became common practice to increase land 
prices.  
Since the court action has a suspensory effect, many road infrastructure projects implemented with external 
financing have been frozen47 until an amicable solution can be found resulting, in most cases, in higher 
prices being paid to landowners. Aware of the negative impact of this situation de on public expenditure 
performance, the Government has undertaken to draft a Bill that will improve control over the clearing of 
rights-of-way and prevent legal action taken from penalizing the implementation of public works. To that 
end, on 11 July 2016 the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) enacted Law 2016-53 relating 
                                                          
47 This was the case of the Ras-Jdir motorway construction project (age: 5.8 years) cofinanced by the Bank and which has been suspended many times since it was 
launched. 
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  COMMENTS ANSWERS 
to expropriation in the public interest48 which limits claims by landowners by stipulating that the filing of 
an appeal shall not affect the implementation of public works. The law thus provides for the depositing by 
the State of provisional compensation that the expropriated person may choose to challenge. However, such 
a challenge cannot call into question either the appropriateness or implementation rate of the works linked 
to the expropriation. From a legal standpoint this represents a major step forward. However, the law’s 
implementing decrees have not yet been published.  
3.  
Law on PPP The subject of PPP has become a key issue since the Revolution. The establishment of PPP is a way of 
circumventing the severe budget constraint that has existed since 2011 and the stagnation of resources 
allocated to public investment. However, this is an area which remains highly controversial in Tunisian 
society. Since the 1960s, the Tunisian economic model has been built on the basis of a strong central 
government presence in the economy and many sectors remain under the control of public enterprises49 
which enjoy monopoly positions.  The implementation of public investment programmes based on a 
partnership with the private sector is an innovation in the Tunisian economic landscape and has been the 
subject of considerable reticence shown by the oversight administrations and public enterprises as well as 
political parties.  
This reticence is the reason for the slow development of the law that has governed the development of PPP 
in Tunisia since 2011. However, following over three years of discussions and revisions, the ARP on 27 
November 2015 enacted a law on partnership contracts (Law 2015-49 of 27/11/2015) (i.e. PPP). It should 
be noted that this law applies to all PPP projects except for local government to which it is expected to be 
applicable after the forthcoming local elections. This law concerning PPP complements the 2008 Law on 
concessions. The implementing decrees for this Law were adopted in June 2016.  It should be pointed 
out that the 2016-2020 Strategic Development Plan (SDP), which includes one investment programme of 
120 billion dinars out of five (5) estimates that 60% of that programme will be financed in the form of PPP.  
 
 
i Source : Mini stère de l’énergie.  
ii Le code fiscal et le code des investissements dis tinguen t les entreprises totalement exportatrices (ETE) et lautres que to talement exportatrices (EATE).  
                                                          
48  Article 14 of the Law stipulates that a National Commission presided over by the Ministry responsible for State Land shall determine the financial value of buildings required for the implementation 
of public projects as well as the modalities for its revision and updating.  
 
49  In addition to the banking sector, the main public monopolies concern the air transport sector (TUNISAIR), port handling (STAM), electricity (STEG) and water (SONEDE). Only the telecoms sector 
has been partly liberalized including the 35% privatization of the capital of TUNISIE TELECOM, the legacy operator in 2006 and opening up of the sector to competition.  This privatization did, 
however, create a strong social movement.  
                                                          
